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James [sak6j] Youngblood Mrkmaw Tenure in
Henderson* Atlantic Canada
The Supreme Court of Canada has characterized aboriginal title to land as a sui
generis legal interest. This essay describes the sui generis interest of Mikmaw
tenure in Atlantic Canada from a Mikmaq linguistic perspective. The author
argues the prerogative treaties and legislation of the eighteenth century suggest
it is a reserved and protected tenure, which in Eurocentric law might be
reconceptualized as allodial tenure.
Introduction
With the proclamation by the Queen of the Constitution Act, 1982,1 the
post-colonial era began in Canadian law. Section 35(1) of the Act
"recognized and affirmed" existing Aboriginal and treaty rights, thus
restoring Canada's jurisgenesis and the original and hidden constitution
of Canada.2 Aboriginal and treaty issues dominate the birth of the Atlantic
Provinces, the birth and expansion of Confederation across the continent,
and were renewed in 1982. Aboriginal and treaty rights remain some of
the oldest sources of constitutional law in modern Canada.
Very few legal and political issues have lasted so long in Canada as
Aboriginal and treaty rights. They have been entrenched in each legal
order, have undergone so many policies and cycles, but they appear
unresolved or unsolvable. Continually, the colonial governments, colo-
nial courts and the legal profession have tried to draw meaning from
Aboriginal rights and the prerogative Treaties of another legal era and
another legal realm to create justice. But justice has been elusive because
seldom have the colonial participants understood the legal context of
Aboriginal and treaty rights or the ramifications of these rights.
The purpose of this essay is to examine the effect of post-colonial order
on the Aboriginal land rights of the Crown's oldest ally in Canada, the
Mflkmaw Nation of Atlantic Canada. In examining this issue, I will
identify three predicaments of British colonial law which will be briefly
explored. Next, I will examine the Aboriginal vision of land and Mkmaw
langscape and law to establish an Aboriginal sui generis context. I will
then examine the intersection of these two contexts in the prerogative
1. 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), c. 11.
2. B. Slattery, "The Hidden Constitution of Canada: Aboriginal Rights in Canada" (1984)
32 Am. J. Comp. L. 364; and "The Constitutional Guarantee of Aboriginal Rights" (1983)
8 Queen's L.J. 23ff.
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treaties in Atlantic Canada to restate the meaning of the reserved sui
generis Mfkmaw tenure. My thesis will be that Mfkmaw tenure can be
best characterized as "allodial tenure" and the treaties recognizing and
affirming this aboriginal tenure as part of the first constitutional order of
Canada continue as an integral and permanent part of the new constitu-
tional order of Canada.
I. British Colonial Law Predicaments
The colonial writer does not have words of his [sic] own. Is it not possible
that he projects his own condition of voicelessness into whatever he
creates? [T]hat he articulates his own powerlessness, in the face of alien
words, by seeking out fresh tales of victims? [T]he language was drenched
without non-belonging.., words had become our enemy.
Dennis Lee3
The basic constitutional framework of colonial law is concerned with the
relations between Great Britain and its colonies.4 Often this colonial frame-
work and the resulting body of common law principles are applied to
Aboriginal title.' This approach ignores the distinct branch of prerogative
Treaties and Legislation that developed in British law concerning Aboriginal
nations and the Crown. Until the enactment of section 35(1) of the Consti-
tution Act, 1982,6 these issues were viewed as merely interesting legal
history. Now the existing Aboriginal rights and treaties are part of the
supreme law of Canada. The Supreme Court has affirmed that
[T]he context of 1982 is surely enough to tell us that this is not just a
codification of the case law on Aboriginal rights that had accumulated by
1982. Section 35 calls for just settlement for Aboriginal peoples. It
renounces the old rules of the game under which the Crown established
courts of law and denied those courts the authority to question sovereign
claims made by the Crown.7
3. "Cadence, country, silence: writing in colonial space" (1974) 3 Boundary 2 No. 311
at 162, 63.
4. See e.g. K. Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law (London: Stevens, 1966); and
C. Clark, A Summary of Colonial Law (London: Sweet, 1834).
5. See Calder v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1973] S.C.R. 313; Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd.
(1971), 17 F.L.P. 141 at 208 (Aust. N.T.S.C.); R. v. St. Catharines Milling and Lumber Co.,
[1887] 13 S.C.R. 577 at 610, (1888), 14 A.C. 46,4 Cart. 107 (P.C.) [hereinafter St. Catharines
Milling cited to A.C.]; R. v. Symonds (1847), [1840-1932] N.Z.P.C.C. 387 at 388-93
(N.Z.S.C.); Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (1832); and Johnson and Graham's Lessee v.
M'Intosh, 8 Wheaton 543 at 573-88 (1823); Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Crarich 87 at 142-43 (1810);
Jackson v. Wood, 7 Johnson's Reports 290 at 295 (1810); Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut,
infra, notes 193-94 and text.
6. Supra note 1.
7. R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at 1106, 3 C.N.L.R. 178 [hereinafter Sparrow cited
to S.C.R.]. The Court was quoting from Professor Noel Lyon's article, "An Essay on
Constitutional Interpretation" (1988) 26 Osgoode Hall L.J. 95 at 100.
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This creates a predicament for constitutional interpretation that must be
briefly explored.
Legal history is a difficult domain. Historians and lawyers view the
past from different perspectives. Typically, legal history is viewed by
historians as a branch of social history. Lawyers have little interest in
legal history; their interest is in judicial thinking. Often, both judges and
lawyers think of legal history as modem law read backward-precedent.
In this presentist process there is a loss of comprehension about how the
law is interwoven and connected to non-law. To simply assume that
modem legal concepts have always existed is a particularly efficient way
of enforcing a singular modem view of law.
Tracing the relationship between Aboriginal tenure and the British
Sovereign through modem law and colonial legal history is a task of
linguistics, history, and law. It is very difficult to conceptualize the
historical consciousness of the treaty making era in Atlantic Canada.
Seldom did the participants state their worldview, consciousness or
concepts in which their lives were constructed and the treaties formulated.
In attempting to understand legal relations between the Mifkmaw
Nation,8 the Imperial Crown and the colonists in the eighteenth century,
we are continually confronted with three different legal consciousnesses,
which are often incompatible. The consciousness of the treaty makers,
Imperial Crown and the Sant6 Mawfomi of Mflkmaq, were constructed on
distinct worldviews and linguistic traditions. Each worldview defined a
distinct relationship between culture and environment that compre-
hended two dualities of place and time.9 One cannot construct the distinct
consciousness and order of each worldview with encyclopedias or
dictionaries with which the two societies never provided us. Equally
difficult is our understanding of nonnarrative sources of the era, since the
primary materials of this essay were not constructed from a modem
Eurocentric conception of rights and property. The nonnarrative sources
signify another view, often inconsistent with modem concepts. Conse-
quently, modem lawyers must not attempt to read into the aboriginal and
8. There are many different spellings for the Mikmaq. I use the Doug Smith-Bernie Francis
system that is the official phonemic orthography of the Sant6 Mawiomi (Grand Council) of the
Mfkmaq. It is different from the English orthography. It is comprised of a, i, e, 6, i, f, Y,j, k, 1,
m, n, o, 6, p, q, s, t, u, t6, w. See M.A. Battiste, An Historical Investigation of the Social and
Cultural Consequences of Micmac Literacy (Ph.D. Thesis, Stanford University, 1983) at 162.
Mfkmaq is plural and Mfkmaw is singular. Its derivation is uncertain; it was either "our kin"
or "allied people", or "people of the red earth" depending on how it was pronounced. Some of
the other spelling variations are Micmacs, Mickmakis, Migemaq, Mic Mac, Mikmakiques,
Migmagi, Micque Macque. In colonial literature they were also labeled as Abenakis, Eastern
Indians, Tarrantines, Acadians, Gaspesians, Toudamand, Cape Sable Indians, Souriquois.
9. See L. Littlebear, "Concept of Native Title" (1982) Can. Leg. Aid Bulletin 99.
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treaty eras the refinements and conventions of the present, or the oppres-
sion of the colonial era.
Two modem constraints obstruct our understanding of Mfkmaq tenure
in Atlantic Canada. They are the legal fiction of original title of tenure of
the Crown and the legacy of the colonial langscape in Canadian law. If we
look at the treaty formation process through either of these legal catego-
ries, we are likely to be misled.1 These modem conventions tell us little
about what was on the minds of the Crown and Sant6 Mawfomi, since
they were constructed after this era.1'
1. Original Title of the Crown in England
At the time of the seminal Wabanaki and treaty conferences (1660-
1725), no comprehensive or dominant European idea of property existed
explaining how to organize people on the land. There were many
competing ideas, all derived from a hierarchy, either ecclesiastical or
aristocratic. European ideas of property begin and are tangled with Judeo-
Christian religion 12 that describes God's relations to humans and the
earth 3 and is later transformed into civil law of the Continent derived
from Roman law and aristocratic feudalism, and a unique British com-
mon law.
At the beginning of the treaty era in Atlantic Canada, the Peace of
Wesphalia in 1648 had ended the authority of the Holy See and created
an international order on defined territorial units.I4 A number of interna-
tional law theories were developed to explain the relationship between
10. H.L.A. Hart, "Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence" (1954) 70 L.Q. Rev. 21.
11. After the Wabanaki and Mikmaw treaties, in the nineteenth century, Sir Henry Maine
asserted that legal consciousness found the idea of property existing in the human conscious-
ness and evolutionary order, see F. Pollock, ed., 10th ed., Ancient Laws 1861 (London: John
Murray 1906) at 306, while the English utilitarian philosophers rejected any divine, natural or
evolutionary theory and assert that positive law created property: J. Bentham, "Of Property"
in J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart, eds., The Theory of Legislation, Introduction to Principles of
Moral and Legislation (London: Athlone Press 1864) at 111. Also in modem law, protecting
the artifact of property came to be understood as a basic purpose of all Governments. These
representative ideal types of state-imposed property systems are common property, collective
property, and private property. All these systems, however, combine the characteristic of these
ideal types. None of these ideal types existed at the time of the Mfllmaq treaties in English
thought.
12. For the ecclesiastical ideas, see M. Stogre, That the WorldMay Believe: The Development
of Papal Social Thought on Aboriginal Rights (Sherbrooke, Que.: Editions Paulines, 1992).
13. H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Libri Tres, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925) at
186.
14. M. Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa, International Legal Issues (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1986) at 1-6.
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the territory and the monarchies. 15 In England, the debate concerning
property and government revolved around the ideas that the Crown
inherited land from God through Adam, and John Locke's belief that a
right to possess property was more a fundamental human right to be
protected by the Crown. In Patriarcha, 16 Robert Filmer argued that God
gave the world and its services not to all men but to Adam and his line by
natural inheritance. It was a grant of absolute dominion and exclusive
control over other humans and resources. God's grant was the beginning
of absolute regal power and aristocratic society. The authority of the
Stuart monarchs in England, Filmer suggested, can be traced back to the
Adamite line, thus justifying the Crown's tenure. 7 Locke argued that
neither reason nor revelation indicates that any man had been favoured
with authority from God over his fellow humans. Any person's uses or
labours on the land were limitations on the Crown's authority over the
land and people.' 8 His work transformed the divine right of Crown into
historical entitlement of natural rights to land acquired by various
individuals outside of civil society but protected by the Crown. Interest-
ingly, neither of these authors argued the English common law's version
of the original title in the Crown.
However, toward the conclusion of Mfkmaw treaties (1760-1779),
entitlement to land in England was viewed as an exclusive despotic
dominion.' 9 Sir William Blackstone, for example, asserted "[t]he grand
15. Ibid. at 13-16.
16. P. Laslett, ed., Patriarcha and other Political Works of Sir Robert Filmer (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1949) at 1-48. Filmer's treatise, written between 1638 and 1652, was originally
published in 1648. It was reprinted in 1652, 1653, 1678, 1680. Locke is said to have read the
1680 collection. In international law it is called the patrimonial theory, based on feudal ideas
of land tenure that regarded territory as a piece of private property pertaining to the ruler.
17. When the Whigs' attempted to exclude James, Duke of York, the son of King Charles II,
from accession to the throne of England in 1679-1681 on the basis of popery and arbitrary
government, the Tory defense was based on Filmer's treatises on Divine Right and passive
obedience to hereditary succession, even if this entailed a Roman Catholic monarch. P. Laslett,
ed., Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) at 48
(originally published in 1689).
18. Ibid. "The Supreme Power," he wrote "cannot take from any Man any part of his Property
without his own consent ... [I]t is a mistake to think, that the Supreme of Legislative Power
of any Commonwealth, can do what it will, and dispose of the Estate of the Subject arbitrarily,
or take any part of them at pleasure" (at II at 138.4). His arguments were extended to Chief
Justice Coke's protective rationale of existing property rights in Calvin's Case (1608), 7 Co.
Rep. la, 77 E.R. 377 to respect all existing property rights in England.
19. W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765-
69) at vol. 2 "Of the Rights of Things", and Chap. 1 "Of Property in general": "There is nothing
which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affection of mankind, as the right
of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe."
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and fundamental maxim of all [English] feudal tenure is this, that all lands
were originally granted out by the sovereign, and are therefore holden,
either mediately or immediately, of the Crown."2" Moreover, in the law
of England there is no proper alluvium, or land, not held of the King; and
no subject can have more than the usufruct oT beneficial enjoyment of the
land he occupies.2' The Crown's original dominion was a collective
tenure, not a system of private rights.
In English law, the original title of the Crown is the fundamental
starting point for every subdivision of property rights. This maxim asserts
that every claimant to an interest in land in England and Canada must
show an estate derived from the Crown. All estates must be evidenced by
either a direct royal grant or indirectly though the Crown grantee's. These
Crown derivative grants must be registered, and are viewed as the
fundamental evidence of legitimate historical entitlement to land.22
While a grand and fundamental maxim, the Crown's original domin-
ion is a fiction of English law that has no foundation in reality or truth.
23
As Professor McNeil has explained:
As for the doctrine of tenures, its effect in this context is to give the Crown
a paramount lordship over lands held by subjects. The fiction of original
Crown ownership and grants was invented to explain how these feudal
relations arose. That is the fiction's purpose, and this is the extent of its
application. The doctrine of tenures, thought capable at common law of
giving the Crown a title to land in the event an estate held of it expires,
cannot be used otherwise to claim lands which subjects possess.24
This fiction had no independent authority in the Law of Nations or
Aboriginal America. Domestic legal fictions should not be applied to
foreign lands. These fictions are not a proxy for actual foreign consent.
The only valid limitations on foreign tenure were those imposed through
a manifestation of its consent according to the traditions or rules of its
society.
The extension of the English fiction to Aboriginal tenures in North
America, and now Canada, is an effect of colonial langscape and
Eurocentric legal thought. For example, as recently as 1990 a unanimous
Supreme Court of Canada in Sparrow, stated "there was from the outset
never any doubt that sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed the
20. Ibid. at vol. 2, 415.
21. Ibid. at vol. 2,51-60; vol. 4,418.
22. D. Baker, Megarry's Manual of the Law of Real Property, 5th ed., (London: Stevens &
Sons, 1975) at 9-14 and 513-19.
23. Blackstone, supra note 19 at vol. 2, 51; J. Allen, Inquiry into the Rise and Growth of the
Royal Prerogative in England (London: 1849, reprint New York: Burt Franklin) at 125-55.
24. Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) at 107.
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underlying title, to such [Aboriginal] lands vested in the Crown. 2 5 This
statement is a classic colonial and Anglocentric assumption, a legal
prejudice born of the colonial context.2 6 This shibboleth constructs an
irrebutable and irrefutable presumption on the shaky foundation of a legal
fiction.27 In post-colonial law such an irrebutable presumption of colonial
law continues to obstruct the processes of truth. There were, and remain,
many doubts among Aboriginal people, foreign nations, and legal schol-
ars about the validity of assertions of Crown sovereignty and title in the
colonization process. These doubts should not be dismissed by the courts
in favour of a colonial nostalgia pretending to be law. The honour of the
Crown, by its own prerogative legislation (the Royal Proclamation of
1763) requires proof of an equitable and honest purchase of lands from
Aboriginal nations. The post-colonial order is so new in Canada that
colonial law once accepted by everyone requires explanation and justifi-
cation. The validity of the fictitious title of the Crown has vanished in
Canada. So too has the colonial context.
2. Colonial Context
In the colonial context of Canada, language and its relationship to place
has been a complex problem. This dilemma remains a barrier to under-
standing and constructing the legal context of aboriginal rights, old
treaties and colonial laws. While most Canadian lawyers are familiar,
perhaps too familiar, with the fictitious title of the Crown, most are
unaware of its limitation. As illustrated above, this unreflective familiar-
ity is particularly significant when they have to give contemporary
content to old laws or to understand the context of Aboriginal tenure in
British Law.
Any construction of Mlkmaq tenure in British law must confront the
unique predicament of the colonial context-the langscape of property.
Property becomes landscape when it is seen, and langscape when it
reveals human attitudes and perceptions in languages orpaysage intirieur
(the landscape of the mind). This constant tension between landscape and
langscape has dominated Canadian writing and judicial decisions.
25. Sparrow, supra note 7 at 1103. As demonstrated below, Mtkmaq tenure is reserved in
Treaties and the Royal Proclamation of 1763, thus it is different from other Aboriginal title,
for example in British Columbia.
26. See R. v. Simon, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387, [1986] 1 C.N.L.R. 153 and Lambert and Hutcheon
JJ.A. dissents in Delgamuukw v. B.C., [1991] 3 W.W.R. 97, [1991] 5 C.N.L.R. 1, [1993] 5
C.N.L.R. 1 at 218-37, and 262-65.
27. The assertion that the Crown was or is the exclusive owner of land tenure in the Island
of England had deep conceptual problems. K. McNeil, supra note 24 at 82-83.
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The most widely shared manifestation of this tension in the Canadian
consciousness is the alienating discontinuity in the colonist's mind
between the experience of place and the language available to describe it.
This fracture is a classic and all-pervasive feature of colonial writing. The
common literary themes showing the discontinuity between language
and place were: the problems of exile, of finding and defining home;
physical and emotional confrontations with the new land and its ancient
Aboriginal meanings; and the formation of racial and oppressive politics
and law.
28
Another related theme was ignoring and denying nature or the ecosys-
tem. Colonial writers and artists in Canada have viewed the landscape as
negative in their wilderness and civilization dichotomy called the wacousta
syndrome.29 Canadian society has incorporated this negative view into
moral and legal co-ordinates of savage and human, colonized and
colonists. This gothic vision of the Aboriginal landscape and its inhabit-
ants was viewed as either an unconsciousness or chaos or a kind of
existence that is cruel and meaningless.30 These views reflected the terror
of the colonizer's transplanted soul. Also these views have created a
pervasive anxiety about recovery of an effective relationship between
self and place and cognitive authenticity. Likewise, this anxiety has
created a national and personal crisis of identity. Those who are unaf-
fected with dislocation and place either view the new land as an object to
be exploited or have had their sense of self eroded by dislocation or
destroyed by cultural denigration.
These themes manifest themselves in literature as an unquestioning
belief in the adequacy or superiority of the imported language and
civilization. This created a "double vision" where identity is constituted
by a strategy of differences.31 The haunting distinction is between the
authentic experience of the real world and the inauthentic experience of
the ideological contexts. It is the polarity of opposites: homeland and
28. See D.E.S. Maxwell, "Landscape and Theme" in J. Press, ed., Commonwealth Literature
(London: Heineman, 1965) at 82-99.
29. G. McGregor, The Wacousta Syndrome: Exploration in the Canadian Langscape
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).
30. W.H. New, Among Worlds: An Introduction to Modern Commonwealth and South
African Fiction (Erin, Ont.: Press Porcepic, 1975); N. Fry, The Bush Garden: Essays on the
Canadian Imagination (Toronto: Anansi, 1971) at 141-42; M. Atwood, Survival: A Thematic
Guide to Canadian Literature (Toronto: Anansi, 1972) [hereinafter Survival]; M. Kline,
Beyond the Land Itself: Views of Nature in Canada and United States (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1970).
31. See A. Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized (New York: Orion Press, 1965); J.M.
Blaut, The Colonizer's Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric
History (N.Y.: Guilford Press, 1993).
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colony, Europe and New World, metropolitan and provincial, order and
disorder, authenticity and inauthenticity, reality and imaginary, power
and impotence, even being and nothingness. No effective linguistic
accommodations of the colonial experience exist for expressing these
differences in a positive and creative way. These themes and patterns are
not accidental. They inform a psychic and historical condition of colonial
law and the construction of eurocentrism.32 Eurocentrism became and
remains an intellectual paradigm about the superiority of Europeans and
their ideals and institutions over other people.33
The problem of an imported language and the "alien" Aboriginal
landscape has been characterized as a pervasive conflict in Canadian
writing. Dennis Lee and Robert Kroetsch wrote that the problem was a
mismatch between language and landscape.34 The North American
landscape has been and is the wrong historical, cultural and physical
environment for English literature. Their colonial minds searched for a
comforting reality, a search initiated by the gap between its worldview
and the land.
The gap between language and landscape, to Lee and Kroetsch, was
the perceived "inauthenticity" of the spoken European language to a
colonial and Aboriginal space. Robert Kroetsch writes:
At one time I considered it to be the task of the Canadian writer to give
names to his experience, to be the namer. I now suspect, that, on the
contrary, it is his task to un-name ... the Canadian writer's particular
predicament is that he works with a language within a literature, that
appears to be his own .... But... there is in the Canadian word a concealed
other experience, sometimes British, sometimes American."
Canadians, in Lee's terms, do not have their own language but are
forced to use the languages of others. The colonial imagination drives
Canadians to continually recreate the experience of writing with their
non-belonging to the land, to experience writing in a colonial space. The
32. As to Eurocentrism construction in literature see B. Ashcroff, G. Griffiths & H. Tiffin,
The Empire Writes Back: Theory andPractice in Post-Colonial Literatures (London: Rutledge,
1989); I. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1990); I. Adam & 14. Tiffin, Past the Last Post: Theorizing Post-Colonialism and Post-
Modernism (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1990). See the critical legal theorist
deconstructing the false opposite in modem law, D. Kennedy, "A Semiotics of Legal
Argument" (1991) 42 Syracuse L. Rev. 75; J. Lyotard, The Post-Modern Condition: A Report
on Knowledge (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984).
33. See S. Amin, Eurocentrism (N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1988).
34. Supra note 3, and R. Kroetsch, "Unhiding the hidden: recent Canadian fiction" (1974) 3
J. Can. Fiction 43.
35. Ibid.
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problem of inauthenticity and its ultimate insolubility, Lee argued,
generates the Canadian obsession with being a victim.36
The first necessity of the colonial writer, Lee argues, is for the
imagination to come home. Yet, this is not possible for the colonial,
because the "words of home are silent." Lee writes,
Try to speak the words of your home and you will discover-if you are a
colonial-that you do not know them.... To speak unreflectingly in a
colony then, is to use words that speak only alien space. To reflect is to fall
silent, discovering that your authentic space does not have words. And to
reflect further is to recognize that you and your people do not in fact have
a privileged authentic space just waiting for words; you are, among other
things, the people who have made an alien inarticulacy of a native space
which may not exist. ... But perhaps-and here was the breakthrough-
perhaps ourjob was not to fake a space of our own and write it up, but rather
to find words for our space-lessness. Instead of pushing against the grain
of an external, uncharged language, perhaps we should finally come to
writing with the grain. 7
Lee also argued:
Beneath the words our absentee masters have given us, there is an
undermining silence. It saps our nerve. And beneath that silence, there is
a raw welter of cadence that tumbles and strains toward words and that
makes the silence a blessing because it shushes easy speech. That cadence
is home .... The impasse of writing that is problematic to itself is tran-
scended only when the impasse becomes its own subject, when writing
accepts and enters and names its own conditions as it is naming the world.38
Lee describes this experience of being "gagged" for authentic words,
while other writers unreflectively used inauthentic words.39 While avoid-
ing an untenable nationalist position, Lee partially answers the problems
of the transplanted and transported post-colonial landscape by suggesting
that the typical alien consciousness dreamed up the land to fill the crisis
of emptiness. 4° The colonizers created an architectonic "langscape" or
36. Ibid.; Also see, novelist Margaret Atwood's account of Canadian literature in Survival,
supra note 30.
37. Supra note 3 at 163.
38. Ibid. at 165ff.
39. Lee was not alone. E.g. D.H. Lawrence captures this sentiment when he states that
"America hurts, because the land has a powerful disintegrative influence upon the white
psyche. It is full of grinning unappeased Aboriginal demons, too, ghosts, and it persecutes the
white men.... America is tense with latent violence and resistance.... Yet one day the
demons of America must be placated, the ghosts must be appeased, the Spirit of Place atoned
for" (Quoted by J. Anaya, "Native Land Claims in the United States. The unatoned-for Spirit
of Place" (Winter 1994) Cultural Survival Quarterly 52).
40. Supra note 3 at 166.
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word world as an artifact, a syncretic vision of European language and
Aboriginal landscape.4'
3. Indian Title in Post-Colonial Law
Similar cognitive predicaments of colonial displacement have informed
the legal decisions on Indian title in British, American, and Canadian law.
Central to the common predicament is the fact that English land law
emerged from particular cultural myths and traditions. It was not con-
ceived as a universal concept and is alien to Aboriginal and civil law.
Moreover, behind the fictions and technicalities of English land law in
Canada are a hidden concept of monocentrism and deeply engrained
assumptions about language, epistemologies, and values.
The imperial expansion of an English land law to other continents has
radically destabilized its utility. By attempting to justify the taking of land
from indigenous peoples other than by consensual purchase, the colonialist
jurists pushed their own inherited fictions, assumptions, and traditions to
their limits. Doctrines of sovereign immunity and jurisdiction serviced
the fictions and silenced indigenous resistance. 42 When this legal langscape
is questioned by the Aboriginal peoples, the British legal system became
jurispathic.
41
Colonial and Eurocentric contexts contaminated initial judicial at-
tempts to classify Aboriginal and treaty rights in Canadian law. Some of
these precedents have been challenged and are no longer valid." Most of
these precedents, however, remain active in Canadian law.
41. McGregor, supra note 29; K. Benterrak,Reading the Country: introduction toNomadology
(Freemantle, W.A.: Freemantle Arts Centre Press, 1984); L. Ricon, Vertical Man/Horizontal
World: Man and Landscape in Canadian Prairie Writing (Vancouver: University of B.C.
Press, 1973).
42. See The Indian Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 98, s. 141, as rep. S.C. 1951, c. 29. See generally, P.
Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3d ed., (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at 263-79, and
301-14.
43. See Delgamuukw, supra note 26. An exception to this rule is the dissenting opinion of
Justice Black of the United States Supreme Court inFPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, (1960)
362 U.S. 99 at 142. See also Guerin, infra at 54.; Hall J. in Calder, supra note 5 and Amodu
Tijani v. Southern Nigeria (1921) 2 A.C. 399 [hereinafter Amodu Tijani] when the Privy
Council stated "There is a tendency, operating at times, unconsciously, to render that [native]
title conceptually in terms which are appropriate only to systems which have grown up under
English law. But this tendency has to be held in check closely." (at 403).
44. The decolonization of Canadian law was initiated by Justice Hall of the Supreme Court
of Canada when he condemned the practice of invoking the savage/civilization dualism in
litigation in his opinion in Calder, supra note 5 at 346. Justice Hall suggested that the law must
re-examine its notions of Aboriginal society, its law, and its people in the face of more detailed
and sophisticated understandings. See also Simon, supra note 26.
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The current intersections of post modernism, critical theory, feminist
criticism, and post-cultural theory illuminate the need for dismantling
colonial thought, its strategy of hierarchical differentiation, and its law.
Contemporary jurists and lawyers continue to peel away the layers of
colonial law, and expose its bias that origiwates in their language and
worldview. The decolonization of Canadian law is best understood as a
struggle to limit governmental power and a search for equitable remedies.
In the legal process, power is the ability to annex, determine, and verify
partial truths as total truths.45 Colonial oppression, for example, was built
not only on control over law, life and property, but also control over
language and the means of communication. The crucial function of
English language as a medium of power and colonial law requires that
post-colonial law redefine itself by including Aboriginal law and language.
Like the colonial mentality and soul of Canada, the Constitution of
Canada is a complex instrument.46 The Constitution is a fragmented series
of documents surrounded by unwritten Aboriginal and English conven-
tions.4 7 It includes aboriginal and treaty rights forged in the prerogative
power in foreign jurisdiction, and the imported conventions and docu-
ments of the Imperial Parliament to the colonists under domestic jurisdic-
tions.45 While the colonizers may have called for a written constitution to
explain their ability to make and implement law and adjudicate disputes,
it was the Imperial Parliament which constituted the Constitution Act,
1867 and its subsequent amendments.
49
45. M. Foucaul,"The politcal funclion oi the ielecual" ( 19"11) 12 Rzal aplxiWoszph I ;
"Afterword: The Subject and Power" in H. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow, Micheal Foucault: Beyond
Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Brighton: Harvester, 1982).
46. Hogg, supra note 42 at 3-26.
47. Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Partners in Confederation: Aboriginal
Peoples, Self-Government and the Constitution (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1993) at 20-27
[hereinafter RCAP]. For a more complete description of aboriginal law as a recognized source
of law see discussion of Connolly v. Woolrich (1867) 11 L.C. Jur. 197 (Que. S.C.); aff'd (1869)
17 R.J.R.Q. 266 (Que. Q.B.); J. Borrows, "Constitutional Law from a First Nation Perspective:
Self-Government and the Royal Proclamation" (1994) 28 U.B.C. L. Rev. 1 at 2, 6, 7, and 41.
48. In Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85, 3 C.N.L.R. 46, Dickson C.J.
acknowledged the separation of the prerogative treaty order from provincial federalism. He
stated: "the Indians' relationship with the Crown or sovereign has never depended on the
particular representatives of the Crown involved. From the aboriginal perspective, any federal-
provincial divisions that the Crown has imposed on itself are interna lo Aself and do not alter
the basic structure of Sovereign-Indian relations. This is not to suggest that aboriginal peoples
are outside the sovereignty of the Crown, nor does it call into question the divisions of
jurisdiction in relation to aboriginal peoples in federal Canada" (at 83). See also J.Y.
Henderson, "Empowering Treaty Federalism" (1995) 58 Sask. L. Rev. 241; P.W. Hogg & M.E.
Turpel, "Implementing Aboriginal Self-Government: Constitutional and Jurisdictional Is-
sues" (1995) 74 Can. Bar Rev. 187.
49. (U.K.) 30 & 31 Vice. c. 3. See, Section 52(2) and Appendix B of Constitution Act, 1982.
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The Constitution Act, 1982 is the latest and controlling component of
the Canadian constitution." In the patriation of the constitution from
control by the United Kingdom Parliament, the First Ministers conceived
of a new Canadian society.5 Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 is
part of the latest constitutional amendments. It linked the old prerogative
regime protecting aboriginal and treaty rights with the parliamentary
regime or responsible government.52 Section 35(l) states, "[t]he existing
aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal people of Canada are hereby
recognized and affirmed",53 thus establishing the borderline between
colonial law and post-colonial law in Canada. As a part of the supreme
law of Canada, section 35(1) specifically directs and mandates recogni-
tion and affirmation of existing Aboriginal and treaty rights at every level
of Canadian society, creating new contexts for interpretation of govern-
mental responsibility and treaty rights in Canada. This section protects
ancient and customary relations to the land either as an Aboriginal right
or a vested treaty obligation.
In 1984, in Guerin, the Supreme Court of Canada took the first fragile
step in decolonizing the Anglo-Canadian law of property. It asserted that
the Crown had a legal duty to the First Nations in relation to their
aboriginal lands, which the majority called a fiduciary duty.54 While
addressing issues of Aboriginal title in relation to this duty, the Supreme
Court of Canada departed from existing legal precedents and pushed legal
theory and language through colonialist mental barriers. Thus, the post-
colonial legal context witnesses an analogous cognitive process in
50. As the last expression of the United Kingdom, Parliament under the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty has the power to make and unmake any law, whatever it is
controlling. See Hogg, supra note 42 at 301-14; RCAP, supra note 47 at 25-27.
51. Hogg, supra note 42 at 53-59. Its innovative features provided for a domestic amending
process and a Charter of Rights recognizing the supremacy of the rule of law which protects
the rights of its territorial residents, ibid. at 7-8.
52. R. v. Secretary of State, [1981] 4 C.N.L.R. 86 (C.A. Eng.); Manual v. England (A.G.),
[1982] 3 C.N.L.R. 13 (Ch.D. Eng.).
53. Section 35(2) provides that "aboriginal people of Canada" includes the Indian, Inuit and
Mftis people of Canada. Section 35(4) provides that "notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act, aboriginal and treaty rights referred to in subsection (1) are guaranteed equally to male
and female persons."
54. R. v. Guerin, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 at 358, [1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 120 [hereinafterGuerin cited
to S.C.R.]. A sui generis or unique fiduciary obligation in this case arose out of the Crown's
duty to protect and preserve a collective aboriginal interest in contemporary land surrendered
for lease by a Band to the federal government under section 18(1) of the Indian Act. The
particular duty was to follow the instructions of the Band governing the Crown's dealings with
third parties in relation to the Band's interest in the reserved Indian land. The obligation was
its roots in the sui generis nature of Aboriginal or Indian title, and the historic powers and
responsibility assumed by the Crown (ibid. at 376). The nature of the relationship involved
gave rise to the fiduciary duty, and the categories of fiduciary obligations, like those of
negligence, should not be considered closed (ibid. at 356).
Mikmaw Tenure in Atlantic Canada
understanding the Canadian landscape as has post-colonial Canadian
literature.
The Supreme Court decided that Aboriginal land title is sui generis.
Chief Justice Dickson for the majority55 analyzed "Indian title" in British
and Canadian colonial law56 and concluded
It appears to me that there is no real conflict between the cases which
characterize Indian title as a beneficial interest of some sort, and those
which characterize it a personal, usufructuary right. Any apparent incon-
sistency derives from the fact that in describing what constitutes a unique
interest in the land the courts have almost inevitably found themselves
applying a somewhat inappropriate terminology drawn from general
property law. There is a core of truth in the way that each of the two lines
of authority has described native title, but an appearance of conflict has
nonetheless arisen because in neither case is the categorization quite
accurate.
Indians have a legal right to occupy and possess certain lands, the ultimate
title to which is in the Crown. While their interest does not, strictly
speaking, amount to beneficial ownership, neither is its nature completely
exhausted by the concept of a personal right. It is true that the sui generis
interest which the Indians have in the land is personal in the sense that it
cannot be transferred to a grantee, but it is also true, as will presently
appear, that the interest gives rise upon surrender to a distinctive fiduciary
obligation on the part of the Crown to deal with land for the benefit of the
surrendering Indians. These two aspects of Indian title go together, since
the Crown's original purpose in declaring the Indians' interest to be
inalienable otherwise than to the Crown was to facilitate the Crown's
ability to represent the Indians in dealing with third parties. The nature of
the Indian's interest is therefore best characterized [in British law] by its
general inalienability, coupled with the fact that the Crown is under an
obligation to deal with the land on the Indians' behalf when the interest is
surrendered. Any description of Indian title which goes beyond these two
features is both unnecessary and potentially misleading.57
55. Ibid. at 376-82, Beetz, Chouinard and LamerJJ. concurring. Justice Estey found that the
Crown acted as the statutory agent of the Indian Band (tribal or community interest) in
arranging a lease of their reserved land with non-Indians (ibid. at 394). Justice Wilson, on
behalf of three members of the court, described the Crown's liability in terms of breach of a
trust. She felt that the surrender document created an express trust of the Crown in the involved
case (ibid. at 355). Madame Justice Wilson, further noted the Indian Act's provisions did not
create a fiduciary obligation in relation to reserves, but the Act "recognized the existence of
such an obligation" (ibid. at 356). Her Ladyship saw Indian title as a property or beneficial
interest sufficient to constitute a trust res or corpus.
56. Ibid. at 379-80. He discussed St. Catharines Milling, supra note 5; Star Chrome case
(Ont. Mining Co. v. Seybod), [1903] A.C. 73, aff g [1902] 32 S.C.R. 1; Amodu Tijani, supra
note 43 at 404; and Calder, supra note 5.
57. Ibid. at 382. This characterization does not take one much further than the Royal
Proclamation of 1763. See B. Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian People, As
Affected by the Crown'sAcquisition of their Territories (Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, 1979).
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Chief Justice Dickson's insight is more valuable than this analysis. His
insight disclosed the misleading colonial description of Indian title as
"beneficial use" or "personal usufructuary rights".58 These vague and
conflicting concepts have appropriated, silenced and marginalized Ab-
original conceptions of land,5 9 thereby enabling the courts to deny any
independent view of their homeland by Aboriginal peoples.' Instead,
Dickson C.J. stated the Indians' interest in land is an independent legal
interest in Canadian law, but distinct from Anglo-Canadian general
property law. 6' Moreover, he stated that this enforceable legal interest
was not a creature of either the legislative or executive branches of
government, therefore it is not a derivative title or estate under the Crown
58. Ibid. at 379-82. In St. Catharines Milling, the Privy Council began this tradition. Lord
Watson's opinion stated: "There was a great deal of learned discussion at the Bar with respect
to the precise quality of the Indian right, but their Lordships do not consider it necessary to
express any opinion upon the point. It appears to them to be sufficient for the purposes of this
case that there has been all along vested in the Crown a substantial and paramount estate,
underlying the Indian title, which became a plenum dominium whenever that title was
surrendered or otherwise extinguished" (supra note 5 at 55). E.g. Hamlet of Baker Lake v.
Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, [ 1979] 3 C.N.L.R. 17 at 62, [1980] 1
F.C. 518, (1980), 107 D.L.R. (3d) 513 (F.C.T.D.).
59. Chancellor Boyd, in his opinion in St. Catharines Milling (1885), 10 O.R. 196 at 206
(Ch.D. Eng.) [hereinafter St. Catharines (Ch.D.)] gave the classic Eurocentric position.
Despite the fact that there was a treaty cession of land to the Crown which created the conflict
between the federal and provincial governments, Boyd, C. stated "Indian peoples were found
scattered wide-cast over the continent, having, as a characteristic, no fixed abodes, but moving
as the exigencies of living demanded. As heathens and barbarians it was not thought that they
had any proprietary title to the soil, nor any such claims thereto as to interfere with the
plantations, and the general prosecution of colonization. They were treated 'justly and
graciously' as Lord Bacon advised, but no legal ownership of land was ever attributed to them."
Colonialism was an issue of power, disguised as law.
60. Chancellor Boyd noted that Marshall C.J. in M'intosh, supra note 5 stated "All our
[English] institutions recognize the absolute title of the Crown, subject only to the Indian right
of occupancy, and recognize the absolute title of the Crown to extinguish that right." Boyd
concluded, "This right to occupancy attached to the Indians in their tribal character. They were
incapacitated from transferring title to any stranger, though it was susceptible of being
extinguished. The exclusive power to procure its extinguishment was vested in the Crown, a
power which as a rule was exercised only on just and equitable terms. If this title was sought
to be acquired by others than the Crown, the attempted transfer passed nothing, and could
operate only as an extinguishment of the Indian right from the benefit of the title paramount."
(ibid. at 209) This is inconsistent with his notion that Aboriginal peoples lack any proprietary
idea of title to the soil. No mention was made of Worcester v. Georgia, supra note 5 correcting
these colonial presumptions. Marshall C.J. wrote that upon discovery, the European colonizers
simply possessed "the exclusive right to purchase such lands as the native were willing to sale"
(ibid. at 545) and the constitutional nature of treaty cessions (ibid. at 557). See J.Y. Henderson,
"Unraveling the Riddle of Aboriginal Title" (1977) 5 Am. Indian L. Rev. 75 at 93-96.
61. Guerin, supra note 54 at 378 and 385. See B. Slattery, "The Legal Basis of Aboriginal
Title" in F. Cassidy, ed., Aboriginal Title in British Columbia: Delgamuukw v. the Queen
(Lantzville, B.C.: Oolichan Books, 1992) at 117-21 (argues for an intersocietal law of
aboriginal rights as the keystone of our common Constitution).
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or made by law of any government under its derived powers. 62 Dickson
C.J. described the legal right as derived from the Indians' historic
occupation and possession of their tribal lands.
63
Chief Justice Dickson rejected the colonial characterization of Indian
title as "a personal and usufructuary right" as unhelpful.r4 This under-
mines the entire judicial foundation of Aboriginal title in Canadian
jurisprudence that originates in the dissenting opinion of Strong J. in St.
Catharines Milling6 and developed by courts for over a century. In 1887,
Justice Strong's dissenting opinion had constructed the usufructuary
rights thesis on the idea that the relationship between the Crown and the
Indians was "analogous to the feudal relation of lord and tenant, or in
some aspect, to that one, so familiar to Roman law, where the right of
property is dismembered and divided between the proprietor and a
usufructuary., 66
However, it is important to note that Dickson C.J., in his rejection of
Indian title as "a personal and usufructuary right",61 failed to recognize
that the Privy Council had not used the concept of "title" to explain
Aboriginal landholding. Rather, Lord Watson stated that "the tenure of
the Indians [is] a personal and usufructuary right.
6
62. Ibid. at 377 and 379.
63. Ibid. at 335.
64. Ibid. at 381. In an Australian case, Mabo v. Queensland, [1992] 66 A.L.R.J. 408 at 489,
[1992] 5 C.N.L.R. 1, Mr. Justice Toohey also observed that "an inquiry as to whether it is
'personal' or 'proprietary' ultimately is fruitless and certainly is unnecessarily complex." As
applied to Aboriginal tenure or tifle, "personar is not used in opposition to a 'real right inland.
In Quebec (A.G.) v. Canada (A.G.), the Privy Council interpreted "personal" to mean that
Indian title was inalienable except to the Crown ((1920), [1921] 1 A.C. 401 at 410-11). This
is a restatement of the prerogative Doctrine of the Imperial Crown's pre-emption of Indian title
explicitly stated in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 (reprinted in R.S.C. 1970, App. 1.) and
Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.) 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3 and implicitly in section
109 of the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), Guerin, supra note 54 at 380. See also R. v. Smith,
[1983] 1 S.C.R. 554 at 569 (Indian title is inalienable to anyone, whether to an individual or
to the Crown).
65. Supra note 5.
66. Ibid. at 604. Strong's analogies, I will argue in the concluding section, are wrong. Under
the lure of feudal legal thought, Strong characterized the 1763 Proclamation as evidencing"...
the recognition by the Crown of a usufructuary title in the Indians to all unsurrendered land.
This title, though not perhaps susceptible of any accurate legal definition in exact legal terms,
was one which nevertheless sufficed to protect the Indian in the absolute use and enjoyment
of their lands, whilst at the same time they were incapacitated from making any valid alienation
otherwise than to the Crown itself, in whom the ultimate title was, in accordance with the
English law of real property, considered as vested" (ibid. at 608).
67. Guerin, supra note 54 at 379.
68. Supra note 5 at 54. The tenurial concept ignored by Dickson C.J. was noted, but not
explained, by Wilson J.'s opinion at 151. Lord Watson also referred to Indian title in another
context: "the right of the Provinces to a beneficial interest in these lands [ceded by prerogative
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Although the terms tenure and title are used interchangeably in
modem law, there is a substantial difference between the historical
notions of tenure and titles or estates in British land law. This was
especially distinct at the time of the Wabanaki and Mikmaw treaties. The
English doctrine of tenure asserts a fiction that all land is owned by the
Crown, i.e. the original title of the Crown,69 and every other interest is a
derived from holding estates either directly or indirectly from the
Crown. 70 Correspondingly, the English doctrine of estates asserts that a
subject cannot own land, but can merely own an estate in it, authorizing
him to hold it for some time.1 In modem English land law, the Crown has
an exclusive tenure or title, under which all derivative freehold estates
are held.72 These estates are essentially an interest in land of defined
duration.
73
In Canadian law, 'title' is a matter of registration statutes, an issue of
recorded evidence. The systems of registration of title are not a separate
code of land law. Registration of title concerns delegated rights to
subjects. They record the actual or potential transfer of rights existing
under the Crown's tenure, which leaves the main basis of the land law
unaffected. 74 However, in Canadian law, the registration system has
Treaty], available to them as a source of revenue whenever the estate of the Crown is
disencumbered of the Indian title" (St. Catharines Milling, supra note 5 at 59 [emphasis
added]). Compare to Delgamuukw, supra note 26 and Guerin, supra note 54, the assertion that
Aboriginal interest does not amount to beneficial ownership (Delgamuukw, ibid. at 27). In St.
Catharines Milling, the contingent beneficial interest in the lands in the province was created
by the preexisting act of the United Kingdom Parliaments with regard to waste lands prior to
Constitution Act, 1867. The Aboriginal tenure protected under section 91(24) of the Constitu-
tion Act, 1867 was an interest other than that of the Province within the meaning of section 109
of the Constitution Act, 1867 (supra note 5). Compare to Justice Le Dain's opinion in Guerin
at the Federal Court of Appeal: "[I]f the Indian title cannot be strictly characterized as a
beneficial interest in the land it amounts to the same thing. It displaces the beneficial interest
of the Crown. As such, it is a qualification of the title of the Crown of such content and substance
as to partake, in my opinion, of the nature of a right of property" ([ 1983] 2 F.C. 656 at 711).
If Aboriginal tenure has not been surrendered to the Crown by treaty, it is a beneficial interest
equal to the Crown and the provinces. If there is a surrender of Aboriginal tenure to the Crown,
the administrative interest operates according to constitutional legislation.
69. Supra text and note 20. Tenure is derived from the Latin tenura or teneo, which means
holding or possessing the land. In English law, the term implies a holding of some real property
under a superior lord in return for services to be rendered.
70. F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law before the Time of Edward I, vol.
1 (Cambridge: University Press, 1898) at 232-33; Baker, supra note 22 at 9-13.
71. Baker, ibid. at 10.
72. See above notes and text of notes 18-20.
73. Baker, supra note 22 at 14.
74. Ibid. at 513-19.
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affected Aboriginal title.75 The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Paulette76
held that such a common law title was not sufficient to file a caveat (or
warning) upon unpatented Crown lands under the federal Land Titles
Act.77 Similar decisions have denied a caveat in the Alberta and British
Columbia land titles legislation.78
In North America, a proprietary, alienable tenure in the Aboriginal
Nations has always been supported by case law. 79 At the beginning of
Confederation, the Privy Council in St. Catharines Milling affirmed prior
to a treaty cession to the Imperial Crown that the Aboriginal peoples had
the exclusive tenure that was alienable only to the Crown by British law.80
However, this critical insight has been ignored over the last century by the
colonial courts. To correct this predicament, Dickson C.J. noted that
Aboriginal title is distinct from English land law concepts, but he did not
describe its relation to English land law. He stated that the Indians'
interest in their lands is a preexisting legal right not created by Royal
Proclamation, but by s. 1 (1) of the Indian Act or by any other executive
order or legislative provision.81 This holding clarifies part of the relation-
ship of Aboriginal tenure to British law, and establishes that formal
75. These systems do not validate Aboriginal tenure. Cession to the Crown, reservations of
land to themselves and the registration system must be seen as acts of colonialization and
racially biased as they protect the immigrants, but not the aboriginal peoples. For an analogy
see "Exclusionary Zoning Litigation in State Courts" in D. Bell, Race, Racism andAmerican
Law (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1980) at 578-84.
76. [1977] 2 S.C.R. 628.
77. R.S.C. 1970, c. L-4.
78. Ominayak v. Norcen Energy Resources (1985), 29 Alta L.R. (2d) 151 (Q.B.), aff'd
(1985), 36 Alta. L.R. (2d) 137 (C.A.) leave of appeal refused by Supreme Court of Canada
(1985), 58 N.R. 122n (S.C.C.). The Alberta government amended their legislation when
challenged by the Lubicon Indians. Land Titles Amendment Act 1977, S.A. 177, c. 27; see
Uukw v. B.C. (Govt.), [1987] 6 W.W.R. 240 (B.C.C.A.) (aboriginal title can have no place in
the Torrens system).
79. Calder, supra note 5 at 151 and 193-96. U.S. v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co., [1941]
314 U.S. 339 at 347; St. CatharinesMilling, supra note 5; Symonds, supra note 5 at 390; Mitchel
v. U.S., [18351 34 U.S. 711 at 745-58; Worcester v. Georgia, supra note 5 at 544-46 and 559-
61; M'Intosh, supra note 5 at 587-88.
80. Supra note 5 at 608-16. However, Lord Watson asserted Aboriginal tenure had its origins
in British law in the 1763 Proclamation, other courts have argued it was recognized in the
prerogative legislation: see Guerin, supra note 54, and Calder, supra note 5.
81. Guerin, supra note 54 at 379. Justice Wilson states that Indian title has an existence apart
altogether from s. 18(1) of the Indian Act (ibid. at 352). The Supreme Court in Calder, supra
note 5 had already conceded that Aboriginal title derives from sources independent from the
Crown. As a legal right, the ultimate source of Aboriginal title is derived from historical
occupation and use of the land, independent from treaties, executive orders, or legislative
enactments. Accord M'Intosh, and Worcester, supra note 5. In Mitchell, supra note 48 at 382
Dickson C.J. restated this position "... that aboriginal understanding of words and correspond-
ing legal concepts in Indian treaties are to be preferred over more legalistic and technical
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recognition by treaty, executive order or legislative enactment is not
required for the legal enforcement of Aboriginal tenure or title in
Canada.82 But, this is a negative definition, saying what Aboriginal tenure
is not rather than what it is.
Unfortunately, the negative concept of sui generis title is not all that
helpful; it continues colonial traditions rather than resolving them.
Although the concept provides the courts with an opportunity to articulate
Aboriginal visions of the land, they have not done so. They have
continued to follow colonial law, for example, by inquiring whether the
Aboriginal plaintiffs and their ancestors were an organized society
occupying and claiming a specific territory to the exclusion of other
organized societies at the time sovereignty was asserted by England.83 If
this Eurocentric test is met by Aboriginal claimants, the courts remain
vague about the incidents and rights of an Aboriginal tenure. They have
refused to restrain non-proprietary governments or the Minister of Indian
Affairs and Northern Development from issuing competing permits to
companies.8 4 Permits on reserved Aboriginal lands may be restrained if
sufficient evidence shows the activities will interfere with the exercise of
Aboriginal rights or uses.
85
The courts have merely characterized Aboriginal tenure in Canadian law
by its general inalienability to anyone other than the Imperial Crown, and the
Crown's obligation to deal with the land on the Indians' behalf when the
interest is surrendered. Courts are content to describe the difficulty that
Aboriginal tenure establishes in the British schema of land tenure.86
constructions. This concern with aboriginal perspective, albeit in a different context, led a
majority of this Court in Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, to speak of the Indian
interest in land as a sui generis interest, the nature of which cannot be totally captured by a
lexicon derived from European legal systems."
82. Moreover, Dickson C.J. rejects the concept of recognized and unrecognized Indian title.
He stated, "It does not matter, in my opinion, that the present case is concerned with the interest
of an Indian Band in a reserve rather than with the unrecognized aboriginal title in traditional
tribal lands." The Indian interest in the land is the same in both cases: see Quebec (A.G.) v.
Canada (A.G.), supra note 64 at 379. The collapse of the recognized-unrecognized distinction
argues for the concept of tenure rather than title, since registration is not at issue. To avoid
confusion I will use both tenure and title to discuss how land is held.
83. Baker Lake, supra note 58.
84. Ibid.; Ominayak, supra note 78.
85. Kanatewat v. James Bay Development Corporation, [1974] R.P. 38 (C.S.) (interm
injuction). The Quebec Court of Appeal suspended the interrn injuction a week later (on
November 22, 1973). In an unreported decision, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the
suspension of the interm injuction, (1974) 41 D.L.R. (3d) 1. A year later the Quebec Court of
Appeals overturned the decision on its merit, [1975] C.A. 166. See Macmillan Bloedel Ltd. v.
Mullin, [ 1985] 2 W.W.R. 723 (B.C.S.C.); Hunt v. Halcan Log Services Ltd. (1986), 34 D.L.R.
(4th) 504 (B.C.S.C.).
86. In Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Paul, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 654 at 678, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed this idea. The inescapable conclusion from the Court's analysis of Indian title up to
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In Delgamuukw, MacFarlane J.A. stated that "[tihe courts have iden-
tified aboriginal rights as sui generis. Their unique nature has made them
difficult, if not impossible, to describe in traditional property law termi-
nology."87 The notion of sui generis title completes the terminological
journey from British "uses", to French or civil law usufruct derived from
Roman law, to Latin uniqueness. This is a strange linguistic journey to
explain Aboriginal concepts of land; it implicitly suggests that Aborigi-
nal people have no linguistic conceptions of their land.
To understand the new sui generis order of aboriginal and treaty rights,
however, the courts and their legal analysis will have to understand bi-
cognitive contexts and interrelated aboriginal worldviews. In other
words, they will have to overcome their Eurocentric biases and prejudices
and see the deep structure or "big picture".88
In its first post-colonial judgment, inR. v. Sparrow, the Supreme Court
of Canada began to take tentative steps toward understanding aboriginal
proprietary rights under the strength and scope of section 35(1). It
emphasized the importance of context and a case-by-case approach to
s. 35(1).89 The context of the appeal was the aboriginal right to fish for
food, which is a very basic human right and crucial for social and
ceremonial purposes. The Court noted,
Courts must be careful, then, to avoid the application of traditional
common law concepts of property as they develop their understanding of
what the reasons for judgment in Guerin, supra at p, 382, referring to as
the "sui generis" nature of Aboriginal rights....
While it is impossible to give an easy definition of fishing rights, it is
possible, and indeed, crucial, to be sensitive to the aboriginal perspective
itself on the meaning of the rights at stake. 90
this point is that the Indian interest in land is truly sui generis. It is more than the right to
enjoyment and occupancy, although, as Dickson J. pointed out in Guerin, it is difficult to
describe what that is in traditional [English] property terminology.
87. Supra note 26 at 23 and HutcheonJ.A. at 262-64 (The Aboriginal rights to land are of such
a nature as to compete on an equal footing with proprietary interests). Similarly, in the
Australian case Mabo, supra note 64, Deane and Guadron JJ. observed that "The preferable
approach is that adopted inAmodu Tijani and by Dickinson J. in the Supreme Court of Canada
in Guerin v. The Queen, namely, to recognize the inappropriateness of forcing the Native title
to conform to traditional common law concepts and to accept it as sui generis or unique" (at
156-57).
88. See C. Bell, Book Review of Native Law, by J. Woodward, [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. at 6.
89. Supra note 7 at 1109 and 1119; [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. 181.
90. Ibid. at 1112; [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. at 182. The Court never defined Aboriginal rights, it was
content to stress the importance of the context of Aboriginal rights. The evidence presented was
that the fishing for salmon was in ancient Musquem territory where they had fished from time
immemorial, and that salmon has always been an integral part of Musqvem culture and life. The
Privy Council had held that the constitutional federal authority to legislate respecting the
fisheries under section 91(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867 was regulatory not proprietary;
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Still, the court never addresses the issue of whether the aboriginal right
to fish for food is a property right in the Musquem worldview. It refocused
the issue to federal legislative powers and the fiduciary duty of the Crown
toward the Musquem.
Building on these post-colonial judicial insights of Guerin and Spar-
row, I want to explore the interpretative context of Indian title from a post-
colonial constitutional perspective and an Algonquian linguistic perspec-
tive. I will then return to the transformation of aboriginal tenure of the
Wabanaki and Mfkmaq into vested tenures under treaties with the
Imperial Crown in the eighteenth century. Consequently, the following
portion of this essay seeks to explain an Aboriginal vision of "property".
From an Algonquian linguistic perspective, we will look at the Aborigi-
nal langscape of property in North America and the initial relations of
Mikmaw territory and tenure and English law in North America. My
approach is necessarily selective, based on personal experience and
competencies.
II. Aboriginal Visions of Land
We are the land. To the best of my understanding, that is the fundamental
idea embodied in Native American life and culture.... More than remem-
bered, the earth is the mind of the people as we are the mind of the earth.
The land is not really the place (separate from ourselves) where we act out
the drama of our isolate destinies. It is not a means of survival, a setting for
our affairs, a resource on which we draw in order to keep our own act
functioning. It is not the ever-present "Other" which supplies us with a
sense of "I." It is rather a part of our being, dynamic, significant, real. It is
ourselves, in as real a sense as such notion as "ego, libido" or social
network, in a sense more real than any conceptualization or abstraction
about the nature of human being can ever be.... Nor is this relationship
one of mere "affinity" for the Earth. It is not a matter of being "close to
nature." The relationship is more one of identity, in the mathematical
sense, than of affinity. The Earth is, in a very real sense, the same as ourself
(or selves).
Paula Gunn Allen91
such constitutional authority does not necessarily empower the federal Government to affect
existing proprietary rights or confiscate property. (Canada (A.G.) v. Ontario (A.G.), [1898]
A.C. 700 at 712).
91. "lyani: It Goes This Way" in G. Hobson, ed., The Remembered Earth: An Anthology of
Contemporary American Indian Literature (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
1980) at 191.
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To speak of modem legal notions of "ownership" 92 and "property"
rights93 in the context of Aboriginal languages or worldview is very
difficult, if not impossible. Except for the colonial and racial assertion
that indigenous peoples did not have a system of property rights94 and the
current indeterminate sui generis czh aa erzatiin, this issue might not
even be important. Aboriginal visions of land and entitlements within
their indigenous federation were unlike the European legal notion of
"property". The Aboriginal vision of property was ecological space that
creates our consciousness, not an ideological construct or a fungible
resource. Upon being asked to sign a land cession treaty, a Blackfoot chief
summarized the differences:
92. Delgamuukw, supra note 26 at 27-40. In modem legal practice, however, it is seldom
necessary in the course of pleading to set up a claim of ownership of a disputed resource or good.
litigalik)MNevovS around eVxd&ene of pIDSeSSiln 'arnd figlS.Oe iu ssfsso lxge.
The word "owner" is an organizing idea of modem property systems that operates as a popular
summary of the technical rules of real property. It expresses the idea of an object being
associated with a particular ioun or name of some individual, supported by a rule that says that
society will uphold most of an individual's or entity's decisions about the use of the object. For
an account of the different views of the relations between the legal term "ownership" and
ordinary language, see B. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1977) at 10ff.
93. Ibid. at 41. No comprehensive definition of "property" exists. In Eurocentric thought, the
concept has never had any unitary meaning. The use of a French term propritd to describe
British land law remains a legal mystery. Even accounting for the fact that French was the legal
language of England until the seventeenth century, the two words had little in common. The
French word "property" has never been translated as "land" in Anglo Saxon or Old English.
The term is translated as "goods" or "movable" (Oxford English Dictionary), while land
informs the idea of "whatsoever may be plowed" or arable land. Lord Coke extended the
definition to "comprehendeth any ground, soil or earth whatsover" (E. Coke, The First Part of
the Institutes of the Law of England: or a Commentary on Littleton's Tenures 15th ed. by F.
Hargave & C. Butler, eds., (London: E. & R. Brooke, 1794) at 4a).
94. Long after the Wabanaki and Mikmaq treaties with the Crown, in the middle of the
nineteenth century, European colonial lawyers and administrators in the European colonial
corporations and colony offices formulated the myth that Aboriginal peoples did not have
developed concepts of land or property. The purpose behind this strategy of denial was to
establish the legal basis for expropriating land from Aboriginal peoples around the world.
Colonialist jurists asserted that private property emerged from ancient European roots, notably
Roman land law and various putative Germanic traits related to individualism. In contrast,
Aboriginals lacked this history and, by implication, lacked the mental and cultural qualities
associated with this history, because of their lack of evolution. R. Thapar,Ancientlndian Social
History: Some Interpretations (New Delhi, India: Orient Longman, 1978). The myth that
Aboriginal peoples had no concept of property rights in the land became an axiom in
nineteenth-century intellectual history. Karl Marx accepted this axiom and produced a broad
theory about the evolution of private property as a major part of his theory about the origins
of capitalism. He argued that this evolution was a peculiarly European phenomenon and that
colonialism did bring about the diffusion of capitalism to the non-European world, a necessary
though painful process for Aboriginal societies. The result of the acceptance of this axiom was
a legal theory that asserted that since the Aboriginal peoples had no concept of private property
rights in land, they did not have any property rights at all. Blaut, supra note 31 at 15 and 81.
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Our land is more valuable than your money. It will last forever. It will not
even perish by the flames of fire. As long as the sun shines and the waters
flow, this land will be here to give life to man [sic] and animals. We cannot
sell the lives of men and animals; therefore we cannot sell this land. It was
put here for us by the Great Spirit and we cannot sell it because it does not
belong to us. You can count your money and burn it within the nod of a
buffalo's head, but only the Great Spirit can count the grains of sand and
the blades of grass on these plains. As a present to you, we will give you
anything we have that you can take with you; but the land, never.95
Generally, the Algonquian people and their linguistic worldview 96 do
not have a defined concept of territory or land. Instead they had a concept
of space.97 Their vision is of different realms enfolded into a sacred space.
Their Earth is a series of ecological spaces; each filled with natural
resources, sights and sounds, and memories. The relationship between
the life forms of the earth informs the Algonquian worldview.
This relationship has been noted by anthropologists, Aboriginal au-
thors, and recently by the legal profession. For example, in the anthropo-
logical context, Ruth Underhill in Papago Woman writes:
"I was born her," breathed Chona reverently, "on the Land."
I wish I had some magical, some almost holy translation for the Indian
word she used. Land, to me, was a possession to be claimed and fought over
by farmers, builders, exploiters-yes-and patriots. For this old Papago
95. T.C. McLuhan, Touch the Earth (Toronto: New Press, 1971) at 53. Like all the
Algonquian languages, the Blackfeet languages originally have no gender distinction, only
balanced responsibilities.
96. The Algonquian language family is spoken along the Atlantic coast and across North
America to the foothills of the Rocky Mountains, from Labrador south to North Carolina and
Tennessee. This language group of more than fifty aboriginal nations completely surrounds the
linguistic islands of the Iroquoian and Lakota confederacies in North America. The word
"Algonquian" is said to be derived by the French understanding of the sounds that referenced
the distinct rock formation around the Great Lakes where the ancient ideographic script or rock
drawings were carved. The Champlain explorers mistook the sound for the name of the First
Nations of the place (Algounequins). H.P. Biggar, ed., The Works of Samuel de Champlain
(Toronto: Champlain Society, 1922-36) at 105ff. It is often spelled Algonkin or Algonkian.
Later anthropologists used the word for the common language group. Some assert that the word
is derived from the Milkmaq term alkoome which referred to people who stand in the canoe and
spear fish in the water or d1legonkin the dancers or el legom' kwin (friends, allies). See P. Vessel,
The Algonkin Nation (Amprior, Ontario: Kichesippi Books, 1987) at 11-14. This is a typical
chicken and egg issue in linguistics. In addition to the Mfkmaq, there are the Wabanaki
(Abenaki), Maliseet, Montagnais-Innu, Naskapi, Odawa, Algonkians, Ojibwa, Saulteaux,
Cree, Blackfoot, Blood, Peigan to mention a few. O.P. Dickason, Canada's First Nations
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1992) at 63.
97. Interestingly, most studies provide little insight into Aboriginal peoples' spatial concerns.
They provide little understanding into ecological or Aboriginal worldviews and settlement
patterns or use of resources. For example, knowing where to harvest or hunt your needs is to
know where to place yourself within a sacred space. Thus, living in a particular space and being
expected to share that space are the controlling concerns.
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woman and her kind, I was to learn, it is the land that possesses the people.
I was to learn, it is the land that possesses the people. Its influence, in time,
shapes their bodies, their language, even, a little, their religion.98
Similarly, the Anishinaki poet and writer, Gerald Vizenor, summarizes
an Ojibwa vision of the land:
The land is everything to me. The land is part of my language, part of the
way I perceive the world. The water, the trees, the smell of pine, the smell
of autumn, the smell of wet leaves in the springs. It is all part of my
imagination, part of my dreams. 99
As these perspectives illustrate, an Aboriginal worldview is a spatial
consciousness rather than material consciousness. Sharing and mobility
discourages the accumulation of inessential resources. The sharing of
space, then, is the meaning for all of Aboriginal life. The relations
contained in those spaces shape both choice and placement and ultimately
group life. Aboriginal people do not speak of living "there"; rather, each
family or person "belongs" to the space. Belonging, then, is directly tied
both linguistically and experientially to a space as well as to shared
knowledge of a series of common places. Belonging to a space is more
than just living in a place or using its resources; it is attendant with
benefits and obligations. Belonging is viewed as a special responsibility.
Aboriginal societies are usually based on kinship ties, specialized
access to resources, and a high degree of social equality. While they are
a family centered people, they are not an isolated or stationary people.
Aboriginal peoples live and work in difference places. They did not
randomly travel as Eurocentric thought suggests, °0 but they travelled to
the resources as a way of creating and harvesting bio-diversity and to
trade. Mobility among the Aboriginal peoples is neither recent, nor was
it introduced by modern means of travel; it was a sustainable way of life.
Aboriginal space is never at rest. It is assumed eternal, yet remains
tolerant to flux (muspekjamkewey). It is a place where a matrix of life
forces generates changes. It is a whole that must be refined by endless
ceremonies of renewal and realignment. These ceremonies represent a
catalyst or an integrating force that unites Aboriginal peoples with its
uniqueness or topistic °' integrity. The forces within a space can be
visualized as frequencies from an enfolded realm.
98. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979).
99. Quoted in Native Peoples, Spring 1993 at 35.
100. See Boyd, supra note 59.
101. Topistic is a holistic model of inquiry designed to make the identity, character, and
experience of a place intelligible. It is derived from the Greek word topos, as an adjective
associated with place, and the noun 'topistics' for the study of placeways. See, E.V. Walter,
Placeways: A Theory of the Human Environment (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1988) at 215.
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The sharing of space links those who belong to the land. In this sense,
belonging to the land means maintaining a series of spaces, such as
fishing stations, hunting stations and harvesting stations, that each have
to be renewed again and again in certain ways by specific kinds of
behaviours and ceremonies. These spaces are not self-renewing. Shared
knowledge about maintaining a particular space penetrates Aboriginal
consciousness and creates languages, beliefs and behaviours.'z They not
only used what is physically available to them, but they made choices
about the rate of resource use, within endurable limits, and modified their
resources, in selective and sustainable ways, to increase the availability
of useful resources. 3 They allocated among themselves and managed
the resources for the allied families and their friends. They created a
customary trading code to increase choices and resources.
The series of spaces orders Aboriginal languages, forming alangscape.
The land creates Aboriginal consciousness through languages and a
unified structure of being. Out of the sounds of the life forces in the
ecology, for example, the structure of Algonquian languages are centered
on the process of being or the verbs.' 4 A cognitive recognition and
acceptance of the interrelations of the shared space inform their languages,
102. For example, consider the Mfkmaq relationship with "animals." They see each species
as constituting a special life form, or nation: they live in their own realm or village, and have
their own chief and holy people. LeClercq commented that they thought "the Beavers had
sense, and form a separate nation; and they say they could cease to make war upon the animals
if these would speak, howsoever little, in order that they might learn whether the Beavers are
among their friends or enemies." LeClercq, The New Relation of Gaspesia with the Customs
andReligion of the Gaspesian Indians, trans. by W.F. Ganong, 1691 ed., (Toronto: Champlain
Society, 1910) at 225; C.G. Leland, The Algonquin Legends of New England: or, Myths and
Folklore of the Micmac, Passamaquoddy & Penobscot Tribes (London: Low, Marston, Searle
& Rivington, 1884) at 31.
103. Often anthropologists have sought to define the use of the resources by indigenous
people too narrowly, thus restricting an understanding of land tenure and its development.
Suggested readings are: J. Inglis, ed., Traditional Ecological Knowledge, Concepts and Cases
(Ottawa: International Program on Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 1993); C. Vecsey
"American Indian Environmental Religions" in American Indian Environments: Ecological
Issues In Native American History (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1980) at 1-45;
A. Tanner, Bringing Home Animals: Religious Ideology and Mode of Production of the
Mistassini Cree Hunters (London: Hurst, 1979); A. Tanner, "Significance of hunting territo-
ries today" in B.A. Cox, ed., Cultural Ecology: Readings on the Canadian Indians and Eskimos
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973) at 101-14.
104. This is a distinct process from the noun-object orientation of English. Many noun-ideas
in English are expressed in Mikmaq as verbs. English nouns can be created out of Mfkmaw
verbs. See Battiste, supra note 8; J. Fidelholtz, Micmac Morphophonemics (1973) 5 Abstracts
Int'l 34; J.Y. Henderson, "Governing the Implicate Order" (Centre of Linguistic Rights,
University of Ottawa) [in press].
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thus creating a shared worldview, a cognitive solidarity, and a tradition
of responsible action." 5
It also creates a series of visual descriptions that are clearly identifiable
within the space, and has specific visual boundaries and uses embedded
in the aboriginal languages. These descriptions make a knowable space
that are interconnected with paths of movement and the cycles of
existence. These cultural descriptions and paths created a specialized
cognitive map of their space.' 016
Aboriginal consciousness is more an emotional response to a place that
acknowledges the ability of the forces in a space to move the soul. A
consciousness that honours processes and relationships rather than fixed
rules, leads to an understanding and acceptance of the interrelated
relationships and expressive energies and experiences. This generative
order is the source of all Aboriginal law.0 7
To understand the shared spatial order of any Algonquian community
is to identify the basic processes of linguistic responsibilities, descrip-
tions and pathways. To understand the order, one must live within it.
Belonging is tied to spaces that make up their consciousness, spaces that
extend throughout the community to their experiences with the land.
These experiences are not lifeless terms connected to landscape features;
they describe the land or its character or common resources.
To those unfamiliar with the space, the Aboriginal langscape seems
confusing; the subtle order of their experience often looks natural to a
stranger. Their ordering of space appears to have given way to the
disorder of use. Yet within a sacred space, every resident knows the order
that makes all places familiar. How they live in their space indicates how
to "organize" their day-to-day life, and establishes how to maintain,
protect, and renew their spaces. Such knowledge is fundamental to their
identity, personality and humanity.
How Aboriginal languages appropriate a space and attach responsi-
bilities to it also reveals their ecological consciousness. Their notion of
self does not end with their flesh, but continues with the reach of their
senses into the land. Thus, they can speak of the land as their flesh. Their
notion of the space is more than vision; it includes the other non-visual
senses.
105. See J.Y. Henderson, "First Nations Legal Inheritances in Canada" (1995) Man. L.J. [in
press].
106. See e.g. Yi-Fu Tuan, "Images and Mental Maps" (1975) 65 Annals of the American
Association of Geographers 210; R.M. Downs & D. Stea, Maps in Minds: Reflections on
Cognitive Mapping (New York: Harper & Row, 1977) at 7 and 30-60.
107. Often this is interpreted as the natural law by outsiders. Among the Cree it is called "wak-
koo-towin".
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To come into a relationship with the ecology signifies one's discovery
of what there is in one's world and self that is sacred and spiritual. Some
relationships of a space were produced through agreements with the
Keepers of the forces.' These ecological covenants determine the
consciousness and actions of the people toward the resources. These
spaces are often thought of by strangers as natural, but to the Aboriginal
people they are created places by agreements. Other spaces were ordered
for ceremonies and rituals that reflected the teaching of the covenants and
are required for renewal of the resources. Cultural consumption was not
limited to the intentions of those who produce it, be it with an object or
space. 109
The entire community's daily existence is based fundamentally on the
spatial concerns of shared resources through a certain space. They depend
on the equal allocation of resources in their midst for daily livelihood, and
must share a series of resources. Aboriginal peoples do not manage the
resources; rather, they manage their space. This spatial consciousness
shapes cultural and resource utilization and innovation.
The prime spaces of an ecology are equally divided by a council of
elders, everyone having a fair share. Participation in Aboriginal life is
accompanied by rights in spaces. The spaces are allocated so that general
community livelihood is ensured, in contradistinction to the common
Western pattern, which guarantees individual livelihood through the
institution of private property. The sense of community solidarity is
enhanced not only by this common property situation, but also by the
family right to secure certain space. This is different from the Eurocentric
ideal of common property or resource usage.' 10
This spatial consciousness shapes responses to innovations. New
resources that facilitate the sharing of traditional resources can be
accepted, while objects that strain the communal solidarity have little
impact. When new resources find their way into Aboriginal life, they are
typically subservient to their awareness of space usage and the enfolded
realms, no matter how they might be used in the context of other cultures.
108. Supra note 75. These Keepers are not seen as supernatural forces, instead they are seen
as natural forces in the ecology.
109. R. Chartier, "Culture as Appropriation: Popular Culture Uses in Early Modem France"
in S.L. Kaplan, ed., Understanding Popular Culture: Europe from the Middle Ages to the
Nineteenth Century (New York: Mouton, 1984).
110. B.J. McCay & J.M. Acheson, "Human Ecology of the Commons" in B.J. McCay & J.M.
Acheson, eds., The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal
Resources (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1987) at 16.
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The established Eurocentric chronology of time is not the Aboriginal
peoples' own version of its past."' The Aboriginal peoples' version of
time is filled not with bold sweeping trends over long periods, but rather
with a specific space filled with experiences and feelings. Past experi-
ences inform modem discussions about these places.
Through their langscape, the naming of the land, the Aboriginal
peoples experience and wisdom continues. Aboriginal people talk about
past experiences motivated by specific concerns, for example, the snow
blinding moon or February. Ultimately their lives revolve around specific
places in their sacred space. Objects come and go, but places in the sacred
space continue as essential to explanation and descriptions. The places
are not transitory; they remain the focal point of the past. The past is
spatial and oral.
Aboriginal past is talked about, with the locational components being
the unifying factor. This factor covers space, time, and motivation.
Talking about the past involves experiences: characters, events, and
objects. Actions from the past involve causation rather than logic. Not
everyone knows precisely the same amount of detail or the same version,
but they take certain places as starting points for discussion. Sometimes
the discussion is a narrative; sometimes it is not.
Often in Aboriginal peoples' discussion of the past, the topics turn to
"the first" or spatial anomalies. An example of a first is the Mfkmaq
district of Sikniktewaq (roughly New Brunswick) describing the low
grumbling sounds that the glacier made as it turned a river into a gulf,
splitting Prince Edward Island (Epekwith) from the continent." 2 Spatial
anomalies provide an explanation about new experiences."' Spatial
questions provide the impetus for Aboriginal peoples to ask why some-
thing is there, and perhaps to correlate it with a certain time period or to
reinforce a narrative per se. Through this endless process, Aboriginal
people come to know about their sacred space, and fill it with culture
111. For example, Mfkmaq have always been unconcerned with their creation or genesis.
They were content in knowing that they had received a precious gift at birth, a gift they
struggled hard to understand and discovered the mysteries of maintaining harmony with
realism. They told Father Maillard, one of the first priests to live with them, and to comprehend
their language, that they were part of the light. "[A]s for us," they were recorded as saying, "we
can know no origin but that which thy rays have given us, when firstamarring efficaciously, with
the earth we inhabit, they impregnated its womb, and caused us to grow out of it like the herbs
of thy field, the trees of thy forest, of which thou art equally the common father." A.S. Maillard,
An Account of the Customs and manners of the Mickmakis and Maricheets Savage Nations,
New Dependent on the Government of Cape Breton (London: S. Hooper & A. Morley, 1758)
at 25.
112. As explained by Kep'ten Steve Augustine of Big Cove Reserve.
113. See supra note 96 describing the term Algonkin.
224 The Dalhousie Law Journal
knowledge and values. Most Aboriginal peoples know which families to
ask for detailed knowledge. No one account explains their collective past,
nor does everyone know every specific detail. Often neither account deals
with any fixed chronological time; dates for events can be only approxi-
mated. Progression of time is connected to the specific lives of known
humans, in other words, linked with memory. It is a matter of culture, not
chronological time.
Memory is measured chronologically in terms of generations or winter
counts or ancestors' lives. If the event happened during the lifetime of a
certain person, then it is usually linked to certain events during that
lifetime. If the event is not located with the family history, then the actual
date is not important or not remembered. It is part of daily life. As each
generation passes on, past events separate from individual lives and enter
the great store of experiences that occurred "before my time". Thus my
time is current experience, before my time is the collective oral traditions
held by the families. Time and event are linked in memory or symbolic
literacy, not in written literacy.
Discrepancy arises, but no one is concerned with consistency. Ab-
original peoples accept inconsistency in the broad understanding of
cycles and the living past.I "Each version provides different perspectives
on past values and events. They do not have a concept of a "true" history.
Instead they have an account of experiences or topistic space. Validity or
justification of historical descriptions rests on family relationships rather
than on content.I15 They usually say "that was the way it was told to us
or me."
116
To concretely illustrate this broad Aboriginal worldview, I will discuss
the Mfkmaw version of their ecology (nestumou) and their understanding
about their Living Lodge (maqmikjwikam). My brief sketch is incom-
plete,"i but it may help others grasp the nature of a particular Algonquian
worldview of "property".
114. Some cultures, especially literate cultures, identify contradictions and claim to isolate
what is true from what is not true. This discounting one version for another for the Mikmaq is
to act in a God-like manner (mntukasowin).
115. S. Schrager, "What is Social in Oral History?" (1983) 4:2 Int'l J. of Oral History 78.
116. They merely claim that the story was handed on to them, that it was important for their
elders that they remembered it and passed it on to them for whatever reasons. As Black Elk
stated to John Neihardt: "This they tell, and whether it happened so or not I do not know; but
if you think about it, you can see that it is true." Black Elk Speaks (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1961).
117. E.g. R.H. Whitehead, Stories from the Six Worlds: Micmac Legends (Halifax: Nimbus,
1988).
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1. Mikmdki: the Sacred Space"8
"Mikmdki" became the concept that the allied people (Mfkmaq) called
their national territory. It is not the usual land description, but rather is
translated as the "space or land of friendship". It stresses the voluntary
political confederation of the various Algonquian fai dties into the Hoty
Assembly orSanteMawfomi and their shared worldview. Wherever their
language was spoken was sitgamfik, their ancient space, and every part of
this territory is sacred to the allied people. This space extended approxi-
mately twenty thousand square miles. In modem terms, Mfkmd.ki de-
scribed the territory now called Newfoundland, St. Pierre de Miquelon,
Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, northern Maine, Prince Edward Island, the
Magdalene archipelago, and the Gaspe Peninsula of Quebec.
a. Nestumou
Although it is possibte to view Mikm.ki as a territoiat concept, in the
Mfkrmaw context or langscape it expresses their sacred order. Their
sacred order is not a cosmological order; it is the result of millennia of
field observations and direct experience by their ancestors. These expe-
riences are directly encoded within their language and symbolic literacy.
These understandings or sentiments are an important part of the implicit
order in which they live as well as practical knowledge.
The sacred order in which the Mikmaq live is expressed as a sustaining
relationship. Consistent with their verb-oriented reality, a process of
being with the universe, the order was and is a widely shared, coherent,
and interrelated worldview connecting all things. For example, the
Mlkmaq conceptualized every animal with a certain mntu and considered
them a "separate nation".1 9 An important feature of this order is the use
of human kinship as a general analogy for ecological relations. 20 The
most obvious and widespread manifestation of this reciprocal relation-
ship is the totemic clan system. The totemic clan system categorized
social obligations, such as sharing and deference, as well as proper moral
and ethical considerations, to the ecological relationship. Plants, animals,
118. This section is derived from discussions with Kep'ten Steve Augustine, Dr. Marie Anne
Battiste, Jikap'tin Alex Dermy, Patrick and Eleanor Johnson, John J. and Sharon Paul, Kep'ten
Noel Marshall, Professor Joe B. Marshall, and Professor Murdena Marshall and students at
Mfkmaq Studies of the University College of Cape Breton.
119. LeClercq, supra note 102 at 277.
120. Vecsey, supra note 103; Tanner, "Significance of hunting", supra note 103; F.G. Speck,
PenobscotMan, The Life Of A Forest Tribe In Maine (London: Oxford University Press, 1940)
at 208.
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and humans are related, and each is both a producer and a consumer with
respect to each other, in an endless cycle.1
21
The sacred order is also a place where the animate power of spirits
(mntu) exists in harmony. The Mfkmaq were conscious of and respected
the animation of their environment. To them every stone, tree, river,
coast, ocean and animal being had been isolated into discrete mntu.'
22
They strive to respect and live in harmony with these intelligible es-
sences. Within their space, a respectful and sacred relationship between
all life forms is the highest form of existence. Such relationships are not
always achieved, but are the purpose of life.
Nestumou is the sound that describes the Mfkmaq experiences on a part
of the Earth. It is a sound that validates their identity within an ecosystem
and a langscape that creates an appropriate cultural literacy with the
ecosystem. Literally, the sound means the "understood realms". Nestumou
describes everything for which they have experiences, not everything that
could exist. Nestumou includes both the visible and the invisible realms,
and is discussed in terms of Lodges (wikw6m). Nestumou expresses their
cumulative wisdom about eight levels of meaning or understandings
(nestunk).'23 These levels are interconnected and transform each other.
The nestunk are the Deep Earth Lodge (lamqamuk),24 the Root Lodge
121. This is not the response of British society when Darwin suggested that Europeans and
other peoples had evolved out of the animal world and could recognize the terrible and obsolete
manlike ape as their distant cousin. His theories revolutionized European mentality creating
scientific racism and creating a religious battle over creationism versus evolution. See J.
Highwalker, The Primal Mind (New York: New American Library, 1981) at 17ff.
122. In English, this concept is often spelled "Manitou" or called "medicines" by the
immigrants.
123. One who understands everything about the known world is called Kaginestmu'k; if one
knows only a part of the known world, one is called mukaginesimu'k. Common sense is called
nsi-tuo'gn, while the entire process of understanding is called nestmnmk. Thus, these sounds
are often used to describe the world, or humankind.
124. The deepest part of Earth is said to provide sustenance to life on Earth. This Lodge is also
analogized to Grandmother, which is often translated as Mother Earth. In the Deep Earth Lodge
are sacred caves, where seekers may receive and be instructed by the animating forces (mntu).
These forces work in all the realms, but are said to belong or reside in either the Deep Earth or
Sky Lodges. The physical forms of rocks, plants, animals and humans are made possible by the
potencies of these forces. These potencies can be known to humans, but only in prayers or
appropriate ceremonies. There is an enigmatic side to animating forces that come into existence
by the abuse or manipulation of the material resources: often these destructive forces are
created by the misuse of gifts by humans. In the deep caves (wlnusfikek), such as Klooscap's
Cave, the original visions were given to the humans; they are the oldest spirit lodges, and
provide the models for all other spirit lodges or ceremonies on the surface of the Earth. Each
force is said to have a keeper or protector (nujoteckwti) who can punish or grant privileges to
humans for their conduct toward the plant or animal form; these mntu can make themselves
visible to humans on important occasions.
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(wjipisekek), 125 the Water Lodge (Iampoq6k6m),126 the Earth Lodge
(kinuwsitagamino), z7 the Ghost Lodge (wskitekmujuiok6m),2 8 the Sky
Lodge (mooskoonwkfk6m),'29 the Light Lodge (wds6qwik6m),'3° and the
Ancestors' Lodge (ski*kmujuawti).13'
125. This realm is above the Deep Earth Lodge, it is an unusual zone: little is currently
remembered about it, but people are warned about venturing into it because of the presence of
the wjipiskek, which can capture and contain the human mntu. This region demarcates the space
of the roots of trees and grasses, the region where bears hibernate, the space of wolf and coyote
dens, where rodents and ants and other insects live. It is a transitionary zone to the Underwater
and Earth Lodges. The life forms that live in this area are considered sacred because they
traverse between the surface of the Earth Lodge and the depths of the Root Lodge. The stones,
roots, and insects located in the Root Lodge are often considered a purer life form than those
on the Earth Lodge; they are therefore considered better medicine for surface life forms.
126. This is an unknown realm. It cannot be directly experienced by humans, it can only be
known through alliances with the keepers of this realmr. It cov ers the ceans, Iakes, river and
streams as well as the fish lodges (nmijui6k6m). It is the domain of the ancient spirits, much
like the parallel realm of the deep earth Lodge.
127. This is the realm of the air, water and surface which provides substance to life on and
above the earth, and for all the things that grow out of the Earth. Within the realm of the Earth
Lodge are four regions: the region of short grasses and plants, and small animals; the region
of the water; the region of tall grasses, humans and large animals; and the region of trees and
forests (nipuktuk). The last region is important because their roots penetrate into the Deep Earth
and extend into the Earth Walk. Places where the Deep Earth is directly accessible, including
caves, deserts, bare mountain tops, etc., are considered sacred.
128. This is the realm of guardian forces that exist alongside the Earth Lodge; the watchers
of the keepers of the sacred caves in the Deep Earth Lodges or the Light Lodges. They maintain
the balance between life forms.
129. This realm contains the clouds, stars, sun and moon, and is associated with the flying
beings. The mountains are considered part of this realm, and are often considered as sacred
places, similar to trees, because they partake of three realms: their peaks appear as part of the
Deep Earth Lodge that reaches into the Sky Lodge. The sky realms, like the deep earth realm,
contain unique forces. Through the Winds, or Breath Regions (jasen), life is possible through
the immortal gift of breath. This realm is also occupied by the forces of Thunder (kaqtuko), who
directs Clouds (alw'k); and Rain (kispesan), who assists Thunder. In the Sky Lodge are Keepers
of the Winds (wjdsen). They have personal spirit names because they have often revealed their
physical form to the people. The east wind is called wejipek. The south winds are called either
wsaqniaq, the sunny, winter winds, orputuesk, the cloudy, warm winds. The west wind is called
ekesnuk. The north wind is called oqatlk. In the highest realm above Sky Lodge live the creative
forces of the universe (ndkus'set) which creates consciousness and gives it order, but not
stability.
130. From this creative realm comes the cosmic forces of light which permeate and maintain
the world and the immortal spiritual potential. Collectively, these forces and potentials are said
to direct all the material arid spiritual forces of the universe. It contains the source of all light
and darkness: it holds the visible lights, the sun (ndkaset), moon (tepknuset), and stars
(kulokoquxh), as well as the invisible cosmic forces (wasitpdg) behind the light and the blue
darkness (qujitpaqtek).
131. Above the Light Lodge this realm is connected to the Milky Way, the spirit's path, and
is considered much like the Earth Lodge, except the being has mich greater magic. Plants,
animals, and human souls all travel this realm, called by missionaries the "Land of the Souls"
(Maillard, supra note 111 at 4-6).
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The center of the sacred realm is viewed as the Living Lodge
(maqmikjwikam). The Living Lodge is composed of three realms: the
underwater lodge, earth lodge and ghost lodge. It is comprised of the
spirals of the unfolding realms of daily Mfkmaq life and the immanent
enfolded realms of intuitive and transcendental experiences. Surround-
ing these realms are five other realms: the deep earth, root lodges, the sky
lodge, the light lodge and the ancestors' lodge. Interconnecting each of
these lodges are the forces (mntu), and each of these Lodges is associated
with certain keepers of forces, regardless of form.
b. Maqmikjwikam
The Mikmaq relations to the forces of the Living Lodge realm
(maqmik wfkam) 32 are direct and extremely complex. This is often
simply called nature in English; but it is a very difficult concept in
Mfkmaw thought, perhaps best expressed as niskammelkik6im (creation
space). The Living Lodge is a spiritual realm, a sacred space; it is a place
for reverence and respect that reveals a natural truth and way of life. These
understandings are woven throughout Mfkmaw consciousness and form
their human order. This space is understood to have the power to shape
the identities of the people who live there.
The Mfkmaq understand how limited their knowledge is about this
realm. Their space in the Living Lodge is always in a state of flux: it has
always been a place of forms that dissolve and flow into everything else,
a realm characterized by its transformations-the changing of forms and
shapes-known through observations. Their environment cannot be
known except though their linguistic knowledge of the place where they
exist. All aspects of existence in the Living Lodge merge in an ongoing,
indivisible process: a realm fragile yet resilient, delicate yet tough, sacred
yet changeable. The air, forest and sea are alive.
In this continual flow, the Living Lodge has always had many ways of
creating harmony out of flux. It makes little sense to create any form of
fixed worldview in this realm; the known truth is that unending change
requires flexibility, both cognitively and physically. Mfkmaw knowl-
edge is not a description of reality; rather it is some perceptions about the
nature of change, insights about patterns or styles of the flux. Life is not
static. To see things as permanent is to be confused about everything; the
alternative is to understand the need for creating temporary harmonies
through alliances and relationships among all forms and forces.
132. Alternatively, it can be expressed as mulgigunode tan wejeskalaegul must kogooaal, or
meamooch niskam oomulgigundim.
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The Mfkmaq are content and comfortable with the Living Lodge's
transformations. They understand life and death as nonparadoxical,
understand that consciousness is their greatest gift, understand their role
in renewing balance by sharing and communicating with everything.
They have a transcendent view of the world that seeks harmony with all
things around them. They understand that they have to bring together all
those things that are essential for the regeneration of the Living Lodge;
yet, they have no notion of any unique specialness in the realm over the
rest of the breathers.
Mikmaq thought and language honour the vastness of the creative,
mysterious flux rather than the greatness of any Lifegiver's power.
Awareness of the sacred flux has always been a source of Mfkmaq
consciousness in the Living Lodge. Such awareness can be acquired or
lost, and it creates an understanding of what are now called in English the
environment and ecology. Understanding the holiness of the Living
Lodge is so urgent, so utterly linked with the pulse of feeling in the
indigenous soul, that it becomes the singular sign of life and knowledge.
Even when every other aspect of nature has failed them, they do not reject
the sacred processes.
The Living Lodge has all kinds of spiritual controllers, who create a
sacred spectrum. Each deserves and receives respect for its abilities. Each
spiritual controller or keeper is referred to as a member of one's own
immediate family, as a close relative, as an ally of the Mfkmaq. Curing
human disease is understood as a function of understanding the relation-
ship with the spirits of a particular ecology. A person's willingness to
restore their identity with the land and its guardian spirits is essential to
the healing process. It is a process of shaping one's vision and motion to
a particular space or surrendering to the sustaining elegance of the space.
The land and its spirits are a living reality that precedes human desires or
values. It is the basis for all subsequent understanding of culture and self
which, in turn, renews and humanizes the space. Cultural traditions are an
articulation of the awareness of the space and its spirits, which confirm
their spatial identity. This creates a feeling of rightness or certainty in
their beliefs.
Regardless of form, these allies are parabolic: their meaning is discov-
ered by experience rather than reflection. The heightened experience or
awareness of one's allies often increases the power of introspection: by
silent dialogues, allies allow one to be aware of what other life forms or
forces are thinking, or how they are influencing the seeker. They provide
sustained experiences that allow one to see and learn the sacredness of life
on earth, to recognize the manifestation of the holy in Living Lodge.
230 The Dalhousie Law Journal
The Living Lodge and all its spiritual controllers finds its highest
expression in the creative processes of life (e.g. babies). Life generating
processes exchange and mingle powers that produce Mikmaw conscious-
ness and language, which reflects these forces. It is based on states of
being or verbs, rather than nouns. 3  They hear singing in the wind not as
poetry but as spirituality. From the sounds of the Living Lodge around
them they create their speech and ideographs. Their consciousness or
knowledge is contained as a form of aesthetic literacy-a symbolic
literacy and an oral tradition--derived from the flux of the Living Lodge.
Most Mfkmaq favour subtlety and poetic understatement as modes of
expressing the holiness of the Living Lodge. Meaning is derived from the
context or relations of things. For the Mfkmaq, symbolic literacy and
prayer are considered art-an act of expression that makes evident much
of the unique sensibility of their soul.
Similar to other indigenous people, the Mfkmaq do not regard their
territories as "natural". Instead, they view it as created by interactions
between their ancestors and the ancestors of other life forms or species.
Every tree, every shore, every mist in the woods, every clearing is holy
in their memory and experience, recalling not only their lives but also the
lives of their ancestors since the world began. Hence, the entire langscape
is a symbolic historical and educational record, testifying to the unique
experience and identity of the people. All physiographic features within
Mfkmki have ancient names in Mfkrmaq language that witnesses their
knowledge of its resources and continuous use of the land.' 34 Thesenames
have been transcribed by the explorers and missionaries. 35
133. Like the structure of Algonquian languages, Mikmaq language is distinct from English.
They created sounds out of the forces in the ecology, the verbs, rather than the noun-object
orientation of English. Thus many ideas in English are expressed in Mfkmaq as verbs. English
nouns can be created out of Mikmaw verbs. See Battiste, supra note 8; Fidelholtz, supra note
104 and Henderson, supra note 104.
134. For example, the names of the seven districts represent this knowledge system.
Sikniktewaq district (now New Brunswick) is the name for the low grinding sounds the glaciers
of the Ice Age made as it turned a river into a gulf and created Epekwith ([land] floating above
the water, or Prince Edward Island). Epekwith and Piktukeway (explosion) comprise another
district. Piktukeway is named for the big explosion that created the harbour, finished the gulf,
and separated Epekwith from the mainland. Kwapikewaq ("last land of the people" or Gaspe
Bay Peninsula) is named for the treaty with the Mohawk and the transfer of the land that ended
a conflict. Sipeknekatik district ("place of wild potatoes or ground nut") is known for the wild
potatoes that grew there (Halifax to Amherst). Eskikewag district ("skin dresser's territory")
district is named for its green lands and large animal population, and its fur skinning activities
(Halifax to Canso). Kespukwith district is the "lands ending or end of territorial
boundaries"(Annapolis Royal to Cape Sable). Unamdkik district is the "place of fog" (from
Cape Breton Island to Newfoundland).
135. P. Pacifique, "Le Pays des Micmac" (1927-1935) vols. 21-23, 25, 27 and 28 Bulletin
de )a Soci&t de Geographie de Qu6bec.
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The Mf'kmaq are not inclined to make vast philosophical judgments or
to create such an elaborate system of thought about the Living Lodge;
they do not believe that the world placed some spirits in a superior
position to others. Of course they're not perfect, but they have devised a
code of behaviour to which they are equal-instead of a morality
impossible to realize. This sacred order was never viewed as a commodity
that could be sold, only shared.
c. Netukulimk
The allied people were organized through extended family structures.
They identified with a hunting district (sakamowti), certain hunting and
fishing stations under the responsibility of certain families, and the
settlements (wigamow) that belonged to each of them. From each district,
wigamow or settlement of kinsmen and their dependents, the Sant
Mawfomi or Grand Council was created. The Mawfomi or Council
recognize one or more kep' ten ("captains") to show the people the good
path, to help them with gifts of knowledge and goods, and to sit with the
whole Mawfomi as the government of all the Mfkrmaq. From among
themselves the kep' ten recognize ajisagamow ("grand chief"), ajikap' ten
("grand captain"), both to guide them and one to speak for them, and from
others of good spirit they choose advisers and speakers, orputu's, as well
as the leader of the warriors or smankus.
The authority of this sacred order was never viewed as a commodity
that could be sold, only shared. Government always has been and is
spiritual, persuasive, and noncoercive. The cruelties of repressive laws
and majoritarian oppression were unknown until the recent interventions
of European habits and laws. The continuity and authority of the Mawiomi
exist in Mikmaw culture, in a common bond and vision that transcends
temporary interests. This bond arises naturally from the fate of being born
into a family (munijinik), community (wikamow), territory (mikmdki),
and people (kinuk.)
A respectful human could participate in the consciousness and order,
but could not possess or own them. The allied people felt they were held
by the spiritual forces of the land. Inherent in their worldview is a
conviction that the universe contained a limited amount of energy (mntu),
that is continually running down'36 and hence requires renewal by all
participants. This conception of a sacred order as dynamic, finite, and
136. Most indigenous people have traditional narratives of ecological catastrophes which
taught them about what modem science calls "entropy".
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fragile has important consequences for the way indigenous peoples
manage and participate in the use of the resources.
The relationship between the Mfkrmaq and the land embodies the
essence of the intimate sacred order. As humans, they have and retain an
obligation to protect the order and a right to share its uses, but only the
future unborn children in the invisible sacred realm of the next seven
generations had any ultimate ownership of the land. In the custom of the
Mfkmaq, the Sant6 Mawfomi was and is the trustee of the sacred order and
territory for the future generations. Part of its duty is to regulate the natural
resources of Mfkm ki among the allied people and through the Nikmanen
trading customs increase the bio-diversity. This is more of a management
right to ensure discipline in consumption of the resources, rather than the
concept of ownership.
Inherent in this sacred order is the conviction that the resources had to
be renewed as well as shared. Rather than managed, which implied
human domination, the Mikmaq developed rituals for sharing or harmo-
nizing the human and spiritual realms.'37 These renewal rituals and
ceremonies brought the people and the land into balance thereby achiev-
ing basic subsistence and material well-being. These rituals and ceremo-
nies created a harmony which emphasized stability and the minimization
of risk for the harvesting of the resources rather than growth and the
accumulation of wealth. The quest for harmony also created the need for
diversification by trade and modification of habitats,'38 thereby develop-
ing surplus capacities and sharing.
Sharing of resources is the equivalent of consensus in creating govern-
ing structures. Just as the managers of shared resources sustain them, the
leaders of communities, districts, and nations are managers of shared
authority and spaces.'39 Sharing of the harvest is neither random nor
universal, but based on patterns, kinship and correspondence. 40 It is an
honour, a duty and a privilege; those who have a little more to share may
gain prestige, influence and dignity.
137. For example, the Mawiomi among the Mikmaq became the keeper of the game, and the
Crees have an elder as the hunting boss which adapts their thinking to the land [tapitam].
138. Fire, for example, was a widespread use of niche modification which maintained forest
bio-diversity. It was important for collecting plants as medicines and for creating fields and
traps for game animals, such as deer, elk, and moose.
139. R. Barsh, "The Nature and spirit of North American political systems" (1986) 10:3 Am.
Indian Q. 181.
140. R. Barsh, "Backfire from Boldt: The judicial transformation of a Coast Salish propri-
etary fishery into a commons" (1991) 4 Western Legal History 1; A. Sillitoe, Roots Of The
Earth: Crops In The Highlands Of Papua New Guinea (Dover, N.H.: Manchester University
Press, 1983).
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Managing a space and sharing is viewed as an integral part of the
ethical development of a Mfkmaq. It is important for the development of
family, friendship and self. Mfkmaq see no distinction between collective
or individual interests. The goal of creating a sustaining space and a
sharing and caring community in which everyone can participate and
belong is the ultimate interest. Everyone must come to this realization;
they must come to understand the beauty and dignity of maintaining,
protecting, and renewing their family space and traditions. Through this
developmental process, Mfkmaq establish a clear understanding of
oneself as a human and in relation to the environment. Through this
process, Mfkmaq understand the needs of the biological realms and the
ethical significance of their desires, freedoms and responsibilities.
In Mfkmaq language, "netukulimk" refers to the responsibility of a
Mikmaq user to be mindful that the Life Givers and the keepers have
consented to the conditional use of the resources being managed. The
prime condition was sharing of the harvest among the communities of the
place. Feasts were an integral part of the sharing of the resources.
Mfkmaw could rarely understand the possessive nature of the Europe-
ans. 141 Moreover, sharing manages demand, and serves to mitigate many
of the incentives to consume a resource.
These sentiments of sharing are generated by the Mikmaw concept of
space. Space is described as spirals of a relative network of family sites
and paths among resources.' 42 Within the Mfkmaq words for particular
locations are encoded not only the use of the land but also its special
significance for families. Certain families or peoples had "rights" to use
certain animals, plants, materials and access sites (hunting and fish traps)
because of their particular relationship. Their indigenous narratives,
comprised in songs and stories, and the ceremonies associated with each
space, link the present and the past.
Conceptually, these differences reflect the difference between the
Mfkmaw worldview and the European worldview. In the Euro-British
141. As one missionary stated "With all their vices, they are exceedingly vainglorious: they
think they are better more valiant and more ingenious than the French; and, what is difficult
to believe, richer than we are. They consider themselves better than the French; 'For,' they say,
'you are always fighting and quarreling among yourselves; we live peaceably. You are envious
and are all the time slandering each other; you are thieves and deceivers; you are covetous and
are neither generous nor kind; as for us, if we have a morsel of bread we share it with our
neighbor'." R.G. Thwaites, ed., Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents, 73 vols. (Cleveland:
Burrows Brothers, 1869)(Reprinted: Pageant, N.Y.: 1959) at 1:173) [hereinafter JR].
142. T. Ingold, The Appropriation ofNature:EssaysonHumanEcologyandSocialRelations
(Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1987); H. Brody, Maps and Dreams: Indians and the
British Columbia Frontier (N.Y.: Pantheon Books, 1982); Tanner, supra note 103; Speck,
supra note 120 at 206.
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world, sharing has traditionally been seen as a threat to the personal
autonomy or choice, thus a threat to legal rights and responsibilities.
143
Altruism, a European morality of sharing and sacrifice within a particular
relationship, is usually seen as inconsistent with the modem theory of
individualism.
The Mfkmaw view provides an alternative vision of a proper social
order. The indigenous nations were generous, sharing whatever they
possessed with an open handedness that amazed the immigrants. Greed
was always considered a wrong, while private management of the
resource, along with a bundle of rights and duties, was the legal norm.
Mfkmaw "property rights" were usually obtained through kinship
rather than use or purchase. They were endowments or legacies. Every-
one has relative claims, through birth and marriage, to the use of a great
variety of sites and resources, which can also be claimed by others on the
same ground. Often the word for kinship and ownership are the same. It
is inconceivable in a Mikmaq worldview, however, that an individual
could claim an exclusive use or entitlement to a particular site or that any
family could lose their relationship to a site. This concept applied both to
men and women.
Renewal ceremonies also emphasize the relationship between space
and claims in the indigenous Mfkmaw worldview. The places of certain
ceremonies are bounded to a specific location and can be transported.
They symbolically reiterated and renewed the ancient relationships
between a particular family and people and a particular ecosystem. The
grounding in a particular ecosystem has been categorized as "geopiety". 14
In the renewal ceremonies, various family claims are continually being
asserted and adjusted. While each renegotiation affects family allegiance
and identity, this is seen as relatively unimportant; the crucial factor is the
periodic equalization of shared rights among the collective families.
This process of resource adjustment created considerable self-serving
confusion among the Europeans. They deduced that the indigenous
Mikmaw tenure systems were essentially collective or communal and
that no individual owned the land.' Indeed that is the case, but what
143. A similar tension is present in the modem general redistributive welfare scheme,
equalization payments and external standards of sharing in the private market autonomy
theories.
144. Inglis, supra note 103; Vecsey, supra note 103; see also J.E. Brown, The Spiritual
Legacy of the American Indian (New York: Crossroad, 1982). In practical terms, this
grounding in a space means that indigenous people attribute great significance even to minute
changes in the ecosystem, and carefully note its condition as they move through it.
Observation was recalled every night around the campfire and passed on to all family and
friends. The same process still happens in most reserves.
145. See Bault, supra note 31.
Mikmaw Tenure in Atlantic Canada
created the perplexity was that those resources were a private family
entitlement. The confusion is unraveled when one understands that in an
indigenous tenure the role of the family or individual is more managerial
rather than proprietary.
What is not understood by outsiders was that each family or personal
claim to a resource or space is based on permissions by local, regional or
national consensus. While these boundaries may be imprecise or shifting
to an outsider, they are part of a complex tenure based on sharing rather
than exclusive use. Very few distinctions exist between personal and real
property. If these distinctions exist it is to give dignity and honour to the
Mfkmaw or family by sharing them, e.g., to exhibit their generosity to
others.
The sacred order itself is never individualized. The tenure is held for
future generations. A family or an "individual" might enjoy wide admin-
istrative authority over a resource or space (a legacy), but they have no
right to withhold the use of the resources or the products of their use to
another insider. The system of kinship relations unites everyone in a web
of complementary rights and responsibilities. Each person is simulta-
neously a parent, child, uncle, aunt, or cousin to others. This implicit order
is non-hierarchical and reproduces itself without the need to accumulate
more people, land, or goods. The continued strength of any claim in the
indigenous tenure is a function of sound management and generosity.
These legacies are "strong" enough to create incentives to conserve, but
"weak" enough to create incentives to share.
The Mfkmaq legacy became vested in a family or person after seven
generations of sound management and generosity. A right of succession
or inheritance is based on actual services to the elderly managers as well
as management of the resource, rather than kinship.
Due to their understanding of the surrounding ecology and their value
system of the Living Lodge, scarcity of resources was rare among the
Mfkmaq. Each family and person had a unique role in harvesting the
ecology. 146 There were few customary principles that governed access to
and control of material resources; however, there were clear rituals about
146. This map is a duplication of Speck's map found in Crown Land Rights and Hunting and
Fishing Rights of Micmac Indians in the Province of Nova Scotia (Membertou: U.N.S.I.,
1976). See Map I and lion back cover of monograph: F.G. Speck, Beothuk andMicmac (1922)
[monograph]. This book is a survey of family hunting territories in Nova Scotia, Prince Edward
Island and Newfoundland for the Division of Anthropology of the Geological Survey of
Canada. Other literature suggests that there exists a similar survey of New Brunswick, but it
has not been found. The allocation of hunting districts was originally mentioned in Le Clercq,
supra note 101 at 234-38. Although not included there were similar allocations of river systems
and their surrounding lands or fishing stations for fishing, and for harvesting the bounty of the
land.
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sharing the resources. Each family leader and their resources were linked.
If one family faltered in the management of their resources, for any reason
or in any manner, their extended family or allies in other districts united
with the family to resolve the problem. If family management of a
resource was a persistent problem creating scarcity or discomforts, the
saya or sakamowti was criticized and if necessary the situation adjusted
by the Mawfomi.
There are other examples in Mikmaw order that address the root causes
of scarcity, thus preventing it from becoming a problem. In the difficult
situations where any Mfkmaw took food or clothing, the local settlement
(wikamou) discussed the reasons something was taken, and if poverty or
need was found, then the taker was not punished. In these situations,
typically the extended family and settlement were criticized, since they
failed to be aware of the poverty and had not taken care to provide for the
needs of its members or visitors. If the predicament continued, the district
leaders (sakamowti) or Mawiomi provided the takers with necessary
space and responsibilities to harvest food, build shelter or make a new
settlement.
Additionally, any district chief or family leader who was negligent or
careless with the resources or did not deal in a generous and fair manner
with other Mfkmaq was deprived of respect, dignity, and ultimately their
responsibilities. Similarly, if travelers or visitors within the sacred space
had anything taken from them, the district chief and local community
were responsible, because of their negligence and lack of watchfulness.
These were grand and fundamental maxims of the customary law among
the Mikmaq in the land of friendships. 47 Most of these maxims were
directly incorporated in the treaties with the Imperial Crown and form the
context of the treaties.
147. See supra note 104.
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III. Mikmaq Tenure in Prerogative Treaties
[I]ndians were protected in the possession of the lands they occupied, and
were considered as owning them by a perpetual right of possession in the
tribe or nation inhabiting them, as their common property .... Subject to
this right of possession, the ultimate fee was in the crown .... Indian
possession or occupation was considered with reference to their habits and
modes of life; their hunting grounds were as much in their actual posses-
sion as the cleared fields of the whites; and their rights to its exclusive
enjoyment in their own way and for their own purposes were as much
respected....
Justice Baldwin of U.S. Supreme Court148
Mikmaq attitudes toward sharing of the sacred space are evident in
almost every treaty with the British Crown. The prerogative Treaties
reserve their land tenure and beneficial interest under the protection of the
Crown and separate from the provinces.1 49 These Treaties were forged
from the ancient ecological covenants with the Keepers of the Mntu and
from theirNikmanen law. The context for the prerogative Treaties was the
ancient Nikmanen Order.
1. Nikmanen Order
The boundaries of the Mfkmaq Nation remained unchanged for centuries,
despite shifting alliances among their allies. 50 They were surrounded by
either their Nikmaq or the ocean. The Nikmaq [allies or friends] of the
Mfkmaw Nation included: the Beothuk (up river people) in Newfound-
land; the Wulustukw keuwiuk (beautiful river people or Maliseet-
Passamaquoddy) of southwestern New Brunswick and northeastern
Maine; the Eastern "Abanaki" of Maine to Ottawa valley, various
148. Mitchel, supra note 79 at 745-46. Strong J. in St. Catharines Milling, supra note 5, after
noting Chancellor Kent Commentaries summary of the Worcester and Mitchel decisions,
stated that the traditional colonial policy relative to Indians and their lands "had ripened into
well established rules of law, and that the result is that the lands in the possession of the Indians
are, until surrendered, treated as their rightful though inalienable property, so far as the
possession and enjoyment are concerned; in other words, that the dominium utile is recognized
as belonging to or reserved for the Indians ...." (cited to S.C.R. at 612).
149. Imperial treaties of a political nature are usually called prerogative treaties and labeled
"sovereignty" treaties (R. v. Francis, 11956] S.C.R. 618 at 625 per Rand J.). Prerogative treaties
are documents of peace that recognize the independence of states, or establish boundaries, or
establish privileges and immunities, or deal with the rights of belligerents (ibid. at 626). It is
said that the essential feature of a prerogative treaty is the "exceptional" or "extraordinary"
nature of the circumstances of its formation (A.M. Jacomy-Millette, Treaty Law in Canada
(Ottawa, University of Ottawa Press, 1975) at 207).
150. See generally Mikrmaw society in Eurocentric literature, P. Nietfeld, "Determinants of
Aboriginal Micmac Political Structure" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Mexico, 1981);
B. Hoffman, "The Historical Ethnography of the Micmac of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Centuries" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1955).
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Montagnais groups north of the Saint Lawrence River, "Eskimo" or Inuit
for the Strait of Belle Isle; and in the 1500s, the Saint Lawrence
Haudenosaunee (Mohawk).
The Nikmaq of the Mflcmaw Nation usually spoke a similar language
and lived in similar maritime and forest environments. In the past, the
allies had consensually united and disunited with the Mfkmaw Nation
according to their desires. Still, a cultural consciousness maintained unity
between the allies, although each respected the other's diverse responses
to common problems and experiences. Their shared language and con-
sciousness formed the basis of a transnational order.
The Nikmanen Order illustrates the development of a voluntary
transnational law that was not based on the family structure. Instead the
order was based on consensual agreements among the indigenous federa-
tions and European monarchies.'I" The Europeans were careful to record
the Mfkmaq's Nikmanen or transnational confederations.' Confronted
with a well-populated land, an organized government and an elegant
economic order, the Europeans were forced to develop new concepts of
law and rights to deal with the allied people and their vast system of
"friends". From a Nikmanen perspective, relations with the Europeans or
guests were part of a continuous process of trying to make peace or
staying neutral in European conflicts.
Sometimes the allies cooperated in raids (called "wars" by Europeans)
against common enemies, particularly against the Mohawk and the
"Armochiquois".5 3 The purposes of these raids were not for territorial
acquisition or wealth, but rather they were seen as means to end a conflict
or enforce customary international trading laws.'54 The Nikmanen order
was not based on a negotiated peace, but rather maintaining and strength-
ening the peace. They saw peace as a state of mind calling for self-
discipline and forgiveness. They understood that a crisis-based council
151. For a description of the Eastern confederacies, see F.G. Speck, "The Eastern Algonkian
Wabanaki Confederacy" (1915) 17 Am. Anthropologist 492; W. Walker, G. Buesing & R.
Conkling, "A Chronological Account of the Wabanaki Confederacy" in E.L. Schusky, ed.,
Political Organization of Native North Americans (Washington D.C.: University Press of
America, 1980) at 41. The Confederacy was called lakutuwi (or kinship) in Passamaquoddy-
Maliseet dialect of Algonquian language, and lakuti in Mikmaq.
152. JR, supra note 141 vol. 3 at 87 and 90; Le Clercq, supra note 101 at 234.
153. Southern members of the Wabanaki Confederacy that were named by Champlain. They
lived from the Saco River in extreme southwest Maine to Cape Cod. They were primarily an
agricultural people with whom the Mikmaq traded. The northern members addressed them and
their more southern allies to the Delaware Nation (Lenape) as sawonehsonuk.
154. See A. Morrison, ed., "Membertou's Raid on the Choacoet Almouchiquois: the Micmac
Sack of Saco in 1607" trans. by C.J. Goetz, in W. Cowan, ed., Papers of the Sixth Algonquian
Conference (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1975); Hoffman, supra note 150.
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could not implement a policy of disengagement. Presents and satisfac-
tions for the military raids and the loss suffered encouraged good feelings,
amity, and international harmony.
A united Confederacy emerged from these conflicts, and created the
Nikmanet Order. At the time of the arri'al f the Euvapearxs, the
Wabanaki Confederacy comprised the Penobscot, Passamaquoddy,
Malecite, and the Mikmaq.I55 It was united with the Ottawa Confederacy,
comprising the Mohawk of Caughnawaga and Oka, the Thtes de Boule,
and the Ottawa. 5 6 The extended confederacy of more than fourteen
nations 5 7 had several descriptions.'58 This continental Confederacy,
usually called Great Council Fire by the Wabanaki, was renewed in 1701
155. As a confederacy they were addressed as Waponahkiyik; Penobscot are called
Panwapskewiyik; Passamaquoddy are Peskotomuhkatiyik; Malecites are Wolastoqiyik; and
M ,maq 'e, Mihtkomak.
156. The Wabanakis addressed the Mohawks as Meqiyik, those of Caughnawauga as
Kanawkiyik, those of Oka as Kanasatakiyik, the Thtes de Boule as Epokatpacik, and the Ottawa
asAtuwak. See Leavitt & Francis, WapapiAkonutomakonol, The Wampum Records (Fredericton:
Micmac-Maliseet Institute, University of New Brunswick, 1990) at 13. WapapiAkonutomakonol
is "talking white beads" that comprised the records of the reason and purpose for the
confederation.
157. "Nit lahkalusonikikon olu nit nit mawe laukutuwi kisolutomuwakon. Skicinuwok newanku
kehsuhkomiksuwok kenu olu kceyawi milicoposultuwok. Msi te yuktok skicinuwok 'tahcuwi
oliyaniay naks wikiniya tepahkalusioniw .... Nit olu tan tehpu wikit tepahkalusioniw 'tahcuwi
ciksotomonol tan eyikil tpaskuwakonol, or kosona osemha. Nit wikuwam tepahkalusioniw
itomuwiw msi te kehsit skicin kisihtaq cuwi sankewipomawsu. Katania apc cikawiyutultiwon.
Cuwi ohi pomawsuwok tahalu wesiwestulticik[,] witsehkehsulticik peskuwol te 'nikihkuwal".
(As for the fence implemented, that [is] that confederacy agreement. The Indians [are] fourteen
ibes,but many different groups. X11 a ihe Indians had 11D go and live iside *afen't.... And
as for whoever dwelled within the fence, he or she had to obey whatever laws were there or be
whipped. That house within the fence signifies every individual Indian who made it must live
peacefully. There would be no bothering one another anymore. They had to live like brothers,
sisters, [with] the same parent) (Ibid. at 57).
158. The Wabanaki concept forjoining one another in a confederacy is 'tolakutiniya (literally
they be related by kinship 'one other they were'). The Passamaquoddy, Malecite and Mikmaw
called it the Putusosuwakon or the Convention Council or kcimawe putuwosuwakon that is a
great joint council meeting. To meet in council is Putuwosin; when everybody meets in council
it is Putuwosiniya, and their councilors were addressed as putuwosiuwinum. In a council
meeting, the alliance was addressed as kcilakutuwakon or Great kinship or Confederacy.
However, the Penobscot as speakers for the Wabanakis often used the terms Peskuwok (those
united into One) or Kisakutuwok (They are Completely United or already related). The
Confederacy laws were called tpaskuwakonol, or measures. All these laws had to be made in
wampum, they would be read annua'ly or when someone asked what had happened on that
occasion (Msiw yuhtol tpaskuwakonol cuwi lihtasuwol wapapik wecihc kisokitasik tan tehpu
eli kinuwi tpiyak) See Ibid. at 51-61. After King William's War (1688-1699) and King
Georges's War (1744-1749), this Confederacy was extended to manage the European warfare
that affected the nations, this continental Confederacy was called the Great Council Fire.
Because of unfamiliarity with the Aboriginal languages, researchers often confuse the Great
Convention Council with the Great Council Fire. The Great Council Fire was the first
confederacy in Canada. See Speck, supra note 151.
240 The Dalhousie Law Journal
and 1749, and extended the alliance to the Lakes Confederacy of the
Obijwa 59 and the Cree (Nehiywaw) Confederacy,' 6° who were related to
the Blackfoot and Lakota Confederacies.161 This interconnectedness was
continued in the treaty process with the Crown.
The extension of indigenous transnational law to include the British
Sovereign is reflected in the Treaties. The early Treaties can be viewed
as an extended Aboriginal system of tensions or bridges linking different
worldviews to a consensual order. The Georgian treaties typically were
made according to Aboriginal, rather than European, protocols. 162 The
Aboriginal Nations conceived of Treaties as living agreements rather
than mere documents. Often the cordiality of the annual meeting and
discussion was seen as more important than the substance of the terms.
Propositions were made orally at conferences and agreed to one by one
with the exchange of symbolic gifts or wampum. Beyond the particular
framework of obligations or rights agreed upon, the agreements created
a permanent, living relationship. Typically this relationship was ex-
pressed in terms of an extended kinship-the King as "father" and the
colonist as "brothers". This is consistent with an indigenous worldview. 1
63
To preserve the kinship, as within a natural family, the Aboriginal
nations and the representatives of the King were obliged to meet from
time to time to renew the friendship, to reconcile misunderstandings, and
to share with each other understandings, experiences and wealth. Thus
most of the treaties were in reality renewal ceremonies of subsisting
relationships. In documentary form these ceremonies mostly consisted of
a transcript of the proceedings and the substance of the agreement
summarizing the nature of the international kinship. This was often
characterized by the metaphor of the chain. By European standards the
agreements were often unnervingly succinct, even vague, but this was not
the result of failure to agree, nor of naivet6. It was the result of abiding by
tribal protocol and worldviews, the acceptance by the British Sovereign
of the aboriginal flexible, kin like nature of the confederation. These
treaties were never intended to locate the Aboriginal nations under the
Crown's direct authority or under the immigrant governments, since they
159. The Wabanaki addressed these Confederacies as Sonutsekotonuk.
160. The Wabanaki addressed this Confederacy as Oquathu'kuk.
161. The Wabanaki addressed these Confederacies as Ksiyahsonuk.
162. The use of First Nations' protocols was a common treaty practice. See Leavitt, supra
note 156; J.G.A. Pocock, "Law, Sovereignty and History in a Divided Culture: The Case of
New Zealand and the Treaty of Waitangi" (Irdell Memorial Lecture, Department of History,
University of Lancaster, 10 October 1991) [unpublished].
163. R.L. Barsh & J.Y. Henderson, "Aboriginal Rights, Treaty Rights, and Human Rights:
Indian Tribes and Constitutional Renewal" (1982) 17:2 J.Can. Studies 55.
Mikmaw Tenure in Atlantic Canada
had no concept of rules from above and did not tolerate such a conception
of rule. The treaties were a partnership. They merely created a consensual
order and a protective relationship"64 reflecting both an Aboriginal view
of order and procedure, and a Eurocentric view of order.
165
The prerogative Treaties enabled the two worldviews and different
societies to make a new normative world using the irony of jurisdictions,
obligations and rights. To live in the new legal world required each
culture to know not only the meaning of the alliance and its terms, but also
the connections or transformations that resulted when one normative
system passed through another. The prerogative Treaties constructed,
through mutual consent, a new normative system out of the various
constructions of reality and visions of what the world might be.
For example, the Wabanaki and Mfkmaq applied the customary
concept of harmony and forgiveness to the English. Specifically, article
2 of the Mikmaw Compact, 1752, stated that "all Transactions during the
Late War on both sides be buried in Oblivion with the Hatchet."'166 This
fragile quest for an explicit order between the diverse federations through
consensual Treaties provided the foundation upon which developed the
first British Empire and their colonies, and eventually the United
Kingdom. 67
2. Prerogative Treaties
Since the mere acquisition of sovereignty by European powers over
Aboriginal lands by European treaties or conquest did not extinguish
164. See H. De Puy, ed., Bibliography of the English Colonial Treaties with the American
Indians (1917); J. Borrows, supra note 47; Slattery, supra note 61; B. Wildsmith, "Treaty
Responsibilities: A Co-Relational Model" (1992) special ed. U.B.C. L. Rev. 324; B. Slattery,
"Aboriginal Sovereignty and Imperial Claims" (1991) Osgoode Hall L.J. 681 at 683.
165. RCAP, supra note 47.
166. In Leavitt, supra note 156 at 54, the idea of creating the Convention Council was
expressed "Yuhtol pekankonikil tomkikonossisol olu naka tapihikpahqilil cuwipuskonasuwol
askomiw" or in translation "These bloody hatchets, bows, and arrows, however, must be buried
forever." Compare to Milnmaw Compact, 1752, art. 2, text and note infra 177.
167. J.Y. Henderson, "The Status of Indian Treaties in International Law" (Paper presented
to the 1993 Conference of the Canadian Council of International Law, Ottawa, 21-23 October
1993) at 132; D.V. Jones, License For Empire: Colonialism By Treaty In Early America
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); See C. Alexandrowicz, The European-African
Confrontation: A Study in Treaty-Making (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1973); C. Alexandrowicz,
An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1967); F. Cohen, Federal Indian Law (Washington: Govt. Printing Services, 1942);
M.F. Lindley, The Acquisition of Backward Territory (London: Longmans, Green & Co.,
1926); A. Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West
Territories, rev. ed. (Saskatoon: Fifth House Publishers, 1991).
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Aboriginal tenure,168 the source of British authority in North America was
created by confederations with the Aboriginal peoples around preroga-
tive Treaties. In the North Atlantic territory, the fundamental principles
of the treaty order were forged in the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), and
realized in the Wabanaki Compact (1713-1725), and the Mfkmaw
Compact (1752-1789). Conforming with the holistic Aboriginal con-
sciousness, the Wabanaki and Mikmaw Compacts were interconnected
and complementary; they were not autonomous agreements. Between
1693 and 1786, more than fifty treaty conferences defined the relation-
ship between the Aboriginal nations of Atlantic Canada and the Imperial
Crown.' 69 These documents are called the Georgian treaties. These
treaties will be closely examined to ascertain the context of the Aborigi-
nal-Crown relationship.
a. Treaty of Utrecht (1713)
This was the first European treaty to acknowledge English political
authority in North America. In section XII, the French granted to the
British political authority all their rights and pretension to the ancient
limits of L'Acadie, which was renamed Nova Scotia; the City of Port
Royal, now called Annapolis Royal and to the Island of Newfoundland.
Britain promised, in turn, not to disturb the Aboriginal nations, who had
been "Friends" to France during the war.
In practice, the "Friends"'7 of Great Britain and France continued their
freedom of trade, protected by section XV (15) of the Treaty of Utrecht
which stated:
168. In British law, a cession of territory by a treaty is a public international law concept. As
I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990)
explains "The term 'cession' is used to cover a variety of types of transactions, and it is
important to seek the legal realities behind the term in each case." (at 133, n.36). Both treaties
of cession and conquest do not terminate the original rights in the territory, expressions of
positive law are required to extinguish those rights. In British law, the reserved rights doctrine
is called the doctrine of continuity in the classic theory of the common law, (Campbell v. Hall
(1774), Lofft 655, 1 Cowp. 204 (K.B.)), and in United States' law it is called the doctrine of
tribal sovereignty (Cohen, supra note 167 at 122).
169. A. Levi et al., "We Should Walk in the Tract Mr. Drummer Made" (Distributed at New
Brunswick Chiefs' Forum on Treaty Issues, St. John, New Brunswick, 1-2 October 1992)
[unpublished]. See also The Mi'Kmaq Treaty Handbook (Native Communication Society of
Nova Scotia, 1987); W.E. Daugherty, Maritime Indian Treaties in Historical Perspectives
(Canada: Indian and Northern Affairs, 1981); Crown Land Rights and Hunting and Fishing
Rights of Micmac Indians in the Province of Nova Scotia, rev. ed. (Union of Nova Scotia
Indians, 1976).
170. This phrase is derived from Algonquian language and the Crown's "alien friend in
league" in Calvin's Case, supra note 18.
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The Subjects of France Inhabiting Canada and others, shall hereafter give
no Hindrance or Molestation to the Five Nations or Cantons of Indians,
Subject to the Dominion of Great Britain; nor to the other aboriginal of
America, who are Friends to the same. In like manner, the Subjects of
Great Britain, shall behave themselves Peaceably toward the Americas,
who are Subjects orTriends to rance; and on both Sides, they shal enjoy
full Liberty of going and coming on Account of Trade. As also the
aboriginal of those Countries shall, with the same Liberty, Resort, as they
please, to the British and French Colonies, for Promoting Trade on one
Side, and the other without any Molestation or Hindrance, either on the
Part of the British Subjects or of the French.
17 1
In the eighteenth century, the terms "liberty" and "franchise" were
used interchangeably to denote royal grants of exclusive economic rights.
Sir Matthew Hale wrote that "liberties or preeminences" were created
under the King's jura regalia. Liberties included "jurisdictions, fran-
chises, and exemptions" that are grounded in express grants or charters
or in the presumptim of Iong "sage' 72 These liber'ties were exclns ie,
inviolable prerogative franchises which limited both the Sovereign, and
subsequent Parliamentary or Colonial legislation.173 Thus, section XV
recognizes and affirms a prerogative franchise of free trade across the
treaty borders to the Aboriginal nations.
Additionally, as a part of the free trade agreement the European
Crowns agreed in section XV that Aboriginals "shall, with the same
Liberty, Resort, as they please". This prohibits the Crown or colonists
from dispossessing the Aboriginals within their agreed upon borders,
thus affirming their aboriginal entitlement to their lands under treaty
boundaries.
Moreover, a commission was established to define the scope of the
"ancient limits of Acadia" and to determine who were the subjects and
friends of the respective crowns. 174 The French commissioners inter-
preted the claim to pertain only to actual French settlements, stressing the
unextinguished Aboriginal dominion of the Mikmaq. The British com-
missioners argued for a broader interpretation, including absentee French
seigniorial grants. 175 However, as I shall argue in the following two
sections, the prerogative Treaties with the Wabanaki and Mflcmaw
nations independently resolved the jurisdictional quandary.
171. A.Toynbee, Major Peace Treates of Modern tistory 1648-1 967, ed. by F.L. Israel, vol.
I (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1967) at 179.
172. The Prerogative of the King D, Yale, ed., vol.92 (London: Seldon Society, 1976) at 201.
173. E. Chitty, Treaties of the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crowz: and the Relative Duties
and Rights of the Subject (London: Joseph Butterworth & Son, 1820) at 119.
174. See Toynbee, supra note 171 at section XV.
175. W.S. McNutt, The Atlantic Provinces: The Emergence of Colonial Society 1712-1857
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1965) at 10-14 and 38-41.
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b. Wabanaki Compact (1713-1760)
After European ratification of the Treaty of Utrecht, the Crown extended
the ratification process to America. This was an attempt to consolidate
British external authority through the voluntary consent of the Aboriginal
nations. This transfer of authority between European Crowns was ratified
by the Wabanaki Confederacy'76 in 1713 and 1714.177 At Portsmouth,
New Hampshire, in 1713, each of the member tribes expressed the "free
consent of all the Indians" belonging to their "several rivers and places"
to be the lawful subjects of Queen Anne, with each tribe promising its
"hearty Subjection & Obedience unto the Commonwealth at Boston" as
well as the Crown of Great Britain.1 78 The tribal delegates agreed to
"cease and forbear all acts of hostility" towards British persons and their
estates and to "maintaine a firm & constant amity & friendship" with
them. They agreed not to entertain any treasonable conspiracy with other
nations to disturb the British inhabitants. 1
79
Article 3 of these treaties clarified the scope of the British settlements
in Wabanaki dominion and, at the same time, reserved Aboriginal
dominion and liberties as separate from those of the British.
That her Majesty's Subjects, the English, shall & may peaceably & quietly
enter upon, imprive [sic], & forever enjoy, all and singular their Rights of
Land & former Settlements, Properties, & possessions with the Eastern
Parts of the said Province of Massachusetts Bay and New Hampshire,
together with all the Islands, Isletts, Shoars, Beaches, & Fisheries within
176. Wabanaki (waponahkik) is the sound describing the space of the dawn or land of dawn.
Uhkomiks is their name for a related group, kehsuhkomiksit is many related groups or tribes.
Sakamo is a chief, sakamoak is chiefs; kcisakomak is great chiefs. Skicinu is a term for the
Indians, skicin is an Indian.
177. R.A. Cumming & N.H. Mickenberg, eds., Native Rights in Canada (Toronto: Indian-
Inuit Assoc. of Canada, 1972) at 295ff [hereinafter CM]. The Wabanaki Treaties with the
Crown begin with the Treaty of 1676 with the Sacos, Androscoggins, Kennebecs, and
Penobscots. In the Treaty of 1678 the English Crown recognized Wabanaki sovereignty and
dominion in New England. The Wabanaki also entered into treaties in 1690, 1693, 1699. (The
Wabanakis of Maine and the Maritimes (Bath, Maine, Maine Indian Program, 1989) at D89-
90. Manuscript copies of the treaties are in Public Record Office (PRO), Colonial Office Series
(CO), organized by date. The principal colonial correspondence is contained in the Colonial
Office Series. They were reorganized by the Public Record Office in England earlier this
century. Prior to this Nova Scotia had organized its records in Public Archives of Nova Scotia
[PANS]. French sources are Archives Nationales, Paris [AN], Archives des Colonies [AC],
Canada [CIlIA. Other sources are the Public Achives of Canada [PAC], and Baxter,
Documentary History of the State of Maine (Portland: Fred L. Tower Co. & Maine Historical
Society, 1916) [DHM].
178. CM, ibid. at 296-99 in Article 1 and 7.
179. Ibid. at Article 2. This is similar to the WapapiAkonutomakonol agreement (Leavitt,
supra note 156 at 60), that if any nation or group disobeyed the Confederation or Wampum
laws, the others together would watch them. (Nit ha lohkalusonihikon naka ipis nihtol nit
Wapapi Tpaskuwakonal. Tan wot pelsotok, 'tahcuwi mawe skiyawal kehsuhkomiksicik).
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the same, without any molestation or claim by us or any other Indians. And
be in no ways molested, interrupted, or disturbed therein. Saving unto the
said Indians their own Grounds, & free liberty for Hunting, Fishing,
Fowling and all other their Lawful Liberties & Privileges, as on the
eleventh day of August in the year of our Lord God One thousand six
hundred & ninety three. 1
8 0
Misunderstandings and violations of the Wabanaki dominion pro-
tected by these Treaties created many military conflicts. The English
assumed that the Wabanaki's permission gave them the sole and exclu-
sive estates of the land, thereby renouncing any claim to the land.' 8 ' Under
Nikamen law, the Wabanaki viewed the English settlements as "guests"
with a right to share the land. In their view, they had given the colonists
a chance to enter into a particular kind of relationship with the land. 8" The
treaty conference and treaties of 1717 were a way of working out this
understanding and affirming the issue of land tenure and title.'83
180. Ibid. at 297 in Article 3. While this article is more specific than the Wapapi
Akonutomakononol, it is similar. It creates an "implemented fence" or boundary between the
British and the Wabanaki legal jurisdictions, so that there would be no bothering one another
anymore (supra note 141). The concept of forever is askomiw. Compare the original Treaty of
Falmouth, 1678 between the Abenakis and English that concluded King Philips War (1675-
78) where it was agreed that the settlers were to enjoy their habitations and possessions
unmolested, but Massachusetts Bay agreed to pay the Indians an annual quit rent "of a peck of
corn" for every English family (K.M. Morrison, The People of the Dawn: The Abenakis and
their Relations with New England and New France 1600-1727 (Ph.D. Thesis, University of
Maine, 1975) at 152.
181. See DMH, supra note 177 F16-M33, vol. 3 (Treaty Conference held 9-10 August,
1717). E.g. "The Gov.: They must Desist from any Pretension to the Lands which the English
own."; "They must not call it their Land, for the English have bought it of them and their
Ancestors"; "Tell them they must be sensible and satisfied that the English own this land, and
have Deeds to shew, and set forth their Purchase from their Ancestors."
182. Ibid. E.g. Wiwuran, spokesman for the Wabanaki stated "We can't understand how our
Lands have been purchased, what has been Alienated was by our Gift"; "We are a little uneasy
concerning these Lands, but are willing the English shall possess all they have done, excepting
Forts" (ibid.). See above part II.
183. Ibid. "Gov.: Tell them we will not take an Inch of their Land; nor will we part with an
Inch of our own." The evening of August 10, the Governor received a letter from French
Governor Vaudreville from the Wabanki priest. The letter stated that when Vandreville was
lately in France, he enquired of the King of France, whether he had in any Treaty given away
the Indians' Lands to the English, and that the French King told him, he had not, but was ready
to succour the Indians, if their Lands were encroacht upon. (ibid.) The Governor rejected the
letter as not worthy of his regard. However, the following day, August 11, the Wabanaki and
the Crown "agreed in the Articles of Peace, that the English should Settle, where their
Predecessors had done." (ibid.) In tile 1717 Treaty they confirmed article 3 of the 1713 Treaty
and added "And whereas, some rash and inconsiderate Persons amongst us, have molested
some of our good fellow Subjects, the English, in the Possession of the Lands, and other
illtreated them;-We do disapprove & condemn the same,-and freely consent that our English
friends shall possess, enjoy & improve all the Lands which they have formerly possessed, and
all which they have obtain a right & title unto, Hoping it will prove of mutual and reciprocal
benefit and advantage to them & us, that they Cohabit with us" (CM, supra note 177 at 299.)
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The Wabanaki Compact (1725) concluded at Boston ended Drummer's
War. ' 4 It reflected a union of the terms of the Treaties of Utrecht, the
Wapapi Akonutomakonol, and the previous Wabanaki Treaties. The
"Severall Tribes of Eastern Indians" were represented by the Wabanaki
Confederacy; His Majesty was represented by the Lieutenant Governor
Drummer of Massachusetts Bay. The Wuastukwuk or Malecite Nation of
the Saint John River (Wulstukw) was also part of the Confederacy. The
Wabanaki Compact renewed the 1693 political and geographical status
quo of the existing treaties. To clarify its dual topics, the existing article
3 of the 1713-14 treaty was divided into two separate articles, 3 and 4, in
the Wabanaki Compact. Article 3 of the compact promised that the
English subjects
Shall and may peaceably and quietly enter upon Improve and forever enjoy
all the singular Rights of God and former settlements[,] properties and
possessions within the Eastern parts of the said province of the Massachu-
setts Bay Together with all Islands, inletts[,] Shoars [,] Beaches and
Fishery within the same without any molestation or claim by us or any
other Indians and be in no way molested[,] interrupted or disturbed
therein. 185
The Confederacy's predominant concern was intrusion on established
territorial boundaries by the British settlers.'86 One of the spokesmen
directly asked the treaty commissioners if the term "settlements" meant
that the "English design[ed] to Build Houses further than there are any
Houses now Built or Settlements made?" "When we come to settle the
bounds" the treaty commissioners answered, "we shall neither Build or
Settle anywhere but within our Bounds so settled [under the 1693 treaty]
without your consent." '87 Later in the negotiations, the Confederacy
sought to clarify the concept of "former Settlements" in Article 3:
We desire to know the right meaning and understanding of two words. As
to the Deed of Land as far as St. Georges Fort, whether Houses will be built
& Settlements made as far as the English have purchased. We are free &
plain in our discourse that there may be no misunderstanding afterward. As
to the Lands that have not been purchased that lye Vacant in spaces
184. E.g. CO, supra note 184 at vol. 5 (1898) 173-74v.
185. CM, supra note 177 at 300, Treaty of 1725, Article 3.
186. In the WapapiAkonutomakonol (Leavitt, supra note 156 at 56), the idea for creating the
Convention Council was expressed "Nit Msiw mehtewestuhtihtit[,] nit oi kisolutomuk
'tolihtuniya kci lahkahusonihikon naka tuciw 'punomoniya epahsiw kci wikuwam
tepahkalusoniw" or "Then when they were finished talking, all decided to make a big fence and
besides they put in the middle [of it] a big house within the fence." The same approach was taken
with the British Crown.
187. CO, supra note 177, vol. 5 173-74v (20 November 1725). This issue was also the topic
of 1726 Treaty Conference at Falmouth in Casco-Bay (DMH, supra note 177 F16-M33, vol. 3
1-5 August 1726).
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between what has been purchased, whether when the English come to
Settle there shall not bear a consideration for that Land. And whether we
shall not have a further gratuity or acknowledgment made to us for what
has been purchased of our Fore Fathers. The reason of our Enquiring into
this is, that we may be able to tell it right when we come home to the Tribes.
The British commissioners, after consulting the governor, responded
concerning future settlements as far as St. George's Fort, so far as the
English had purchased by deed:
Those Lands are the property of particular Persons who have the Indian
right by fair purchase, as you are sensible by the Deeds which have been
shown you, & you Cannot reasonably Expect that the sd. Proprietors
should be hindered of making Improvemt. of what is their own however
care will be taken by the Government That no Encroachmt. shall be made
on you, and that they do not any wise Injure you, but treat you as Friends
& good Neighbours."'
Addressing the Confederacy's question concerning the "Lands that have
not been purchased which lye Vacant in spaces between what hath been
purchased"; the commissioners stated that the British subjects would
have to purchase it from the tribes. "[I]f the English should have a mind
to purchase any of it, when they come to settle, you shall hereafter
Dispose of to the English, and therefore when ever you sell any Land, it
will be best for you to acquaint the Government thereof, & they will take
care that you be not wrong therein.
'1189
188. Ibid. (26 November 1725). An example of one of these deeds is"... Madockawando,
[one of the Wabanaki treaty negotiators in 16931 deed to Sir William Phipps, Knight... dated
May 9th, 1694, Land both sides of St. Georges River bounded Eastward by Westsouwestkeeg
and westward of the west of Hatches Cove Island..." cited in Levi, supra note 169 at 26 this
was taken from Descriptions of English Deeds in the Province of Maine drawn from
Proceedings of the English "land claims" Committee established pursuant to the Peace of 1725/
26. Loron, the spokesman, stated "We can't find any Record in our Memory, nor in the Memory
of Our Grand Fathers that the Penobscutt Tribe have sold any Land, as to the Deed mention last
Winter, made by Medockewanda and Sheepscutt John they were not Penobscutt Indian, one
belonging to Mechias Medockewondo, the other towards Boston, if we can find in reality that
the Lands were Purchased of the right Owners, we should not have insisted upon it, nor have
opened our Mouths, we would not pretend to tell a Lye about it" (DMH, F16-M33, vol. 3, 3
August 1726). See also J.W. Springer, "American Indians and the Law of Real Property in
Colonial New England" (1986) 30 Am. J.L. History 25; H.R. Shurtleff, ed., Record of the
Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England, 1628-1686 (Boston: Press
of WilliamWhite, 1853-54) vol.4, Part II,at 213 (Royal Commissioners reaffirmed Indian title
to all their lands).
189. Ibid. 26 November 1725. In the Treaty Conference held at Falmouth in Casco-Bay, in
July and August 1726, Lt. Gov. Drummer told the Wabanaki "you shall have equal Justice in
all Points with the Subject of His Majesty King George, either in Controversies respecting the
Property of Land, or any other matters whatsoever, we don't suppose that any Gentlemen that
come to produce or offer Claims of Lands there shall be their own Judges, but it shall be
determined by Lawful Authority, wherein the Indians shall have the Benefit of the Law, equal
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Article 4, following Article 3 of the 1713 treaty, stated:
Saving unto the Penobscot, Naridgwalk and other Tribes within His
Majesty's province aforesaid and their natural Descendants respectively
all their lands, Liberties and properties not by them convey'd or sold to or
possessed by any of the English subjects as aforesaid. As also the privilege
of fishing, hunting, and fowling as formerly 90
The treaty acknowledged they were friends and subjects of the King.
However, the British treaty commissioners candidly admitted they were
not successful in getting the tribes to recognize King George as the sole
owner and proprietor of New England and Nova Scotia. 9 '
In 1743, a prerogative Court of Appeal heard the complaints of a
southern member of the Wabanaki Confederacy against a royal colony,
and held that the aboriginal nations had the property of the soil, thus
affirming the treaties terms.'9 2 The Royal Court of Commissioners in the
Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut case held, over one dissent, that:
The Indians, though living amongst the king's subjects in these countries,
are a separate and distinct people from them, they are treated as such, they
have a polity of their own, they make peace and war with any nations of
Indians when they think fit, without control from the English.
It is apparent the crown looks upon them not as subjects, but as a distinct
people, for they are mentioned as such throughout Queen Anne's and his
present Majesty's commission by which we now sit. And it is plain, in my
conception, that the property of the soil of these countries; and that their
lands are not, by his majesty's grant of particular limits of them for a
Colony, thereby impropriated in his subjects till they have madefair and
honest purchase of the natives. 193
They concluded that controversies with the tribes of Indians protected by
treaty were neither controlled by the laws of England nor colonial laws,
but rather by "a law equal to both parties, which is the law of nature and
of nations. 1
94
with any Englishmen whatsoever, and this you may be assured of, for we don't expect a Peace
to last on any other footing than that of Justice." DMH, supra note 177 at F16-M33, vol. 3
(Treaty Conference, 4 August 1726).
190. CM, supra note 177 at 301, Treaty of 1725, Article 3.
191. PAC, supra note 177 at RG 1, vol. 12 (15 December 1725).
192. J.R. Smith, "Appeals from Royal Commissions" in Appeals to the Privy Councilfor the
American Plantations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959) at 417.
193. Ibid. at 427-28; Certified Copy Book of Proceedings Before Commission of Review
1743 (1779) at Houghton Library, Harvard University. See 1773 Proclamation, supra note 64.
See also less than a century later, United States Supreme Court reached the same conclusions
in Worcester, supra note 5.
194. Smith, ibid. at 434; Certified Copy Book of Proceedings Before Commission of Review
1743 (1779:118). See also B.A. Clark, Native Liberty, Crown Sovereignty (McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1990) at 37.
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This decision affirmed that in British law the Aboriginal nations were
a separate and foreign jurisdiction from the colonies. It recognized their
disputes were "controlled" by the law of nature and nations and under the
protection of the Crown in Council in London, under the Crown's
prerogative jurisdiction of foreign affairs, rather than through local
colonial officers. The Governor of Connecticut appealed this decision to
the Privy Council where the case lingered until 1771 when the Privy
Council affirmed the 1743 Commission's decision. 95
Further ratifications of the Compact by southern Wabanaki tribes of
the Compact were held at Casco Bay in 1727, 1728, 1732; at Annapolis
Royal in 1728 and 1735; and at Deerfield in 1735. Treaty Conferences
were held with the Wabanaki tribes at Boston in 1740; St. George's Fort
(Maine) in 1742; Annapolis Royal in 1744; Falmouth, Boston and
Halifax Harbour in 1749; and St. George's Fort in 1751, 1752, 1753 and
1754; Falmouth in 1754, Halifax and Fort Frederick in 1770; Boston in
1773; Halifax in t775, t778, 1776; St. John River in 1777; Fort Howe
(Saint John) in 1778; Aukpaque in 1780; and Oromocto in 178 1.196
Mfkmaq delegates attended each of these treaty conferences. Some of the
Mfkmaq district chiefs acceded to the Compact in 1726 at Annapolis
Royal and 1749 at Halifax.
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After the 1726 ratification conference at Casco Bay, the spokesperson
for the Wabanaki Confederacy, Loron Sagourrat, wrote Lieutenant-
Governor Drummer objecting to the written treaty. He wrote that,
"Having hear'd the Acts read which you have given me I have found the
Articles entirely differing from what we have said in presence of one
another, 'tis therefore to disown them that i write this letter unto you. 198
In particular, he challenged the addition of a statement thal the Wabanaki
acknowledge King George to be their King and had "declar'd themselves
to the Crown of England". Loron wrote that during the treaty negotiations
when you hae ask'd me if I acknowledg'd Him for king i answer'd yes butt
att the same time have made you take notice that I did not understand to
195. 15 January 1771 [P.C.]; Order in Council Sustaining a Report of a Board of Review of
a Decision of Board of Enquiry into Complaints of the Mohegan Indians, 1773.
196. Levi, supra note 169 and The Wabanakis of Maine, supra note 177. During this time,
British Treaties with the Six Nations in 1740 (Albany), 1744 (Lancaster), 1752 (Logstown) and
1778 (Fort Stanwix) were concluded, extending their Covenant Chain. They provided for the
protection of the King and promises that the King will always purchase their lands and never
take them from them. See A.T. Vaughan & W.S. Robinson, eds., Early American Indian
Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789 (University Publication of America) (Virginia
Treaties, 1723-1775) vol. 5 at 26-30 and 51-89; J. Hurley, Children or Brethren: Aboriginal
Rights in Colonial Iroquoia (Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, 1985).
197. CM, supra note 177 at 302-06.
198. DHM, supra note 177 at vol. 23 at 208.
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acknowledge Him for my king butt only that I own'd that he was king his
kingdom as the king of France is king of His.'99
The Mflkmaq Delegation at the Wabanaki Treaty Conference asserted the
same position. On December 1, 1725, when Lieutenant Governor
Mascarene read to the Mfkmaq Delegates a proposed ratification Treaty
(often labeled Number 239), the Mfkmaq stated their own understanding
of the words: they were supposed to "pay all the respect & Duty to the
King of Great Britain as we did to ye King of France, but we reckon our
selves a free People and are not bound. '
'200
The prerogative Treaties, the "great King's Talk" with the Wabanaki
displayed the four distinctive characteristics of the Aboriginal legal mind
in the Nikmanen and aboriginal order: a reliance on consensual jurisdic-
tions rather than rule from above; a quest to share peace and friendships
in the Wabanaki territiory through insular, collective autonomy and
boundaries; an abhorrence of warfare and quest for harmony; and, an
elastic respect for legal transformations of each people. Additionally, the
treaties recognized and affirmed aboriginal tenure as a distinct tenure.
According to their traditional concept of sharing, they granted peaceful
occupation to those English minorities who had acquired an interest in
Wabanaki tenure by a fair, honest, and consensual purchase from the
Wabanaki nations. The Wabanaki treaty created the foundation for the
Mfkmaw Compact.
c. Mikmaw Compact (1752-1789)
After the War of Austrian Succession, the French and English sovereigns
mutually restored all conquests made during the war in the Treaty of Aix-
la-Chappelle (1748). Acadia was returned to England. Article III re-
newed and confirmed the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht, "as if they were
therein asserted, word for word. This renewal included Article XV,
199. Ibid. (1916) at 209. The French-speakers present at the ratification confirm that the
Wabanaki had "come to salute the English Governor to make peace with him and to renew the
ancient friendship which has been between them before", not to submit themselves to the
English King or accept responsibility for beginning the hostility with the English, or that they
would live according to English law ("Trait6 de paix entre les anglois et les abenakis" (1727),
in Collection de manucrits, vol. 3 (Quebec, 1884) at 134-135). Compare to article 7 of the
Article of Capitulation of Grenda and judicial interpretation of that phrase in Campbell v. Hall,
supra note t67 at 205.
200. (2 December 1725) 17 PAC NS "A" MG 1 CO 217. In 1752, the Abenakis gave a similar
description of the relations to the King of France to the Governor of Massachusetts represen-
tative "We are entirely free, we are allies of the King of France, from whom we have received
the Faith and all sorts of assistance in our necessities; we love that monarch, and we are strongly
attached to his interest." (C. Jaenen, "French Sovereignty and Native Nationhood during the
French Regime" in J.R. Miller, ed., Sweet Promises: A Reader on Indian-White Relations in
Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991) at 32).
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protecting Aboriginal sovereignty, dominion and trading liberties as
allies or "Friends" of either the British or French.
20 1
The original Commissions to the Governors of Nova Scotia in 1719
ordered the Governor to send for the several heads of the said Indian
Nations or clans, and promise them friendship and protection on His
Majesty's part.2"2 The 1749 Commission to Cornwallis, establishing the
royal colony of Nova Scotia, renewed the 1719 order and provided for the
preconditions of grants of land in fee simple to the colonialists. The first
condition was that the Governor was conditionally "directed to make
grants of such land in fee simple as are not already disposed of by his
Majesty to any person that shall apply to you for the same. '23 Secondly,
as a condition antecedent, the Commission required that before the
Governor could grant any such land to English subjects, he had "by &
with the advice and consent of our said Council to settle and agree with
the Inhabitants of our Province for such Lands, Tenements, & heredita-
ments as now are or hereafter shall be in our power to dispose of.
' 2 4
Reading these provisions together, they confirm that the Mlkmaw Nation
were entitled to their reserved lands under their existing treaties with the
Crown in 1726 until they were purchased by the Crown.
This 'settle and agree' provision was an important condition anteced-
ent, and an explicit constitutional limitation on the colonial Crown's
authority to establish these estates in Nova Scotia. It witnessed an
elaboration of the requirement of fair and honest purchase of tribal
201. C.M. Parry, ed., The Consolidated Treaty Series (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publica-
tions, 1969) vol 38 at 305.
202. 1719 Instruction to GovernorPhilips of Nova Scotia, 19 June 1719; L.W. Labaree,Royal
Instructions to British Colonial Governors, 1670-1776 (N.Y.: D. Appleton, Century Co.,
1935) vol. 2, No. 673 at 469. See Statement prepared by the Council of Trade and Plantations
for the King, 8 September 1721 ("It would likewise be for your Majesty's service that the sev.
Govemts of your Majesties Plantations should endevor to make treaties and alliances of
friendship with as many Indian nations as they can .. ") cited in Levi, supra note 169 at 35.
203. Labaree, ibid. at 581; See generally L.W. Labaree, Royal Government in America (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1930).
204. Ibid., emphasis added. This section applies the British principle of continuity of laws to
the new royal colony. This principle is called the doctrine of Continuity in British law, and
reserved rights in the United States. The principle of continuity of property rights provides that
property rights, once established, continue unaffected by a change of sovereignty unless
positively modified or abrogated by the new sovereign (Campbell, supra note 168 at 895). This
principle has been held to apply to aboriginal title by the highest courts in the United States,
Great Britain, and Canada (Worcester, supra note 5 at 544 and 559; Mitchel, supra note 79 at
734; Symonds, supra note 5; Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker (1901), [1901] A.C. 561 at 579 (P.C.);
Re Southern Rhodesia (1918), [1919] A.C. 211 at 234 (P.C.); Amodu Tijani, supra note 43;
Calder, supra note 5 at 383 and 401 per Hall J.; Guerin, supra note 54 at 377). The Crown
provided the correct procedure for settling and agreeing with the Inhabitants by public cession
provisions in the 1773 Proclamation, supra note 64.
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dominion by the Governor for the British Sovereign. It also prevented any
private purchase of tribal dominion Only if the Mfkmaw Nation sold
their ancient dominion and the Governor bought it for the Crown through
prerogative Treaties2 5 could the Governor have granted lands to the
British settlers in fee simple. In the subsequent treaties, however, the
Mikmaw Nation did not cede or sell their land to the Crown; they only
agreed to small British settlements within their Aboriginal dominion.2"6
The Wabanaki Compact served as an archetype for the Mfkmaw
Compact (1752), that recognized the British sphere of influence in
Acadia.217 In September of 1752, the Grand Chief Cope of the Mfkmaw
Nation arrived in Halifax with his delegation to establish the terms of
peace with the British Sovereign. 20 8 The Council stated that they were
happy to have the Mikmaq come to bury the hatchet between the "British
205. Labaree, ibid. at 469.
206. The mandatory Governor-in-Council property agreement and settlement with the
Aboriginal nations or tribes under the 1749 Commission, presumably by treaties, were
reinforced by other prerogative limitations on the exercise of colonial authority by the Crown.
First, His Majesty made all potential legislative power subject to the "further powers" of Royal
Instructions and Commands under "our signet & sign manual or by order in our privy Council."
Thus, the continuing supervision of Nova Scotia was to be carried out by the King-in-Council
alone, acting through the issuance of prerogative Instructions. Second, the Commission also
included a repugnancy clause; it required all law, statutes, and ordinances to be made
"agreeable to the Laws and Statutes of this our Kingdom of Great Britain." Thus, the relevant
rules and principles of the United Kingdom's public law were also limitations of the colonial
authorities and legislatures. A crucial part of the Statutes of Great Britain was the 1677 Statute
of Frauds (29 Car. 2, c. 3), which made written documents necessary in all transfers of legal
estates. This therefore applied to Aboriginal dominion transfers to the Governor, as well as to
the Crown. The sanctity of the Commission was assured by this Imperial review process. It
required that all exercises of legislative powers had to be transmitted for royal approbation or
disallowance within three months of their passage or they were "utterly void and not effect any
thing to the contrary." Under this limitation, the Governor of a colony could assent to colonial
legislation, withhold assent and thereby veto the legislation or reserve it for the signification
of Her Majesty's pleasure in London. With respect to colonial legislation assented to by the
Governor, nevertheless, such could be disallowed by Imperial Order in Council in London after
it was reported. With respect to colonial legislation reserved for London's approval, it did not
become law unless and until that approval was given by Imperial Order in Council.
207. CM, supra note 177 at 307.
208. NSA, supra note 177, at vol. I at 594; PANS, supra note 177 MSS. Documents, vol. 35,
Doc. 71; Hopson to Board of Trade, 16 October 1752. Nova Scotia Council Minutes on the 14th
of September recorded the Grand Chief stating he was empowered by the Mlkmaq to treaty with
the Crown. The Counicil Minutes stated: "He was also asked. How he proposed to bring the
other tribes of the Mickmack Nation to a Conference here [Halifax]-who replyd That he would
return to his own people and inform them what he had done here, and then would go to the other
Chiefs, and propose to them to renew the peace, and that he thought he should be able to perform
in a month, and would bring some of them with him if he could, and if not would bring their
answer." (T.B. Akins, Selections from the Public Documents of the Province of Nova Scotia
(Halifax: Annand, 1869) at 671). It was apparent that Nova Scotia's Council knew about the
federated structure of the "Mickmack Nation", but little about its actual procedures.
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Children of His Omnipotent Majesty King George and His children the
Mickmacks of This Country." They assured the Mfkmaq that King
George had declared that they were "his Children" and asserted that the
Mfkmaq "have acknowledged him for your great Chief and Father"
presumably in the prior ratification of the Wabanaki Compact. The
Council stated that King George has ordered us to treat you as our
brethren. Moreover, they explained that "what is past shall be buried in
oblivion and for the time to come we shall be charmed to live together as
Friends." 209 Friendship and burying the past in oblivion are ideas derived
from the wording of the Treaty of Utrecht and Nikmanen law.21 °
The Mfkmaw Compact, known to Mfkmaq as Elikawake (in the King's
House) was a direct political union between the heads of states of the two
nations.2 1' The Grand Chief ("Chief Sachem of the Tribe of Mick Mack
Indians") 212 and Delegates, were formally recognized as the proper
representatives of the Mfkmaw Nation, marking the acquisition of a
separate legal personality for them in the Law of the Nations and of Great
Britain.
The Mfkmaw Compact fulfilled the previous prerogative Instruction
to the British governors to enter into a treaty of protection and friendship
with the Indian nations and clans.21 3 His Majesty promised them that they
209. Ibid. at 673; CO, supra note 177 at 217/13. The Council accepted Cope's authority to
carry the treaty proposal to the other Mikmaq chiefs. "We approve of your engagement to go
first and inform your people of this our answer and then the other Tribes, with the promise of
your endeavors to bring them to a Renewal of the Peace. When you return here as a mark of
our good Will we will give you handsome presents of such Things whereof you have the most
need: and each one of us will put our Names to the Agreement that shall be made between us.
And we hope to brighten the Chain in our Hearts and to confirm our Friendship every year; and
for this purpose we shall expect to see here some of your Chiefs to receive annual presents
whilst you behave yourselves as good and faithful children to our Great King and you shall be
furnished with provision for you and your Families every year. We wish you a happy Return
to your Friends and that the Sun and the Moon shall never see an End of our Friendship" (ibid.
at 673). Compare with Article II of Mikmaw Compact, CM, supra note 177 at 307.
210. See above section A and B (1). Compare to Article II of Mfkmaw Compact, supra note
177 at 307 and supra note 166 and infra note 239.
211. CM, supra note 177 at 307, Treaty of 1752.
212. The title of "Chief Sachem" was new to prerogative treaties. In European writing, the
concept was first applied to the Mfkmaq in Bertrand's letter concerning Grand Chief
Membertou's baptism in 1610 the Grand Chief was labeled "du grand sagameos" (JR, supra
note 141, vol. 2 at 89). The concept of Chief Sachem was not used in the Wabanaki Compact.
The 1693 Treaty was with the "Sagamores and Chief Captains", the accessions of 1713 and
1714 with the "Delegates", the 1717 Compact with the "Sachems and Chief men", the 1725
with the "Delegates" of the Wabanaki Confederacy, and the Mfkmaq accessions of 1728 and
1749 with the "Chiefs". In the same manner as the four Delegates who spoke for the Wabanaki
in the 1725 Compact, the Grand Chief and the three Delegates spoke for "themselves and their
Tribes[,] their heirs and the heirs of their heirs forever" (CM, supra note 177).
213. Supra note 209.
254 The Dalhousie Law Journal
"shall have all favor, Friendship and Protection shewn them from this His
Majesty's Government. '" 2 4 The concept of "Protection" had been intro-
duced in the 1713 Treaty with the Wabanaki, although the 1725 Compact
promised only His Majesty's "Grace and favor" (Article 1).215 The
promise of "Protection" in the Wabanaki and Mfkmaw Compact is
significant because it is one of the first examples of protectorates in the
Law of the British Empire.1 6 The separate promise by the Grand Chief
Cope represented the jurisgenesis of the Mfknaw Nation under the
protection of the British Sovereign.
As a treaty of peace and protection, The Mfkmaw Compact created
boundaries for communities which respected their autonomous political
and legal systems. The Compact constituted an integrated legal order
based on mutual obligations recognizing sharing, autonomy and freedom
of association. 217 In order to "Cherish a good Harmony" created by the
new relationship, the Crown promised that "so long as they shall Con-
tinue in Friendship" the Mfkmaw would annually receive "Present of
Blankets, Tobacco, some Powder & Shott."21 These provisions were
consideration for British settlements and trading rights with the Mfkm6.ki.
The Mfkmaw Compact explicitly incorporates the Wabanaki Compact
which reserved all Mfkmaw lands, liberties, and properties that had not
been conveyed or sold to the English or possessed by any of the English
subjects before 1693.219 Thus it continues the existing judicial precedent
214. CM, supra note 177 at 307, Treaty of 1752, Article 2. The Mfkrmaw district chiefs ratified
of the Wabanaki Compact in 1726 and 1749, the Crown explicitly promised them "all Marks
of Favour, Protection & Friendship" (CO, supra note 177, vol. 217/4 at 82; PAC, supra note
177 at NS "A", MG 11). These Treaties were reaffirmed as part of the Mtkmaw Compact in
1752.
215. Ibid. at 1713 Treaty and 1725 Treaty (Article 1).
216. Similar wording was used in the southern district of British North America, e.g.
Cherokee Nation treaties, infra note 249. E.g. the 1886 treaties that set up a protectorate among
the native chiefs of the Somali Coast of Africa. "The British Government, in compliance with
the wish of the undersigned Elders ... hereby undertakes to extend to them, and the territories
under their authority and jurisdiction, the gracious favour and protection of Her Majesty the
Queen of England" (R. v. Crewe (1910) 2 KB 619 at 619; 77 S.P. 1265).
217. In Nikmanen law, this was the standard measure (Leavitt, supra note 156).
218. Mlkmaw Compact 1752, article 6. These terms are often called "annuities".
219. Mikmaq Compact, 1752 by article 1. The date of possession had to be before 1693
according to the Wabanaki Compact, supra text of note 146. See especially article 5 of the 1795
Treaty between the United States and the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawanoes, Ottawa, Chipewas,
Putawatimes, Miamis, Ell-River, Wee's, Kickapoos, Piankashaw, and Kaskaskia for a concise
summary of the status of reserved land in a treaty article. The United States and the "Friends"
of the Mikmaw Nation stipulated: "The Indian tribes who have a right to those lands, are quietly
to enjoy them, hunting, planting, and dwelling thereon so long as they please, without any
molestation from the United States; but when those tribes, or any of them, shall be desposed
to sell their lands, or any part of them, they are to be sold only to the United States; and until
such sale, the United States will protect all of the said Indian tribes in the quiet enjoyment of
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of Milkmaw having the property in the soil and the fair, consensually and
honest purchase standard for land acquisition.22° Additionally, it estab-
lished a boundary between the reserved Mikmaw lands and the sparse
English settlements.22" ' Consistent with the Mfkmaq langscape and
Nikmanen law, the peaceful enjoyment of the British settlement was
confirmed by the Crown's promise that,
provisions, as can be procured, necessary for the Familys and proportional
to the Numbers of the said Indians, shall be given the Indians half Yearly
for the time to come; and the same regard shall be had to the other Tribes
that shall hereafter Agree to Renew and Ratify the peace upon the Terms
and Conditions now stipulated.222
Thus, the Compact did not convey any land or property interest to the
Crown. The Compact reserved all the sacred space of the M'kmaq for
their descendants. In the 1726 and 1749 Mfkmaq ratification of the
Wabanaki Compact, the Mfkmaq district chiefs only promised that they
"shall not molest any of His Majestie's subjects or their dependents in
their settlements already made or lawfully to be made, or in their carrying
on their traffick and other affairs within the said Province [of Nova Scotia
or Acadia]. '223 Moreover, it is to be noted that, in the 1752 negotiations,
Grand Chief Cope told the Nova Scotia authorities that the Mfkmaq
"should be paid for the land which the English had settled upon in this
Country. 212 4 However, the Crown did not respond to this request.
Article 8 of the Compact provided that the Mfkmaq were to be treated
as equals of English subjects and that in any controversy the Mfkmaq
would be protected in their tort, contract and property rights in His
Majesty's Courts of Civil Judicature.225 This is a unique provision in the
their lands against all citizens of the United States, and against all other white persons who
intrude upon the same." (3 August 1795, 7 U.S. Stat. at 49).
220. See Mohegan Indians, supra note 5, for a discussion of this point, supra text of notes
157-160.
221. For actual possession in 1693 to 1770, see A.H. Clark, Acadia: The Geography of Early
Nova Scotia to 1770 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968).
222. Mfkmaw Compact (1752) article 5. This is the start of the Crowtn's notion of equalization
payments and a redistributive economy.
223. This was also incorporated into the Mikmaq Compact, 1752 by article 1. CM, supra note
177 at 307, Treaty of 1752. The promise not to molest any of His Majesty's subjects is similar
to the Wapapi Akonutornakonol law that in united Aboriginal nations territory there would be
no bothering one another anymore (Katama apc cikawiyutultiwon) (Leavitt, supra, note 156
at 59).
224. This is the English version. Akins, supra note 208 at 671. Mikmaq tradition says that the
Grand Chief required payment for the English settlements. See above part II (B)(2) for
Wabanki precedent for purchase.
225. Article 8 clarifies article 6 of 1725 Compact and article 4 of 1726 and 1749 Mtkmaq
Treaties. See also supra text and notes 155 and 159 for the context of these articles. Article 6
the Wabanaki Compact, 1725 provided that "no private Revenge shall be taken" by either the
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Georgian treaties, because it rejects political solutions and criminal law
in favor of civil remedies. 26 At the same time, the Mfkmaq leaders
continued to assume responsibility for "any robbery or outrage" commit-
ted by their members against His Majesty's subjects within their settle-
ments as in their 1726 and 1749 Treaties. 227 The district chiefs remained
responsible for their own communities and family conflicts. 228 The terms
of the Treaty established the retraction of the Mikmaq's consent to British
legal remedies and political solutions in the Wabanaki Compact.2 29 This
reflects Mikmaw abhorrence of state-imposed violence-that is, both the
Putuwosuwakon's (Convention Council) practice of whipping and Brit-
ish criminal law. They rejected the idea of law as political power or
command, and instead asserted an idea of law as shared meanings.
230
Wabanaki or the English. Instead, both sovereigns agreed to submit any controversies, wrongs
or injury between their people to His Majesty's Government for "Remedy or induse there of
in a due course of Justice." Article 6 was affirmed by Mikmaq in 1726 and 1749, article 7.
Compare with the decline of feudal tenures, and corresponding development of central national
legal systems, the European treaty order began to specify the effect of boundary changes on
access to courts, jurisdictional clauses, and choices of law. Article VIII of the Treaty of Utrecht
(Toynbee, supra note 171 at 1.207). The Treaty of Paris continued this article (ibid. at 314,
Article XVI), but also began a reference by applying "the Law of Nations" to the disputes which
might arise in the future.
226. The Nova Scotia Assembly acknowledged the Sovereign's legal responsibility to
protect treaty obligations and rights within its jurisdiction in an Act to Prevent Fraudulent
Dealing in Trade with the Indians, S.N.S. 1772, c. 3.
227. In these treaties, the chiefs promised to give satisfaction and restitution to be made to the
parties injured (Article 1 confirming Article 2, 1726 Treaty). In the 1726 and 1749 Accession,
the Mfkmaq district chief took responsibility for "any robbery or outrage" in the English
reserves. They expressly promised to make satisfaction and restitution to the "parties injured".
This was an extension of the customary law of the Mfkmaq to the new settlements. Thus, when
a Mikmaw robbed or committed an outrage against any Englishman, even if it happened in the
settlements, British criminal law could not be applied. These terms affirmed the autonomy of
the diverse legal orders. It was a positive attempt to prevent a Wabanaki or Mikmaq from
asserting their law if an Englishman offended a Mikmaq as well as in the opposite case. Under
the Treaties the indigenous law was suspended in these cases and transferred to His Majesty's
justice. Controversies between "Indians", however, the law of private revenge and family
justice was and is still operative. Similarly, controversies among English settlers, were settled
by His Majesty's law.
228. As far back as the Great Convention Council, the families retained jurisdiction over
wrongs committed by their children. "Tokec wen keq oli wapololuhket[,] cuwi semha.
'Nikihkul 'tosemhukul nit ipis" ("Now [when] someone did something wrong (wapol), and he
or she had to be whipped, his or her parent whipped him or her [with] that whip") (Leavitt, supra
note 156 at 58).
229. Supra text and note 192.
230. The political importance of the Mikmaq Compact to His Majesty is illustrated by the
manner in which it was widely published in the British Empire. It was made public by a Nova
Scotia Proclamation in 1752 (Proclamation (24 November 1752) PANS, supra note 177 at
MSS. Documents, vol. 35, Doc. 77; Letter from Hopson to Board of Trade, 6 December 1752),
sent to the Colonial Office (NAS, supra note 177 vol. 1 at 685), and printed in French and
English by the Crown (De Puy, supra note 164).
Mfkmaw Tenure in Atlantic Canada
After the end of the Seven Years war between the English and
French,23' in 1770, a Mfkmaw delegation from both French and English
jurisdictions met with Governor Belcher and the Legislative Assembly to
renew and extend the Compact.23 2 Father Maillard participated in the
conference, interpreting the comments of each party.2 33 His official notes
further reveal the legal nature of the Compact as explained by the man
who was the first Chief Justice in Canada.
234
Belcher began with a description of the nature of protection and
allegiance under the 1752 Compact. "Protection and allegiance are
fastened together by links," he told the Mfkmaq chiefs. 235 Then he
explained the ratification process to the Mikrmaq district chiefs:
[i]f a link is broken the chain will be loose. You must preserve this chain
entire on your part by fidelity and obedience to the Great King George the
Third, and then you will have the security of his Royal Arm to defend you.
I meet you now as His Majesty's graciously honored Servant in Govern-
ment and in His Royal Name to receive at this Pillar, your public vows of
obedience to build a covenant of Peace with you, as upon the immovable
rock of Sincerity and Truth, to free you from the chains of Bondage, and
to place you in the wide and fruitful Field of English Liberty.
23 6
The "Field of English Liberties", Belcher promised the assembled chiefs,
would be "free from the baneful weeds of Fraud and Subtlety. ' 237 To
ensure this, "The Laws will be like a great Hedge about your Rights and
properties-if any break this Hedge to hurt or injure you, the heavy weight
231. In Article 40 of the French Capitulation to the British in 1770, the King promised to
maintain the tribes in their Aboriginal lands. See A. Shortt & A.G. Doughty, eds., Documents
Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada 1759-1791, 2d ed., (Ottawa: J. de L. Tach6,
King's Printer, 1918) Vol. 1, Pt. 2, Sessional Papers No. 18 [hereinafter S & D]. Article 40
continues the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht, supra note 154, and Article II the Treaty of Paris,
1773, supra note 190 at 314 also reaffirmed it. Additionally, Article XXIII of the Treaty of Paris
confirmed article 40 of the Capitulation (ibid.). Both the Articles of Capitulation and the Treaty
ends any arguments about abrogation by hostilities or conquest. See especially Campbell,
supra note 168 at 895 (articles of capitulation upon which the country is surrendered and the
articles of peace by which it is ceded are sacred and inviolable according to their true intent and
meaning).
232. For a list of the chiefs who had to ratify the Compact, see letter of Col. Fry to Governor
Belcher (7 March 1770) in (1770) London Magazine 377 and (1809) 10 Collections of the
Massachusetts Historical Society, First Series 115. The Wabanaki reaffirmed peace on the
basis of their 1725 Compact on 13 February 1770 (B. Murdock, A History of Nova Scotia, 3
vols. (Halifax: J. Barnes, 1865) at 384).
233. PANS, supra note 177 at MSS. Documents. vol. 37, Doc. 14.
234. Installed as Chief Justice of Nova Scotia Supreme Court in October 1754. "Jonathan





258 The Dalhousie Law Journal
of the Law will fall upon them and furnish their disobedience. 238 The
separate dominions of the district chiefs and the British settlements was
affirmed and would be strictly protected by His Majesty's law.
Following customary procedures, the Governor and district chiefs
buried the hatchet and washed the war paint from their bodies in token of
"a peace that would never be broken."23 9 The Governor interpreted these
symbolic acts as a guarantee of:
English protection and Liberty, and now proceeding to conclude this
memorial by these solemn instructions to be preserved and transmitted to
you with charges to your Children's, never to break the Seals or Terms of
this Covenant.
2 4
In this way, the metaphor of the "Covenant Chain" entered into Mfkmaw
sacred order.
The chief from Cape Breton Island, a French jurisdiction, speaking for
the rest of the assembled chiefs, responded to Governor Belcher's
commitments by promising that the Mikmaw Compact would be "kept
inviolable on both Sides." He accepted His Majesty as "friend and Ally",
and placed the Mfkrmaq into His Majesty's protection as "a safe and
secure Asylum from whence we are resolved never to withdraw or
depart." In the name of all Mikmaq, he stated that, "As long as the Sun and
Moon shall endure, as long as the Earth on which I dwell shall exist in the
same State, you this day see it, so long will I be your friend and
ally .... 2 41 In the subsequent ratification Treaties with the several
"Districts of the Michmach Nation and the Crown"2 42 the existing
Compact and its obligations were continued as legal and private obliga-
tions for the Crown to defend by prerogative law and civil law.
238. Ibid. The metaphor of "the Hedge" is directly related to the Wabanaki concept of "fence
(implement)" (lahkalusonihikon) or territorial boundaries in the WapapiAkonutomakonol, and
its laws (tapaskuwakonol) (Leavitt, supra note 156 at 56-57).
239. Compare supra notes and text 166 and 210. The Mfkmaq understanding of burying the
hatchet and washing the war paint was to bar any future references to the hostilities. Yet, in
attempting to extinguish the Compact and Treaties, provincial Attorneys General have raised
the hostilities that were supposed to be buried, see Simon, supra note 26. The introduction of
such evidence in a court of law is contrary to a strict construction of the terms of the Compact
and Treaties as understood by the Mflkmaq at the time of the treaty.
240. Ibid.
241. Ibid.
242. PANS, supra note 177 at MS. Doc. vol. 37, No. 14. Additional ratification treaties were
made with the "Merimichi, Jediack, Poginouch & Cape Breton Tribes" (CO, supra note 177
at 217/8 and 276-84) and "Pictouk and Malegomich" in 1771 (Piktukewaq aqq Epekwith)
(PANS, supra note 177 at RG1 165:160-66, 187 and RG 1 430:20-21); with the Newfoundland
Mikmaq (Ktaqtmkuk of Unamdkik) (CO, supra note 177 at 218/6 ff. 203-06; see also E.
Chappell, Voyage of H.M.S. Rosamound to Newfoundland and Southern Coast of Labrador
(London: J. Mawman, 1818) at 82 for another treaty that has not been found during the
American Revolution); with "Miranichi, Restigouche, Richibucto, and Shediac Indians,"
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In sum, in all of the Georgian treaties the Mikmaq retained their sacred
order for themselves and made no mention of sale of lands to the Crown.
They agreed to allow the British coastal settlements - that is, English
reserves within Mfkmaw land tenure. The peaceful enjoyment of the
existing settlements zannot be equated with a purchase oy cession of
Mfkmaw tenure, nor controlled by English law.2 43 Under the treaties,
these English reserves should be viewed as a secular refuge carved out of
the general sacred space. The peaceful enjoyment by the English of the
settlements was derived from the treaty by the consent of the Mikmaw.
This privilege within Mikmaw tenure was not created nor controlled by
English law; it was controlled by Mfkmaw law, the Compact, and the law
of nations. At the time of the Compact, moreover, the English settlements
were under prerogatives of the Crown in foreign affairs.
3. Legal Construction of the Georgian Treaties
Since the Constitution Act, 1982, the courts have confirmed the validity
of the central treaties of the Compacts.2" The Supreme Court of Canada
has identified these treaties as having a sui generis character, 245 and
established new principles of sui generis treaty interpretation.
246
In establishing these interpretive principles, the Supreme Court of
Canada has followed the United States Supreme Court construction of
British treaties of peace and friendship in the southern district,247 and
"Micmac Tribes residing between Cape Tormentine and the Bay de Chaleur" at Windsor in
179 (Sikniktewaq & Kesp~kewaq) (CO, supra note I-"- at vol. 21,)54: 1252-57), and
"MicMacTribeof Restigouche" in 1786 (Kespdkewaq) (PANS,supra note 177 at 3-5, 29 June
and 7 July 1786). The confusion of names is part of the colonialized lngscape of the treaty era.
243. This is the problem of Locke's theory of tacit consent irn property law, see J.Y.
Henderson, "The Doctrine of Aboriginal Rights in the Western Legal Tradition" in Quest For
Justice For Native People (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986).
244. R. v. Paul (1986), 58 N.B.R. (2d) 297 (Prov. Ct.), [1986] 1 C.N.L.R. 105 (Treaties of
1726 and 1749); Simon, supra note 26 (Treaty of 1752). The Canadian courts, however, are still
cautious in their application of the new constitutional standards. They will not enter upon
questions of constitutionality unless it is absolutely necessary in the litigation. In R. v. Vincent,
[ 1993] 2 C.N.L.R. 165 (Ont. C.A.) the Ontario Court of Appeals has stated that the term "treaty"
in section 35(1) means treaties entered into between the British Crown and the Indians.
245. The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that the integral elements of these treaties
are the mutual intentions to create obligations at the time of the agreements, the presence of
mutual binding obligations, and a certain measure of solemnity. R. v. Sioui, 119901 1 S.C.R.
1025, [1990] 3 C.N.L.R 127 at 139-40 [hereinafter Siouicited to C.N.L.R.] citingSimon, supra
note 26 at 401 and 410.
246. Simon, ibid.
247. Sioui, supra note 245. See A.T. Vaughan & J.T. Juricek, eds,, Early American Indian
Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789 (University Publication of America) (Georgia
Treaties, 1733-1763). The prerogative administrative order in continental British North
America was divided into a southern district and a northern district (Plan for the future
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United States treaties with the eastern Aboriginal nations.248 Because the
terms of the treaties were similar to the Wabanaki and Mfkmaq treaties,
with some articles being identical, they can provide crucial guidance in
the juridical interpretation of the Georgian treaties.
Similar to post-colonial litigation, the United States Supreme Court
originally considered their "peace, favour, and protection" treaties as sui
generis.249 A year later, the Court held they were modeled after and
similar to European treaties.50 It emphasized the equality and "mutual
consent" of the parties to these treaties and described the agreement as
containing "stipulations which could be made only with a nation admitted
to be capable of governing itself."25
These various treaty obligations were the source of federal legislation
over Indian tribes.u2 Without them there was no independent federal or
management of Indian Affairs, 1774, CO, supra note 177 at 324/77). These district superin-
tendents created the alliance with the Aboriginal people by treaties. "Micmacs" were placed
in the northern district, the "Cherokees" were placed in the southern district.
248. C.J. Kappler, Laws and Treaties (Washington: Govt. Printing Press, 1902) vol. 2. See
e.g. treaty between United States and Wyandots, Delaware, Chipewas, and Ottawas Nation
(1785); Choctaw Nation (1786: Article 2); Chickasaw Nation (1786); Pattawatimas and Sacs
Nation (1789); and Creek Nation (1790).
249. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, (1831) 5 Pet. I (U.S.S.C.) the United States Supreme
Court held it lacked original jurisdiction to hear a criminal dispute between the Cherokee
Nation and the State of Georgia. In its analysis it stated that "[t]he conditions of the Indians in
relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two peoples in existence" (at
16). See infra, text and notes 263-65 for the key treaty clause. Still the majority confirmed that
the Cherokee Nation was a sovereign-"a distinct political society, separated from others,
capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself' (ibid.). The two dissenting Justices
stated it is not "denied by the majority of the court that the Cherokee Indians form a sovereign
state, according to the doctrine of the law of nations; but that, although a sovereign state, they
are not considered a foreign state, within the meaning of the constitution" (ibid. at 53-53). See
also supra note 238.
250. In Worcester, supra note 5 at 550 the Court said that Indian "treaties, in its language, and
in its provisions, is formed, as near as may be, on the model of treaties between the crowned
heads of Europe."
251. Ibid. at 555. E.g. article 8 of the 1791 Treaty provided that any United States citizen
settling on Indian land "shall forfeit the protection of the United States, and the Cherokees may
punish him or not, as they please" (ibid.).
252. See, U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advise and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties provided two-thirds of the Senators present
concur... ); art. VI, § 2 ("[A]II Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land...") The United States Supreme Court
in Cherokee Nation, supra note 249 stated: "The numerous treaties made with them by the
United States recognized them as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and
war, of being responsible in their political character for any violation of their engagements, or
for any aggression committed on the citizens of the United States by any individual of their
community. Laws have been enacted in the spirit of these treaties. The acts of our government
plainly recognize the Cherokee nation as a state, and the Courts are bound by those acts." (ibid.)
See also Worcester, supra note 5 at 561-62. Some of these obligations toward Indians are "to
secure them in the title and possession of their lands, in the exercise of self-government, and
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state source of legislation over treaties." 3 The implementation of the
spirit and obligations of these treaties into federal laws was through the
constitutional allocation of authority.
25 4
None of the treaty obligations between the Aboriginal nations and the
Crown or the United States was more important than its obligation of
protection.2 5 The United States Supreme Court has also been clear that
the "protectorate relationship" did not extinguish Aboriginal sover-
eignty, or abolish their governmental powers, or make them dependent
upon federal law. Treaties of protection were judicially construed as "a[n
Aboriginal] nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more
powerful, not that of individuals abandoning their national character, and
submitting as subjects to the laws of a master." '256 Therefore, they
remained "distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries,
within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the
lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but
guaranteed by the United States." '257
to defend them from domestic strife and foreign enemies; and powers to the fulfillment of these
obligations are necessarily reserved ... " (U.S. H. Rept. No 474, Comm. Ind. Aff., 23d
Congress, 1 st session, May 20, 1834 at 17). In the Constitution of Canada there is no express
provision for treaty making, but section 35(1) and 52(1) of Constitution Act, 1982 affirm
treaties as part of the supreme law of Canada.
253. In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Conm' n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) the Supreme Court
observed: "The source of federal authority over Indian matters has been the subject of some
confusion, but it is generally recognized that the power derives from federal responsibility for
regulating commerce with Indian tribes and for treaty making" (ibid. at 172, n. 7).
254. Cherokee Nation, supra note 249 at 16 ("Laws have been enacted in the spirit of these
treaties"). Worcester, supra note 5 at 561. Congressional power is under art. I, § 8, cl. 3 of the
U.S. Constitution, that permitted Congress to "regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." The treaty obligations to the Cherokee
Nation and other Aboriginal nations were originally implemented by Congress in the Indian
Trade and Intercourse Act, 1 Stat 469 (1796). Equivalents in the Constitution in Canada are
the federal authority over "Indians and Lands reserved for Indians" in section 91(24) and
implementing treaty obligations of the Crown in section 132 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
255. See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1942) held that the chief source of Federal Power was the treaty-making power
of the President and Senate with its corollary of Congressional power to implement by
legislation the treaties made (at 33 and 89, quoting Rice, "The Position of the American Indian
in the Law of the United States" (1934) 16 J. Comp. Leg. 78); see also R. Stirickland, ed., Felix
S. Cohen's Handbood of Federal Indian Law (Charlottesville: The Michie Company, 1982)
at 207. ("Carrying out the obligations and executing the powers derived from these treaties
became a principal responsibility of Congress, which has enacted many statutes relating to or
implementing treaties" ibid, at 208).
256. Marshall C.J., Worcester v. Georgia, supra note 5 (Treaty of Hopewell, 1785,7 Stat. 18,
20). Also "a weak State in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under the protection
of one more powerful without stripping itself of the right of government, and ceasing to be a
State" (at 561). Also see, dissent in Cherokee Nation, supra note 249 at 552-55.
257. Cherokee Nation, ibid. at 557. The Court stated that "The Cherokee nation ... is a
distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in
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In this specific context, the Court was interpreting the Cherokee
Nation treaty (1785) with the United States. The preamble stated the
United States promised to "give peace to all the Cherokee, and receive
them into the favour and protection of the United States of America on the
following conditions. 2 58 Article 3 of the Treaty of Holston (1791)
provided:
The said Indians do acknowledge themselves and all their tribes to be
under the protection of the United States and no other sovereign.5 9
The Court reinforced these points in its decision in Worcester when it
interpreted Article III of the 1791 Treaty:
The third article acknowledges the Cherokees to be under the protection
of the United States of America, and no other power. This stipulation is
found in Indian treaties, generally. It was introduced into their treaties with
Great Britain;... Its origin may be traced to the nature of their connection
with those powers; and its true meaning is discerned in their relative
situation.... The Indians perceived in this protection only what was
beneficial to themselves-an engagement to punish aggression on them. It
involved, practically, no claim to their lands-no dominion over their
persons. It merely bound the nation to the British crown, as a dependent
ally, claiming the protection of a powerful friend and neighbor, and
receiving the advantages of that protection, without involving a surrender
of their national character. This was the true meaning of the stipulation,
and is, undoubtedly, the sense in which it was made. Neither the British
government nor the Cherokees ever understood it otherwise.... Protec-
tion does not imply the destruction of the protected.216
which the law of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right
to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and
with the acts of congress" (ibid. at 561). See supra notes 192-94.
258. 7 Stat. 18 (1785); renewed (1791) (art. 1, "perpetual peace and friendship", renewed
(1794)). This is similar to the Wabanki and Mikmaq Compacts. See Vaughan, supra note 247
for the British treaties with the Cherokee Nation, beginning in 1756 which their "ancient
Alliance be renewed, and the old Chain, brightened between the English and the Cherokees"
(vol. 5 at 220). In 1773, the Cherokee Nation, Chactahs [Choctaw] Nation, Chicasah
[Chickasaw) Nation, Creek Nation, and Catawbas Nation entered into a "perfect and perpetual
peace and sincere friendship with King George III" and establishined a boundary between the
British colonists and the Aboriginal nations (ibid. at 296). In addition, the Cherokee Nation
entered prerogative Treaties for the "preservation of peace and friendship" in 1776, 1777, 1778
and 1770 that ceded lands to the Crown in the provinces of South Carolina, North Carolina and
Virginia, while it reserved lands for the Cherokee Nation (ibid. at 326 and 367). For provisions
concerning peace and friendship treaties with the United States, see e.g. 1778 Treaty with
United States of America and Delaware Nation (art. 2 "perpetual peace and friendship"); Six
Nations (1784, Preamble; renewed 1789: art. 1, "friendship and protection"; renewed in 1794
"perpetual peace and friendship"); Choctaw Nation (1786: Preamble, "favor and protection");
Chickasaw Nation (1786: Preamble, "favour and protection"); and Creek Nation (1790: art. I
"perpetual peace and friendship", renewed in 1797: Preamble).
259. 7 U.S. Stat. at 39. The Wabanaki or Mkmaw Compact does not have similar treaty terms.
This was a common treaty article in the United States.
260. Ibid. at 551-52.
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Finally, the Supreme Court stated that an Indian "treat[y], in its
language, and in its provisions, is formed, as near as may be, on the model
of treaties between the crowned heads of Europe. 26 1 He pointed out that
the words 'treaty' and 'nation' are words of our own [English] language,
selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves,
having each a definite and well-understood meaning. We have applied
them to Indians, as we have applied them to the other nations of the earth;
they are applied to all in the same way.
2 62
As Professor Frickey has recently argued, such an egalitarian approach
encourages judges
to challenge rather than to accept blindly assumptions rooted in colonial-
ism, of which there are many today; to interpret documents of positive law
flexibly in order to promote the ongoing sovereign-to-sovereign relation-
ship of the tribe and the federal government; to keep the judiciary out of
the business of imposing new forms of colonialism; and to refuse to relieve
Congress of the responsibility to determine expressly whether future
exercises of colonialism should occur."'
Since the affirmation of existing Treaty rights in the Canadian consti-
tution in 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada has established a similar
context for Aboriginal and Treaty rights. The Supreme Court of Canada
has interpreted prerogative Treaties as constitutive documents,264 but the
Canadian courts have not decolonized the prior contractualist prece-
dent265 to a clear sovereignty position.2 66 In construing the 1770 treaty
with the Hurons, Mr. Justice Lamer, speaking for the unanimous Su-
preme Court of Canada in R. v. Sioui,267 stated:
261. Ibid. at 550.
262. Ibid. at 559-60.
263. P.P. Frickey, "Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law" (1993) 107 Harv. L. Rev. 381 at 428.
264. Ibid. at 408-11; Simon, supra note 26 and Sioui, supra note 245.
265. In Canada (A.G.) v. Ontario (A.G.), [1897] App. Cas. 199 the Privy Council stated that
an Indian treaty is a mere promise and agreement and the duty to compensate merely a personal
obligation by the governor. In R. v. Syliboy, [1929] 1 D.L.R. 307 the County Court of Nova
Scotia held that Indians were never regarded as an independent power capable of making
treaties, reversed by Simon, supra note 26. In R. v. Wesley, [ 1932] 4 D.L.R. 774 this Court held
that Treaty 7 is a contract. In R. v. Pawis, [ 1980] 2 F.C. 18, [1979] 2 C.N.L.R. 52 at 58 the federal
court held that the Robinson-RurotTreaty is acontract, lnBrtish law contracts are not sources
of law, they are legal transactions. Similar rules have been applied to treaties between the
United States and the Crown.
266. In the United Kingdom, according to Lord McNair, the Courts dealt with initial treaties
made with native tribes "in the same way as they would have dealt with a treaty with a foreign
state." Law of Treaties (1961) at 54. See also H. Reiff, "The Proclaiming of Treaties in the
United States" (1936) 30 Am. J. Int'l L. 67.
267. Supra note 245.
264 The Dalhousie Law Journal
we can conclude from the historical documents that both Great Britain and
France felt that the Indian nations had sufficient independence and played
a large enough role in North America for it to be good policy to maintain
relations with them very close to those maintained between sovereign
nations. The mother countries did everything in their power to secure the
alliance of each Indian nation and to encourage nations allied with the
enemy to change sides. When these efforts met with success, they were
incorporated in treaties of alliance or neutrality. This clearly indicates that
the Indian nations were regarded in their relations with the European
nations which occupied North American as independent nations.
26
There are reasons why the Canadian courts ought to be more vigourous
in their interpretative canons than the Supreme Court of the United States.
The interpretative canons in Worcester are based on a quasi-constitu-
tional clear-statement rule,2 69 while the emerging Canadian interpretative
canons are explicitly derived from a constitutional imperative of section
35(1).
Moreover, Canadian courts have made it clear that since the honour of
the Crown is involved in treaties no "sharp dealings" or unjust construc-
tions can be used to invalidate the terms as they were originally under-
stood. 270 Where a treaty was negotiated by the Crown in the context of a
grossly unequal bargaining, the courts will not allow an interpretation to
prevail that suggests sharp dealing or trickery.271 Yet, in the colonial era
the courts have allowed federal acts, international Conventions, and
constitutional amendments to modify or suspend some Aboriginal treaty
obligations .2
72
268. Ibid. at 1052.
269. Frickey, supra note 263 at 412-18.
270. R. v. Taylor and Williams (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 360. InReKane, [1940] 1 D.L.R. 390
(N.S. Co. Ct.), Justice McAuthur "assumed that the Dominion Parliament in its legislative
enactments regarding 'Indians and Lands reserved for the Indians' [Section 91(24) of the
Constitution Act, 1867] constantly kept in mind the duty and obligation of the Crown to
safeguard all Indian rights, and fulfill all promises contained in those treaties with the exactness
which honor and good conscience would dictate..."(ibid. at 395).
271. Ibid.
272. Aboriginal treaties have been held to be sources of law that produce ights which the
federal legislature can modify or cancel, but not provincial legislatures. (Daniels v. White and
the Queen , [ 1968] S.C.R. 517 at 521, Cartwright C.J.; R. v. Sikyea, [ 1964] S.C.R. 642; See K.
McNeil, Indian Hunting, Trapping and Fishing Rights in the Prairie Provinces of Canada
(Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, 1983). These decisions assert the treaties as governed strictly
by British law, not a law compatible with both nations. In British constitutional traditions, any
act of Parliament could be repealed by a subsequent act, thus they assumed that Aboriginal
treaties could be amended or extinguished by subsequent federal statute or agreements. Other
judges consider that such instruments are a matter of honour between Canada and the First
Nations, thus a moral obligation (R. v. George (1963), 14 D.L.R. (2d) 31); compare to Guerin,
supra note 54.
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In 1985, the Supreme Court of Canada responded to the opportunity of
interpreting the 1752 Treaty in the Simon case, 273 thereby heralding a
post-colonial judicial era.274 Chief Justice Dickson, speaking for an
unanimous court, overruled a colonial precedent in Syliboy which held
" t~he saiages' right of sovereignxty eve~n of oawners,ip were never
recognized" by the Crown or international law.275 Dickson characterized
the Syliboy decision as both substantively unconvincing and a biased
product of another era in Canadian law that is inconsistent with a growing
sensitivity to native rights in Canada.
276
Additionally, Chief Justice Dickson stated that "[w]hile it may be
helpful in some instances to analogize the principles of international
treaty law to Indian treaties, these principles are not determinative.
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Instead, he held that the Indian treaty is unique in Canadian law, it was
characterized as "an agreement sui generis, which is neither created nor
terminated according to the rules of international law. 278
In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that the particular
terms of each treaty must be construed in a "fair, large and liberal" method
in the sense they would have been naturally understood by the particular
Aboriginal grantors at the time of the treaties,279 but not in a way that
273. Simon, supra note 26 rev'g Syliboy, supra note 265 and the Nova Scotia Court of
Appeals on treaties in Isaac, infra note 292; Cope, infra, note 293.
274. The Simon rules of construction applied to treaty interpretation are consistent with those
that prevail under post-colonial international treaty law. See Right of Passage over Indian
Territory (1960) I.C.J. Report 6; Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara [1975] I.C.J. 3 at 39;
andthe 1913 Vienna Convention on the Low ofTreaties,23 Mwy 969,U .N. U16c. XICONV.39;
27 at 289 (1969), 1155 I.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 976.
275. Syliboy, supra note 265 at 313. In Isaac, infra note 292 at 481, Chief Justice MacKeigan
overruled Syliboy on its conclusion that the 1773 Proclamation was not applicable to Cape
Breton, but the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Cope, infra note 293 and Simon, supra note 26
had affirmed Syliboy's interpretation of the treaty.
276. Simon, ibid. at 399.
277. Ibid. at 404. Similar principles have been affirmed by the First Ministers of Canada in
section 35.6(1) of the Charlottetown Accord, 1992 (Draft Legal Text, 9 October 1992) that
arguably remains a constitutional convention of Canada with the First Nations. See A. Heard,
Canadian Constitutional Conventions, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1991); Re Resolu-
tion to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 (no legal requirement for consent of
provinces to enact constitutional amendments, but convention required substantial degree of
provincial consent).
2TI. Simon, ibid. See supra notes 166 and 2X1 for the United States' version ol this idea.
279. Ibid. See Worcester, supra note 5at 515 and 551-54; Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. I at 10-
11 (1899), followed in Simon and Sioui, supra notes 26 and 243 estaDlished the importance of
language construction and linguistic inequities in the Indian treaties. See also Whitefoot v.
United States, 239 F.2d 658, 667 n.15 Ct. Cl. (1961), cert. denied 369 U.S. 1818 (1962);
Duwamish Indians v. United States, 79 Ct. Cl. 530 (1934). The lack of skilled interpreters and
the failure to translate the treaty into the languages of both parties are unique factors to
Aboriginal treaties.
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should make the treaty promises ineffective in their modem applica-
tion.2 0 The treaty terms must be interpreted according to the sense or
spirit in which the Aboriginal negotiators would have naturally under-
stood them, rather than the technical English meaning of the words.28'
Thus, ambiguous expressions in terms of treaties must be construed in
favor of the Aboriginal people.
82
In construing older Indian treaties, the Canadian courts have required
that their terms must be liberally construed in the light of the law and facts
existing when the treaty was. signed. 283 In Sioui, Mr. Justice Lamer
acknowledged and confirmed the importance of the historical context in
trying to determine if an instrument is a treaty.2 4 However, Simon limits
parts of the historical context by rejecting interpretations that continue
colonial or racist biases and prejudices. 85
In the judicial construction of treaties, these interpretative rules
empower Aboriginal languages, langscapes, and worldviews. Moreover,
they create a compelling interpretative presumption against reading any
Aboriginal right or treaty provision according to standards developed
after the treaty that might be interpreted as effectuating an abandonment
of aboriginal sovereignty or rights.286 Prerogative Treaties must also be
read as unique delegations from the Aboriginal nations to the Crown that
establish a legal relationship and the most exacting fiduciary standards,
not as typical derivative grants of rights from the Crown to the Indians. 28 1
280. Sioui, supra note 244; Simon, supra note 26; R. v. Nowegijick, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29. See
also Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 at 631 (1970); Choctaw Nation v. United
States, 318 U.S. 423 at 431-32 (1943); Worcester, supra note 5 at 582. Similar principles have
been affirmed by the First Ministers of Canada in section 35.6(1) of the Charlottetown Accord,
1992, supra note 277.
281. Supra note 279.
282. Simon, supra note 26; Nowegijick, supra note 280 at 198; relying on Jones v. Meechan,
supra note 279, which followed Worcester, supra note 5.
283. In international law, this canon is called the rule of intertemporal law. Right ofPassage,
supra note 272.
284. Supra note 245 at 1045, quoting Mr. Justice Norris in R. v. White and Bob (1964), 50
D.L.R. (2d) 613 at 649 (B.C. C.A.) aff'd in the Supreme Court of Canada [1965] S.C.R. vi
[unreported], (1965), 52 D.L.R. (2d) 481. Nowegijick, supra note 280 affirmed the same
principle that Indian instruments with the Crown must be construed in light of the law and fact
contemporary to them as part of the law of Canada.
285. Supra note 26 at 399.
286. This follows international law where the traditional legal presumption is against any
implied relinquishment of State sovereignty. Polish War Vessels (1931), P.C.I.J. Ser. A/B, No.
43 at 142; The River Oder Commission (1929), P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No 23, at 26; S.S. "Lotus"
(1927), P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 10 at 18; Polish Postal Service (1925), P.C.I.J. Ser. B, No. II at
39; S.S. "Wimbledon" (1923), P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No I at 24-25.
287. Guerin, supra note 54; Sparrow, supra note 7; Cohen, 1982, supra note 255 at 220-28
and 232-35. UnitedStates v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (interpretation of source of inherent
sovereignty); McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 at 174-75 (1973).
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Courts in both the United States and Canada have been suspicious of
arguments that the Aboriginal nations had agreed to relinquish sover-
eignty or Aboriginal rights under any term of the treaty, 288 because the
Aboriginal negotiators could not be held strictly accountable for the
nuances of the foreign English treaty text.089 In sum, these canons of treaty
construction establish a fundamental method of equitable treaty interpre-
tation. More ambitiously, these post-colonial rules of interpretation can
be invoked to combat political powerlessness, and to be a remedy for the
toxicity of colonization and Eurocentric thought.
290
IV. Mkmaw Tenure as Allodial Tenure
The place where you are, where you are building dwellings, where you are
now building a fort, where you now wish to establish your authority, this
land of which you now wish to become the absolute master, this land
belongs to me, I have come from it as surety as the grass, it is the proper
place of my birth and of my residence, this land belongs to me, the Indian;
yes I swear, that it was given me by God to be my homeland in perpetuity.
Sant6 Mawiomi Declaration to the new
Governor of Kchibouktouk 1749291
On the basis of the foregoing review of the terms of the Mfkmaw
Compact and the rules of treaty interpretation, it can be argued that the
Crown clearly has affirmed, recognized, and reserved the original tenure
of the Sant6 Mawfomi of the Mfkmaw Nation. Part I of this essay
described the imported fictions, contradictions and fragility of Canadian
property law, while Parts II and III outlined the dynamic elements of
Mikmaq tenure and the interpretive rules. In this section, I will attempt to
bring them together to provide legal meaning for Mfkmaw tenure as it is
encoded in the prerogative Compact and treaties. In determining its sui
generis meaning, I will be looking at all forms of law, rather than British
and Canadian law. These positive laws leave no authority for the fiction
of original title in the Imperial Crown. Thus, ancient prerogative law of
the Crown, Imperial Acts, and English and Canadian law will be used to
determine the legal meaning of the reserved and protected Mfkmaq
288. Simon, supra note 26; Sparrow, supra note 7; Sioui, supra note 245; and Worcester
supra note 5 at 551-61.
289. Ibid.; Frickey, supra note 263 at 397-98.
290. Post-colonial international treaty law reaches a similar position, but does not address
situations typical of "indigenous treaties" where the parties lacked a common language of
negotiation, the agreement was recorded by only one party, and it was couched in technical
vocabulary which was almost certainly unfamiliar to the opposite party. See Articles 27 and 31
of the Vienna Convention, supra note 274.
291. 24 September 1749. Original in Mtkrmaq and French in (1988) 1 Le Canada Francais 17.
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tenure. Each source of these laws has limits, but a sensitive and integra-
tive approach can overcome the limitations.
It is well settled in law that the protected Mfkmaq tenure in prerogative
Treaties and Legislation was never formally or explicitly ceded or
purchased by the Imperial Crown. The first comprehensive review of
Mfkmaw legal history in Nova Scotia, was conducted by Chief Justice
MacKeigan in 1975 in R. v. Isaac.292 He concluded that original Indian
rights as defined in Worcester existed among the Mflkmaq. 293 He held
these original rights arose in English customary or common law and were
confirmed by the Royal Proclamation of 1773 and other authoritative
declarations. 294 He further declared that the Royal Proclamation of 1773
292. [1976] 13 N.S.R. (2d) 460 (C.A.).
293. Ibid. at 475. Because of the infamous R. v. Syliboy decision denying the 1752 Treaty was
valid (supra note 265), the Chief Justice did not consider the treaty rights aspect of hunting.
Ironically, however, the Chief Justice did reverse the Syliboy ruling that the 1773 Proclamation
did not apply to Nova Scotia (ibid. at 481). In 1982, the Chief Justice affirmed the Syliboy
decision in R. v. Cope 49 N.S.R. 555 at 564 (C.A.); as did Hart and MacDonald JJ.A. in R. v.
Simon 49 N.S.R. (2d) 566, at 572-77 (C.A.). In 1985, the Supreme Court of Canada in Simon,
supra note 26, reversed these decisions.
294. The Chief Justice stated that "The Proclamation was clearly not the exclusive source of
Indian right... but rather was 'declaratory of the aboriginal rights'.... I am of the opinion that
the Proclamation in its broad declaration as to Indian rights applied to Nova Scotia including
Cape Breton. Its recital (p. 127) acknowledged that in all colonies, including Nova Scotia, all
land which had not been 'ceded to or purchased by' the Crown was reserved to the Indians as
'their Hunting Grounds'. Any trespass upon any lands thus reserved to the Indians was
forbidden" (Isaac, ibid. at 478). This passage was cited with approval by the Nova Scotia
Appeal Division in R. v. Denny (1990), 94 N.S.R. (2d) 253 at 260, [1990] 2 C.N.L.R. 115
(C.A.). (Aboriginal right to fish beyond the strict perimeter of Reserved lands). In the Chief
Justice's analysis of the 1773 Proclamation he stated "The 'lands reserved' apparently
included all lands in Nova Scotia which the Indian had not ceded or sold to the Crown. 'Ceded
land' presumably included lands then occupied with the assumed or forced acquiescence of the
Indians, such as those at Halifax, Lunenburg, Liverpool and Yarmouth, and the former Acadian
lands taken over by New England 'planters'. Later the 'land reserved' as 'Hunting Grounds'
were, of course, gradually restricted by occupation of the white man under Crown grant which
extinguished the Indian right on the land so granted. Indeed, the land where the rights exists
may have in time become restricted in Nova Scotia to the reserved lands which we now know
as 'Indian reserves'." (Ibid. at 479) This explanation of ceded is another part of the colonial
langscape problem in Canadian property law. MacKeigan does not attempt to resolve the
inconsistency between the 1773 Proclamation or the Statutes of Frauds, and the lack of written
cessions or purchases. This belief in implied extinguishment theory of Crown grants and white
occupation is inconsistent with the prerogative law and English law, and is probably built on
a white supremacist doctrine of colonialization theory. Such reconciliation is particularly
difficult when the prerogative law, the constitutional law of the colony, prohibited anyone from
trespassing or purchasing land from Indians (below part III (C)). His interpretation of
extinguishment by occupation under Crown grants or leases was raised before the Supreme
Court of Canada in Simon, supra note 26. The Court did not make a decision on this issue, but
they stated that extinguishment cannot be lightly implied.
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had not been altered by subsequent treaty, agreement or competent
legislation.295 In conclusion, MacKeigan C.J. stated:
No Nova Scotia treaty has been found whereby Indians ceded land to the
Crown, whereby their rights on any land were specifically extinguished,
or whereby they agreed to accept and retire to specific reserves, although
thorough archival research might well disclose records of informal agree-
ments, especially in the early 1800's when reserves were established by
executive order.... I have been unable to find any record of any treaty,
agreement or arrangement after 1780 extinguishing, modifying or con-
firming the Indian right to hunt and fish, or any other records of any cession
or release of rights or lands by the Indians.... The review has confirmed
that Indians have a special relationship with the lands they occupy, not
merely a quaint tradition, but rather a right recognized in law.296
MacKeigan C.J. did not examine the treaty reservation of Mfkrmaq
lands, liberties, and property issues.2 97 This oversight enabled the Chief
Justice to hold that Indians on Nova Scotian reserves had a usufructuary
right in the reserve land, the legal right to use that land and its resources,
including, the right to hunt on that land.29 He acknowledged that original
rights were preserved when the colonial governments set apart reserve
295. Isaac, ibid. at 478. See especially section 25 of the Charter that continued the validity
of the rights arising from the 1773 Proclamation.
296. Ibid. at 478-79,483 and 485. Chief Justice MacKeigan concluded that "The history of
the next eighty-seven years discloses little concern for the Indians. The incoming settlers
pushed them back to poorer land in the interior of the province. The government gradually
herded them into reserves and made sporadic and unsuccessful attempts to convert them into
agricultural people" (ibid. at 483-84). Before the Supreme Court of Canada in Simon, supra
note 26 the Province of Nova Scotia argued that the Treaty of 1752 was not a valid treaty
because it did not cede land to the Crown or delineate boundaries, and that occupancy by the
white man under Crown grant or lease had extinguished the treaty reservation and gave
absolute title in the land covered by the 1752 Treaty to the Crown (part VIII, 408-10). The
Court found it unnecessary to come to a final decision on extinguishment by occupation of
Crown grant or lease (Isaac, ibid. at 405-406).
297. This issue had continued to be avoided by the courts. In 1982, in the Court of Appeals
decision in R. v. Cope, supra note 293, MacKeigan rejected the Treaty liberties argument as
well as the Aboriginal rights argument. Chief Justice MacKeigan said that clause 4 that
recognized the "liberty to hunt and fish" in the 1752 Treaty was "very far short in words and
substance from being a grant by the Crown of a special franchise or privilege replacing the more
nebulous aboriginal rights"; or that the treaty could not "be considered a treaty granting or
conferring new permanent rights" (ibid. at 564). In the same year, section 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 1, transformed the nebulous existing aboriginal rights as
well as the positive treaty rights into synchronic constitutional rights. In the subsequent
Appellate Division decision in R. v. Simon (1982), 49 N.S.R. (2d) 566 (C.A.) Chief Justice
MacKeigan did not write an opinion. Justice MacDonald, however, used MacKeigan's
decision as precedent in the companion case on fishing rights. On appeal, the Supreme Court
of Canada in Simon, supra note 26 and Sparrow, supra note 7 overruled the Nova Scotia Appeal
Division decision on both issues.
298. Cope, ibid. at 478 and 485.
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lands, 99 but he did not explain their authority to set apart lands reserved
under the Compact. Moreover, he also held these customary original
rights were implicitly continued and protected in section 18(1) the Indian
Act. 3°° Since this decision, no further proof of cession or purchase of
Mfikmaq tenure has occurred, although there have been many implicate
theories that attempt to justify the loss of use of the lands without
providing compensation.3 10
Since the Isaac decision, the Supreme Court of Canada has further
defined the sui generis fiduciary duty of the Crown toward reserved lands
in the context of the 1773 Proclamation and the Indian Act.302 Moreover,
the Supreme Court of Canada in Simon explicitly affirmed that the 1752
Treaty: created mutually binding legal obligations under federal law
independent of the constitutional law;3 °3 provided a civil mechanism for
dispute resolution;3" has continuing validity and force as when it was
concluded since it has not been terminated;3 °5 established rules of fair,
large and liberal construction of treaties in favour of the Indians; 36 and
demanded strict proof of extinguishment of a treaty-protected right.307 In
Sioui the Court rejected the idea of third party extinguishment to a treaty
right and added the requirement that Indians who are party to a treaty must
consent to its extinguishment.30 8
Furthermore, in Sparrow the Supreme Court underscored the neces-
sity for constitutional principles of interpretation regarding existing
rights under section 35(1). 309 Existing Aboriginal rights must be proven
299. Ibid. at 469 and 485.
300. Ibid. See Guerin, supra note 54 for an analysis of the fiduciary duty that arises under this
section in a situation of non-recognized Aboriginal title.
301. A. Tanner & S. Henderson, "Aboriginal Land Claims in the Atlantic Provinces" in K.
Coates, Aboriginal Land Claims in Canada (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1992) at 131-166.
All these intricate theories are based on a self-interested and privileged colonial assumption:
the force of colonial circumstances to allow courts to deny or regulate existing prerogative
rights; for example European settlement in British North America is sufficient for a court to
extinguish prerogative treaties and legislation protecting Aboriginal peoples. Not only is this
contrary to the British rule of law but also the United Sates Supreme Court has consistently
rejected this principle: Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976);
McClanahan, supra note 253 at 173; Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S.
404 (1968); The Kansas Indians 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866); Worcester, supra note 5.
302. Guerin, supra note 54.
303. Supra note 26 at 398-401.
304. Ibid. at 401, referring to art. 8.
305. Ibid. at 403-07.
306. Ibid. at 402-03.
307. Ibid. at 405-06. In Sioui, supra note 245, reaff'd Simon, supra note 26.
308. Supra note 45 at 1061-66; C.N.L.R. at 151-154.
309. Ibid. at 1101-1109; C.N.L.R. at 177-87. In this case the Court stated that section 35(1)
must be interpreted in a purposive and liberal way so as to entrench the existing Aboriginal
rights. These rights must not be viewed in a vacuum. Aboriginal history and traditions must be
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to exist, that is to be unextinguished, and are to be interpreted with
flexibility to permit their evolution over time.31 0 The Court rejected the
Crown's arguments that Aboriginal rights can be extinguished by federal
Acts or regulations. Instead it stated that federal-provincial control of an
Aboriginal right does not mean that the right is extinguished, even if the
control is exercised in great detail.3"1 Finally, the Court stated that the
Sovereign's intention is controlling and to extinguish Aboriginal rights
the Sovereign's written command must be clear and plain.3"2
In Sioui, the Supreme Court of Canada directed the legal profession not
to ignore the land issues. It stated:
a treaty has to be interpreted by determining the intention of the parties on
the territorial question at the time it was concluded. It is not sufficient to
note that the treaty is silent on this point. We must also undertake the task
of interpreting the treaty on the territorial question with the same generous
approach toward the Indians that applied in considering earlier questions.
Now as then, we must do our utmost to act in the spirit of Simon,3 3
Applied to the Mflcmaq Compact that affirmed Aboriginal tenure and
rights, these decisions establish three stringent tests (a strict proof of the
fact; the Sovereign's clear and plain intention to extinguish; and consent
of the Indians) that tend to diminish any theory of implied extinguishment
examined to determine the purposes of these rights. The section 35(1) rights are relative to other
constitutional rights, in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Aboriginal claimants
must show they are a holder of a fight and prima facie interference with the fight, then any
conflicfing legislation, to be valid, must be constitutionally justifie6.
310. Ibid. at 1091-93; C.N.L.R. at 169-171. The Court refused to equate "existing" with the
concept of being in actuality or exercisable (R. v. Eninew (1984), 10 D.L.R. (4th) 137, 32 Sask.
R. 237 (C.A.)). This approach answers the problems of how law can persist as order in a world
of pervasive change and progression.
311. Ibid. at 1095-1101,1111-1119,C.N.L.R.at 173-76,182-187. InDenny, supranote294
at 263, the Nova Scotia Appeal Division affirmed the Aboriginal right to fish for food strictly
on a constitutional interpretation of section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, and indepen-
dent from the force and effect of the terms of the Mfkmaq treaties. They stated "based upon the
decision in Isaac, this [aboriginal] right has not been extinguished through treaty, other
agreements or competent legislation. Given the conclusion that the appellants possess an
aboriginal right to fish for food in the relevant waters, it is not necessary to determine whether
the appellants have a right to fish protected by treaty" (ibid. at 263).
312. Ibid. at 1098-99; C.N.L.R. at 174-175; R. v. Alphonse, [ 1993] 5 W.W.R. 401 (B.C.C.A.).
313. Ibid. at 213. This decision protects Aboriginal andTreaty rights andlinsulatesit from past
encroachment due to nonuse, subsequent colonial acts, and modem statutes. Additionally, the
confirming prerogative legislation renders the implicate extinguishment theory unconstitu-
tional. This decision is consistent with the International Court of Justice decision in the Right
of Passage over Indian Territory, supra note 274. In interpreting an old indigenous treaty, the
court ruled: "that the validity of a treaty concluded as long ago as the last quarter of the
eighteenth century, in the conditions then prevailing on the Indian Peninsula, should not be
judged on the basis of practices and procedures which have since developed only gradually."
272 The Dalhousie Law Journal
of Mfkmaw tenure or rights as suggested by Chief Justice MacKeigan and
so boldly asserted by the Province of Nova Scotia.314
Faced with these judicial precedents, the meaning of the reservation of
"all Mikmaw lands, Liberties, and properties that they had not conye'd or
sold to or possessed by any of the English subjects" in the 1752 Treaty
must be reconceptualized. In no case has the unity of the prerogative
treaties and legislation been analyzed. In the cases to date, the courts have
fragmented these protective documents thereby reaching narrow results.
The governments and courts of the Atlantic provinces have virtually
ignored or avoided the 1752 Treaty and its context or wording, that is, the
only mutual expression of respective rights. This is of special importance
since the 1752 Treaty is the central and unifying treaty of the Mfkmaw
Compact with the Crown.
Central to this reconceptualization is an understanding of the Mfkmaw
Nation's relationship with the Imperial Crown at the time of the Compact.
At this time neither the Legislative Assembly of Nova Scotia nor federal
government of Canada existed. Additionally, this relationship was based
on treaty or consensus in international law, exercised under the preroga-
tives of the Crown. The treaty relationship was a constitutional and legal
alliance with the Crown as a whole, since it was undivided at the time of
the Compact. The alliance was based on mutual respect and trust, not
coercion or prudence. Moreover, this consensual relationship knew
nothing of the Norman or feudal system of land tenure, emanating from
one chief lord or king or the development of English land law. Instead, it
was founded on a nation-to-nation relationship in the Law of Nations, the
law of Great Britain, and by the explicit terms of the treaties by British
civil law.
1. Allodial Tenure
In the context of the English schema of land law, the Compact clearly
illustrates that the Mfkmaw tenure was and is a protected allodial
tenure.3"5 Allodial tenure is an entire property in the land; a territory held
314. Supra text and notes 294 and 297; see Hopton v. Pamajewon (1993), 16 O.R. (3d) 390
(C.A.).
315. This is a late Latin term alodium or allodium. English also uses the Germanic term
lannemanni, or boclands. Blackstone, supra note 19 at 105. In German it is also called
lehensfreies or Freiguterbgut, in Spanish alodio, in French proprietY. The concept is also called
odal in Iceland or free inheritance in Lex Scalia. The reserved Mikmaw tenure in Atlantic
Canada is similar to the concept of an allodial tenure in British law. I realize the risk of
collapsing Mtkmaq tenures into foreign theories, but I am arguing by analogy not appropriating
an alien langscape. I am using the concept of allodial tenure as a metaphoric bridge between
the distinct worldview and langscapes.
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in absolute ownership without service or acknowledgement of any
superior people. 16 Thomas Hobbes stated that "[w]hen a man holds his
Land from the gift of God only, the lands Civilians call allodial."3'1 Lord
Coke stated that in the Domesday Book the tenants in fee simple are called
alodarrii or aloarii,31 8 while Stubbs refers to them as "alodiars of
Domesday". 9 English writers have called a territory allodial if possessed
by a free title, 32°or a full propriety32' or if held of no one but enjoyed his
land as free and independent.322 Others noted that the King "might have
his ancient allodial property." '323 Allodial tenure was also analogized as
the rights held by the great proprietors of English land,324 or to the same
privileges and rights as had been enjoyed by the original proprietors of
England,32 5 before feudalism.
3 26
In British land law, allodial tenure is an undiscussed and neglected
tenure. Because of the fiction of the original title of the Crown of England
and its feudal land traditions, allodial tenure became an inconceivable
tenure in England, and thus a 'ituall irreyktvant 1tga wzncfpt ill Biitish
and Canadian legal analysis. It is an uncharted tenurial system beyond the
competency or expertise of the British court or legal profession. Still the
vague concept has haunted British legal history, and been a source of
some judicial confusion.
327
316. Oxford English Dictionary, rev. ed. (Oxford: University Press, 1961) at 237. Manley,
Interp. (1672).
317. T. Hobbes, A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Law, rev.
ed. by J. Cropsey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971) at 1999.
318. Coke, supra note 93 at lb.
319. W. Stubbs, The Constitutional History ofEngland in its Origin and Development, 6th
ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1897, repr. New York: Barnes & Noble Inc. 1967) vol. 1 at 89.
320. D. Hume, History of England from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in
1688, rev. ed. (Indianapolis, 1983-5) vol. I at 246.
321. T. Keightley, The History of England (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1860) at 77.
322. Warmington, infra note 403 vol. 1 at 174.
323. Freeman, infra note 404 at vol. 3 at 95; E.A. Freeman, English Constitution (Toronto:
J. Campbell & Son, 1872) at 77.
324. A. Smith, An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, rev. ed. (New
York: Modem Library, 1937) vol. 1 at iii, vol. 4 at 413.
325. T. Carte, History of England (1747) vol. 1 at 364.
326. J.F. Kirk, History of Charles the Bold (1864) vol. 4 at iii; Stubbs, infra note 385, vol. 1
at vii and 297.
327. In the thirteenth century, in lowland Scotland, a number of free individuals held land for
which they could not show a charter or claim to have been infeft by any lord "de antiquo
conquesto", "per antiquam tenarum" or simply "de antiquo" (P. Vinogradoff, Villainage in
England: Essays in English Mediaeval History (Oxford: University Press, 1892) at 199 and
452-56). Today, the folk-lands appear in the udal lands of the Orkney and Shetland Islands,
acknowledging no feudal superiority or ultimate ownership of the sovereign, but with the
kinsmen having a vague entitlement to reversion (C.F. Kolbert & N.A.M. MacKay, History of
Scots and English Land Law (Berkhamsted: Geographical Publications, 1977) at 15-17); The
courts have held that the mere long use of feudal conveyance is not enough to affect the allodial
274 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Allodial tenure is the opposite of the feudal or fee tenure, which is
derived from inheritance. Before the arrival of the Europeans, the Sant6
Mawiomi was the allodarii, or the Aboriginal lords of their "free manors"
or absolute property of their ancient territory in America. As discussed
earlier in this essay, the sui generis land tenure of the Mawiomi arose long
before its relations with the Imperial Crown as a customary tenure created
by the Mfkmaw worldview. Its tenure in Atlantic Canada is the equivalent
of the Crown's original title or tenure in England. For example, Lord
Watson in St. Catharines Milling noted this when he stated that "the entire
property of the land remained" with Indian nations and tribes under the
Royal Proclamation of] 773 and discussed their interests as "tenures".32
The allodial tenure of the Mfkmaw was confirmed by the prerogative
Treaties. The treaties transformed this tenure into a vested tenure pro-
tected by civil law. Mfkmaw tenure was not created by the Compact or
subsequent Treaties, it was merely acknowledged by the Crown. Mikmaw
tenure was not derived from a grant from the Crown; it arose in the
customary worldview and law of the Mfkmaw Nation and Nikmanen
order.3 29 As illustrated earlier, Sant6 Mawfomi, like other Aboriginal
nations, had an orderly notion of space and place, that was fundamental
to their linguistic order and cultural coherence that could be translated
into aboriginal law of property and into the allodial tenure in Roman and
English law.
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the distinct theory of
aboriginal title in M'Intosh, 330 when Aboriginal title was seen as a distinct
pattern of property tenures and rights derived solely from aboriginal
authority, and not dependent upon either the state or federal land tenure
nature of the udaller's title (Beatton v. Gaudie (1832), 10 S 286). The Court of Session has
affirmed allodial tenure and prevented the Crown from claiming ownership of the foreshore
and salmon fisheries (W.P. Drever, "Udal Law and the Foreshore" (1904) Jur. Rev. 189; Smith
v. Lerwick Harbour Trustees (1903), 5 F 680; Lord Advocate v. Balfour (1907), SC 1360).
328. Supra note 5 at 54-55. Chief Justice Marshall stated the universal conviction that the
Indian nations possessed a full right to the lands they occupied (Worcester, supra note 5 at 560),
the Indians were the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain
possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion (M'Intosh, supra note 5 at 574).
Justice Clifford of the Supreme Court stated that apart from the pre-emptive right of purchase
acquired by the United States as successor of Britain, the Indians retain their "absolute" original
title as "owners and occupants of the territory where they resided" (Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. 211
at 243-4 (1872)).
329. See above part 1I. "[AIII thought is founded on [the] demand for order" .vi-Strauss, The
Savage Mind (London: Weindenfeld and Nicolson, 1966) at 10, Levi-Strauss commenting on
the Pawnee comment to an anthropologist that "All sacred things must have their place",
elaborated: "It could even be said that being in their place is what makes them sacred for if they
were taken out of their place, even in thought, the entire order of the universe would be
destroyed." (ibid.)
330. Supra note 5 at 593-94.
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systems. In Cherokee Nation, the majority stated: "Though the Indians
are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, heretofore, unques-
tioned right to the lands they occupy, and that right shall be extinguished
by a voluntary cession to our government. '' 3 1 The two dissenting justices
stated,
notwithstanding we do not recognize the right of the Indians to transfer the
absolute title of their lands other than to ourselves, . . . the principle is
universally admitted, that this occupancy belongs to them as a matter of
right, and not by mere indulgence. They cannot be disturbed in the
enjoyment of it, or deprived of it, without their free consent; or unless ajust
and necessary war should sanction their dispossession. In this view of their
situation, there is as full and complete recognition of their sovereignty, as
if they were the absolute owners of the soil
332
In Worcester, the Court held as a matter of law under the United States
Constitution that: "The Indian nations had always been considered as
distinct, independent potiticat communities, retaiiing their original
natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil from time imme-
morial. '333 These descriptions correspond to the concept of allodial
tenure.
Similar to British and Canadian judges,334 the American judges did not
seem to find it necessary to make any detailed analysis of Aboriginal
tenures. They were only concerned with their conveyance to private
parties or the United States. All the common law courts in North America
have recognized that Aboriginal land tenure was clearly not dependent on
external policies, but rather on "original natural rights" recognized in the
Treaties, prerogative laws, and federal common law.335 If they had
understood the concept of allodial tenure, these courts could have
unravelled their perplexity with aboriginal title.
Even if the Mikmaq tenure is seen as provisional or transitional and
requires eventual ratification by the law of civil society, the prerogative
treaties performed this act within British law, and the 1773 Proclamation
331. Supra note 249 at 17 (emphasis added).
332. Ibid. at 55.
333. Supra note 5 at 559-60 (emphasis added).
334. See above part I of essay.
335. B. Slattery, Ancestral Lands, Alien Laws: Judicial Perspectives on Aboriginal Title
(Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, 1983) at 17-36; Henderson, "Unraveling the Riddle of
Aboriginal Title", supra note 60. See Justice Strong's comments in St. Catharines Milling,
supra note 5 at 631-32: "The words 'rights', 'title' and 'possession' [in section 3 of the Quebec
Act, 1774] are all applicable to the right which the crown had conceded to the Indians by the
proclamation [of 1773], and, without absolutely disgarding this 3rd section, it would be
impossible to hold that these vested rights of property or possession had all been abolished and
swept away by the statute." Lord Watson agreed with this position in St. Catharines Milling,
supra note 5 at 54.
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affirmed that principle in prerogative law.336 Prerogative legislation
vested the Mfkmaw tenures under the protection of British public law.
337
Indeed, the shared purpose for entering into a treaty of peace and
protection with the Imperial Crown was to tighten up and protect these
vaguely understood Aboriginal tenures in the territorial concepts of the
Law of Nations and Nature as well as British law.335 The Imperial Crown
reserved all the existing Mfkmaw lands, liberties and properties not
already purchased from Mfkmaq, until the nation was willing to sell. Even
if some doubt is raised, the Supreme Court in Sioui, just as in Worcester,
has clearly stated that in the absence of any express mention of territorial
scope of treaties, it has to be assumed that the parties to the treaties
intended to reconcile the Aboriginal nations need to protect the exercise
of their customs with the desires of the British to expand.
3 9
If all Aboriginal territory and tenures were reserved for the Mfkmaw
nation then the Crown has a unique protective treaty obligation to
preserve it. Through the clear wording of these Compacts and prerogative
legislation, the British Crown can acquire a derivative estate or interest
under Aboriginal dominion, but this does not affect the original territorial
sovereignty of the Aboriginal nations. Aboriginal nations can share their
original territories or rights with European nations and peoples, but their
guests do not acquire their original title.
Even acquisition of such tenure through international agreements or
prerogative Treaties creates derivative roots of title, and not original
titles.3 40 Within the context of the fundamental principles of English
tenure, the Crown could only acquire a derivative or jurisdictional title
from an Aboriginal nation through a treaty of cession.
The Crown's future interest acquired by prerogative treaties of peace
and protection, however, can never be complete ownership, because it is
protective and conditional rather than absolute. If the Imperial Crown
received cessions or surrenders of Aboriginal lands, it did so as a fiduciary
or trustee, with legally enforceable fiduciary duties. 4 The Crown's
336. Article 8 of the Treaties itself, subsequent prerogative Instructions, and Proclamations
implementing these Treaties within the law of Great Britain. Colonial law also implemented
the prerogative Legislation in the provinces. 1762 Law, supra note 191.
337. Clark, supra note 194 at 58-84.
338. Mohegan Indians, supra notes 158-161. See generally, J.Y. Henderson, "The Doctrine
of Aboriginal Rights in the Western Legal Tradition" in Quest For Justice For Native People
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986).
339. Supra note 5 at 157.
340. Advisor Opinion on Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. Rep. 3 at 39.
341. Guerin, supra note 54; Seminole Nation v. US, 316 US 286 at 296-7 (1942). See J.
Hurley "The Crown's Fiduciary Duty and Indian Title: Guerin v. The Queen" (1985) 30 McGill
L.J. 560; D.M. Johnson, "A Theory of Crown Trust Toward Aboriginal People" (1985) 18
Ottawa L. Rev. 307.
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derivative use or allocation of the treaty lands is based on full perfor-
mance of the delegations and obligations described in the Treaties.
34
1
Failure of the Crown to perform its treaty obligations would cause all its
jurisdictional interests over the land to revert to the Mikmaw Nation by
the fundamental elements of English land law. Because the Imperial
Crown had a fiduciary duty toward the Mfkmaw Nation to protect their
Aboriginal tenure and rights in dealing with colonialists and third parties,
it could not annex the protected tenures for its own uses or for any colony
or dominion. It had to remain a foreign jurisdiction of the Crown. The
Crown, however, could formally request a colony or dominion to admin-
ister these rights and obligations.
Moreover, unrelinquished Mikmaq lands were and are superior to
either the Crown's interests or rights conveyed by the Crown to its
subjects. While the Imperial Crown could assert a preemptive title against
other European nations in the Law of Nations,3 43 under the express terms
of the Compact Aboriginal tenure was reserved to the Mt'kmaq. The
Compact and prerogative legislation denied the Imperial Crown any
present interest in Aboriginal tenure, other than protection of the land.
The future or ultimate interest of the Crown in the reserved Mfkmaw
tenure was an opportunity. Such opportunity is a concept of enablement
rather than legal title or possession; it refers to doing more than having.
Having opportunity certainly does not entail rights to land or material
possession, it makes no sense to speak of future opportunities as propri-
etary. Being enabled or constrained refers to the rules and practices that
govern the Crown's action. The structural and specific relations of the
Crown to the acknowledged and reserved Mfkmaq tenure had to be
acquired pursuant to the rules established by the 1773 Proclamation, that
is, through a consensual public purchase from the Sant6 Mawfomi when
they were willing to sell.314 Until Mfkmaq tenure is purchased by the
Crown, it is protected allodial tenure in prerogative law and cannot be
342. In 1973, the Queen to the Assembled Chiefs in Calgary formally conceded that "her
government in Canada understands the necessity of full compliance with the spirit and terms
of the Treaties." As quoted by J. Chretien, Address (Statement made as Minister of Indian
Affairs and Northern Development on Claims of Indian and Inuit People, 8 August 1973)
[unpublished]. This position was not new, it was a consequence of the international affirmation
in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The Treaty Convention reaffirmed the
principle that Treaties are absolutely obligatory on the parties. It universally recognized that
"every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed in good faith."
On October 14, 1970, the Federal Government of Canada unconditionally acceded to the 1969
Conventions. It made no distinct qualification about either the Georgian or Victorian Treaties,
hence within the federal jurisdictions they have an obligatory force.
343. Worcester, supra note 5 at 542-44.
344. "[lf at any Time any of the said Indians should be inclined to dispose of the said Lands,
the same shall be purchased only for Us, in Our Name, at some public Meeting or Assembly
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compromised by any other party without the mutual consent of the
Mawiomi and the Sovereign of Great Britain.
Consequently, there is nothing in law to support the proposition that
any British subjects have a general right to acquire any protected
Aboriginal territories by any method.3 45 From the seventeenth century,
the Crown and colonial legislation prevented private land purchases by
requiring all acquisitions of Aboriginal land to be licensed or approved
in advance. The reasons for these restraints on Aboriginal alienation to
individuals and corporations lay with the Crown's right of preemption,
created by the international discovery convention and treaties,3 46 to
negotiate exclusively with the Aboriginal nations and tribes for extin-
guishment of their tenure.
In the Mikmaw context, the legal meaning of Aboriginal dominion
may be best understood as operating within the context of allodial tenure,
rather than fee simple title,347 in British law. Mkmaw tenure, whether
protected by treaties or not, is an absolute property or free tenure, an
independent and unique tenure system that acknowledges no external
lord or superior. It was not part of the inheritance of the Imperial Crown.
In feudal law, allodial tenure exists without any obligation of vassalage
or fealty, and was not considered to be under the Crown. It is the converse
of a fee simple tenure or estate,348 since it does not come to the Crown or
lords by inheritance but from personal effort. If the Crown has any interest
in the Mikmaw tenure as allodial lands, it is by treaty or contract. In
prerogative Treaties and Legislation, as discussed previously, the Crown's
exclusive method of acquiring the reserved tenure was by purchase.
of the said Indians, to be hold for the Purpose by the Governor or Commander in Chief of our
Colony respectively within which they shall lie" (CM, supra note 177 at 291).
345. Worcester, supra note 5 at 545; The Seneca Lands, 1 Op. A.G. 465 (1821); Fletcher v.
Peck 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 142-48; Mohegan Indians, supra note 192 at 118. See also 25
U.S.C. 177, originally enacted in Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts of July 22, 1790; Oneida
Indian Nation v. County of Oneida 105 S. Ct. 1245 (1985); Joint Tribal Council of the
Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F. 2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975), 388 F. Supp. 649 (D. Me 1975);
and R.N. Clinton & M.T. Hotopp, "Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Restraints of Indian
Land: The Origins of the Eastern Land Claims", (1979) 31 Maine L. Rev. 17.
346. Worcester, supra note 5 at 544 (discovery allocated the exclusive right to purchase, but
did not found the right of the possessor to sell), at 546 (Crown charters and other European
grants were mere blank paper, so far as the rights of the native were concerned).
347. Suggested by K. McNeil, supra note 24 at 304-06. This is a very valuable suggestion,
but it presumes some inheritance from the Crown or title or interest under the British Crown.
Because of these implications, I prefer allodial tenure. In practice, there may not be any
significant difference.
348. These estates are derived from the Latin concept offeodum, the quality or descending
to the heirs of a holder.
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2. Prerogative Laws of Great Britain
The established prerogative regime, the Imperial Parliament's Foreign
Jurisdiction Act,3 49 and the classic theory of the common law have been
reinforced by the new constitutional order of Canada. All these acts are
consistent with Mfkmaw ter nure being a protected allodial tetxre. Neither
the Crown nor its agents have authority to take away the rights of the
protected Aboriginal nations or to modify their Aboriginal or treaty rights
in any way by other prerogative acts.350 There is no evidence that the
protection of unrelinquished Mfkmaq tenure in Atlantic Canada was
legally transferred to the possession of the general British colonizers to
be allocated among British subjects by domestic positive law. Any claims
by colonists, then, should be readily dismissed since they were prohibited
by the prerogative legislation from acquiring title to land for themselves
from the Mfkmaq or their spokespersons.
In the eighteenth century, when the Mikmaw Compact was created, the
prerogatives of the Crown were a residuary monarchical power and
practice created by international law.35" ' The entire executive authority of
the Kingdom rested in the Imperial Crown, on the foundation of custom
and the common law. 352 This prerogative component of the Kingdom is
one of the three great constitutional powers in Great Britain.353 The
349. Infra note 385.
350. Connolly v. Woolrich (1867), 17 RJRQ 75 at 84 and 95 (relying on Worcester, supra
note 5); M'Intosh, supra note 5 at 594-97.
351. Often the international law origins are neglected in English law. Typically English
courts and lawyers conceptualize the royal prerogatives as a pre-eminence which the Sovereign
enjoys over and above all other persons by virtue of the common law, but this traditionally
includes international law. Blackstone, supra note 19 vol. 4 at 67-68. The prerogatives were
not created by the common law, because it is the residue of royal authority left over from a time
before it was effectually controlled by the common law or statute. Case on Convocation ( 1611),
22 Co. Rep 72; Proclamations' Case (1611), 12 Co. Re. 74. As to the source of prerogative
authority, the best the English courts have said is that the King ought to be under no man, but
under God and the law, because the law makes the King. Chitty, supra note 173 at 351. The
prerogatives of the Crown are great constitutional principles that are, generally speaking "as
ancient as the law itself' R. v. McLeod (1883), 8 S.C.R. 1. The law of the King can best be
understood as an ancient branch of aristocracy law of nations and a separate realm from
Parliamentary authority in English law, see, Shaw, supra note 14 at I 1-16.
352. A.B. Keith, Imperial Unity and the Dominions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1916) at 35;
Chitty, supra note 173 at 4. For Crown prerogative, see generally 8 Halsbury's Law of England,
3d ed. (London: Butterworth & Co., 1752-64) at 836.
353. B. Clark, supra note 194. The British Empire consisted of a mother country, the
protected foreign states, and the colonies. The Imperial Crown exercised the right of
concluding treaties on behalf of all parts of the Empire. Generally, the question of treaty making
is derived from international law, rather than domestic law. While the latter developments of
Parliamentary supremacy steadily diminished the scope of the royal Prerogative, the treaty-
making power was not diminished. In the eighteenth century, the Crown exclusively exercised
this power.
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Prerogatives were exercised in relation to foreign affairs such as entering
into treaties.354
As a matter of modem constitutional convention, it subsequently
developed that Parliament may object to the substance of a treaty, but it
is still generally true that its terms cannot be challenged in the courts. 355
Since the days of Lord Coke, the English courts have held that they may
determine the existence of a prerogative power or privilege, but could not
control the manner of its exercise.
356
a. Prerogative Legislation
The prerogative treaties of the Mfkmaw Compact validated and protected
the Mfkmaq tenure by the prerogative law of Great Britain and interna-
tional law. As an exercise of prerogative power, the treaty obligations
protected Mfkmaw lands, liberties, and properties.357 The prerogative
treaties and legislation vested the original property in the Mfkmaw Nation
in the prerogatives jurisdiction of the Imperial Crown, with the civil
courts the designated agent of the treaty relationship. The treaties and
aboriginal rights were protected from English colonists by prerogative
legislations, e.g., the Royal Instructions and Proclamation and from other
nations by the customary international law.
The specific terms of the prerogative Mikmaw Compact and treaties,
however, take us beyond the Court's sui generis analysis. By the treaties,
the ancient tenure was transformed into a vested Mfkmaw tenure pro-
tected by prerogative legislation and the civil laws. Six years after the
354. It is the sole prerogative of the Crown in British constitutional law to negotiate, enter,
and determine the contents of a treaty, ratify the treaty, and provide for implementation of the
treaty obligations. H, Evatt, The Royal Prerogative (Sydney, Australia: The Law Book
Company Limited, 1987); A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution,
8th ed. (London: MacMillan, 1915) at 460 ("A treaty made by the Crown is valid without the
authority or sanction of Parliament"); A. Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominion
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1912) at 1102 ("There is no real doubt that treaties made by the
Crown are binding on the Colonies whether or not the colonial governments consent to such
treaties").
355. A modem court may challenge the legislation giving effect to a treaty, but not the treaty
itself, that purported to bind the sovereign of Parliament for the future.
356. S.A. De Smith, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 4th ed. (Harmondworth:
Penguin Books Ltd., 1982) at 137.
357. Despite the interest of international and municipal law in treaties, no written constitu-
tional rules control the definition of Treaties in the United Kingdom or Canada. Our guides to
prerogative Treaties are unwritten constitutional conventions and actual historical practices.
Therefore, the main rules followed in this area are based on unwritten customs of the Crown
and First Nations. When the Canadian federation was instituted in 1867, more than a century
later than the Compact, the Imperial Government preserved its responsibilities toward pre-
existing treaties. The obligation of implementing these Treaties in Canada fell to the Parliament
and Government of Canada through section 132 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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Compact, on 2 October 1758, and pursuant to the authority delegated to
the Sovereign by the Mfkmaq, the Legislative Assembly was convened
in Nbva Scotia. British constitutional conventions establish 1758 as the
date of the reception of the English legal system in old Nova Scotia as a
settled colony,358 which also included New Brunswick.3 59 At that time the
entire body of English law was imported, except to the extent that the law
was unsuitable to the circumstances of the colony, for example, due to the
existence of compacts and treaties with the aboriginal people.3" Since the
Compact was an existing prerogative Act made before the reception of the
English common law of colonization, 36 1 it required no implementing by
colonial legislation to be controlling. Indeed, the Compact and preroga-
tive Legislation defined part of the suitability of the reception of English
law, and a pre-existing Imperial obligation and part of the existing
prerogative constitution of Nova Scotia.
362
Without formal cession or purchase of Mfkmaq tenure by the Crown,
the effect of Article 8 of the Compact, the implemented 1771 Instruc-
tions,363 and the 1773 Proclamation3 64 was to protect the Aboriginal
territories or properties from English colonialists and assemblies. These
prerogative Legislations conferred upon the Crown a sui generis fidu-
358. Uniacke v. Dickson (1848), 2 N.S.R. 287 (S.C.); Hogg, supra note 46 at 30 finds this
dubious and argues that dates of reception thus derived are quite artificial and are really cut-
off dates.
359. This is different from the idea that the first colonist carried as a birthright the English
law and filled any legal void in the new territory. This idea was also limited by the court's
determination if they were suitable to the circumstance of the territory, such as prerogative
treaties. Hogg, supra at 46. The 1773 Proclamation "annexed" Cape Breton and Prince Edward
Island to old Nova Scotia's government, while reserving the Mikmaw Hunting Grounds in all
places, thus creating a different date for the reception of English law. No other documents
"annexed" the reserved Hunting Grounds to any colony or to the federal government.
360. Hogg, ibid. at 30 and 32.
361. Ibid. at 28.
362. Commentaries, supra note 21 vol. 4 at 67-68. See especially, Justice Strong in St.
Catharines Milling, supra note 5 at 615-16 cited to S.C.R.: "[A]t the date of confederation the
Indians, by constant usage and practice of the crown, were considered to possess a certain
proprietary interest in the urisurrendered lands which they occupied as hunting grounds; that
this usage had either ripened into a rule of the common law as applicable to the American
Colonies, or that such a rule had been derived from the law of nations and had in this way been
imported into the Colonial law as applied to Indian Nations...."
363. 3 Geo. III; CO, 217/19 at 27-28; PANS, Micro reel B- 1028 (4 May 1772). See, J. Singer
"Well Settled?: The Increasing Weight of History in American Indian Land Claims" (1994) 28
Georgia L. Rev 481 at 503-08.
364. Original text is entered on the Patent Rolls for the regnal year 4 Geo. III, is found in the
United Kingdom PRO: c. 66/3693 (back of roll); C.S. Brigham, ed., British Royal Proclama-
tions Relating to America, (Worcester, Mass.: American Antiquarian Society, 1911) vol. 12 at
212-18; CM, supra note 177 at 285-92; Slattery, supra note 57; and Borrows, supra note 47.
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ciary duty, both contractually and equitably, to protect the Mfkmaw
Hunting Grounds for the Crown under the law.
365
In 1771 Additional Instructions to the Governor of Nova Scotia and the
other colonies acknowledged the "inviolable" compacts and treaties that
had been made with the Aboriginal nations. They stressed that the peace
and security of the colonies "greatly depend upon the Amity and Alliance
of the several Nations or Tribes of Indians bordering upon the said
colonies." British Governors were ordered to "support and protect" the
Aboriginal nations in "their just Rights and Possession and to keep a just
and faithful Observance of these Treaties and Compacts which have been
heretofore solemnly entered into. 366 This affirms the legal force of the
Mlkmaw Compact in the constitutional law of Nova Scotia. It was a direct
act of state ratifying the existing Compacts and Treaties, witnessing the
consent of the Sovereign to be bound by the existing Treaties and
Compacts. To ensure the treaties were respected, moreover, the Sover-
eign ordered that the Governors:
forthwith cause this Our Instruction to you to be made Public not only
within all parts of your Province inhabited by Our Subjects, but also
amongst the Several Tribes of Indians living within the same to the end that
Our Royal Will and Pleasure in the Premises may be known and that the
Indians may be apprized of Our determin'd Resolution to support them in
their just Rights, and inviolably to observe Our Engagement with them.36
The 1771 Instructions were implemented in old Nova Scotia through
the Nova Scotia Proclamation in 1772,368 thus legally prohibiting anyone
from trespassing, surveying, possessing, confiscating, or managing the
reserved Mfkmaw tenure protected by the prerogative Treaties.3 69 More-
over, the Nova Scotia Assembly acknowledged the Sovereign's obliga-
tions to legally protect treaty obligations and rights within its jurisdiction
365. CM, supra note 177 at 285-86.
366. Supra note 328.
367. Ibid. PANS, supra note 177 RGI 30 at 58.
368. Supra note 329. To make the Instructions a legally enforceable document, the Sovereign
commanded the Governor to make the instructions public and to issue a colonial Proclamation,
in the name of the Sovereign, "strictly enjoining and requiring all persons whatever who may
either willfully or inadvertently have seated themselves on any Lands so reserved to or claimed
by the said Indian without any lawfull Authority for so doing forthwith to remove therefrom
[;I And in case you fitnd upon strict enquiry to be made for that purpose that any person or
persons do claim to hold or possess any lands within Our said Province upon pretense of
purchases made of the said Indians without a proper licence first had and obtained either from
us or any of Our Royal Predecessor or any person acting under Our or their Authority you are
forthwith to cause a prosecution to be carried on against such person or persons who shall have
made such fraudulent purchases to the end that the land may be recovered by due Course of
Law." (Ibid.)
369. Worcester, supra note 5.
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in its Act to Prevent Fraudulent Dealings in the Trade with the Indians.
3 70
This Act implemented Article 8 of the Mfkmaw Compact. It stated that
because the Indians
were unacquainted with the laws of this province, and in what manner they
are to proceed in order to do themselves right, the Lieutenant Governor,
Council and Legislative Assembly authorized the Governor, Lieutenant
Governor, or Commander in Chief, upon complaint of any Indians within
this province, made to him or either of them, that they have been wronged
or cheated of their furs or any other merchandize, or in any other their trade
and dealing with other His Majesty's Subjects; that the Governor, Lieuten-
ant-Governor, or Commander in Chief, is hereby desired to direct His
Majesty's Attorney General to prosecute the same, either before His
Majesty's Justices, or in any of His Majesty's Courts of Record in a
summary way, as the laws do direct, and such prosecution shall be deemed
legal, and the judgment and execution shall issue accordingly.
37'
In the Royal Proclamation of 1773,372 the Imperial Crown described
the reserved Aboriginal dominion or territory of the Sant Mawiomi
under the Compact as their protected "Hunting Grounds." '37 3 This applied
to old Nova Scotia, including New Brunswick, Cape Breton and Prince
Edward Island, Newfoundland and Quebec.3 74 The test to determine the
application of the Proclamation was whether the Indian nations or tribes
were "connected" with the Crown, or lived under the Crown's "protec-
tion".37 5 The terms of the Mfkmaw Compact showed that the Mawfomi
370. S.N.S. 1772, c. 3.
371. Ibid.
372. See supra note 329.
373. See, in Worcester, supra note 5 at 552-53 (construing the fourth article of the Treaty of
Hopewell that created a boundary line between United States "allotted" and the Indians
"hunting-ground"). In the Treaty of Holson, July 1791, these terms were changed to "the
boundary between the United States and Cherokee nation", rather than allotments or hunting
grounds.
374. Major General Gage sent the 1773 Proclamation to officers in command of the post of
Halifax, Louisbourg, and Newfoundland 11 October 1773. C.E. Carter, ed., The Correspon-
dence of General Thomas Gage with the Secretaries of State (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1931) vol. 2 at 1. On the 28 January 1774, Old Nova Scotia Governor Wilmot formally
acknowledged receiving the Proclamation and promised the Board of Trade to give it the widest
circulation (CO, 217/21, ff. 7-8). In Quebec, Lieutenant Governor Carleton issued a Procla-
mation dated 22 December 1776 and published in the Quebec Gazette (29 December 1776)
ordering "if any of the said Inhabitants have made any Settlements on Indian Grounds, to
abandon them without Delay" in B. Clark, supra note 194 at 99. On 9 February 1777, Governor
Paliser of Newfoundland wrote Lord Shelburne, Secretary of State for the Southern Depart-
ment, that the Quebec Governor allowed settlement along the Labrador seaboard "contrary to
the Kings Proclamation of the 7th October" (CO, 194/18 and 27).
375. "And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to our Interest, and the security of
our Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom We are connected, and
who live under our protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession of such
Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded to or purchased by Us, are
reserved to them or any of them, as their Hunting Ground" (CM, supra note 177 at 291).
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were connected with the Crown and lived under its protection by their
consent.37 6 Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada has said that any
silence in the 1773 Proclamation about existing Compacts and treaties
cannot be interpreted as extinguishing them or their obligations.3 7
All lands in British North America that were not purchased by the
Crown from the Aboriginal nations and tribes in 1773 were reserved as
their Hunting Grounds. The reserved Mfkmaw tenure was protected by
this prerogative legislation and the constitutional law of Great Britain.
3 78
The very wording of the 1773 Proclamation clearly shows that its
objective, so far as the Indians were concerned, was to provide a solution
to the problems created by fraud and greed which hitherto some of the
English colonists had demonstrated in buying up Indian land at low
prices.3 79 The Proclamation confers rights on the Indians without neces-
sarily extinguishing any other right conferred on them by the British
Crown under a treaty.380 These special constitutional rights have always
existed and are now explicitly continued by the Charter of Rights.381
There is no evidence that the Crown ever considered reserved Mfkmaw
tenure before the Compact was res nullius or terra nullius or was acquired
by prescription, or effective control, or accretion or ceded or conquered
territory. The terms of the Wabanaki and Mfkmaw Compacts illustrates
they were regarded as having the original title, which a colonist could
purchase. To prevent conflict in purchases of Aboriginal tenure, these
Compacts placed the aboriginal land and people under the protection of
the Imperial Crown. The prerogative legislation conclusively affirms,
376. Above at part II B(3).
377. Sioui, supra note 245 at 152. The 1772 Instructions to the Governor explicitly stated
Treaties and Compacts were protected by the Law (CM, supra note 177 at 285-86).
378. In the Representation of the Lords of Trade on the State oflndian Affairs (7 March 1778),
it was confirmed that "the Proclamation of October 1773 ... forbid, by the strongest
prohibitions, all Settlement beyond the limits therein described as the Boundary of the Indian
Hunting Ground, putting both their Commerce and Property under the protection of Officers
here acting under your Majesty's immediate authority, and making their Intervention neces-
sary in every transaction with those Indians." Clark, supra note 194 at 99 citing C.W. Alvord
& A.C. Carter, Trade and Politics 1777-1779 (Springfield: Trustees of the Illinois State
Historical Library, 1921) vol. 3 at 184. The document received the King's endorsement and was
sent as a royal instruction of 1778 under the signet and sign-manual (ibid. at 245-47).
379. Sioui, supra note 245 at 152.
380. Ibid.
381. Section 25 of the Constitution Act, 1982 (Charter), supra note 1. Lord Watson stated in
St. Catharines Milling, "Whilst there have been changes in the administrative authority, there
have [sic] been no changes since the year 1773 in the character of the interest which its Indian
inhabitants held in the land surrendered by the treaty. Their possession, such as it was, can only
be ascribed to the general provisions made by the Royal Proclamation in favour of all Indian
tribes then living under the sovereignty and protection of the British Crown" (supra note 5
at 54).
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recognizes, and legally protects the territorial sovereignty of the Mfkmaw
Nation.38 2 The Crown's future interest was a protective and derivative
estate in the Law of Nations, with the 1773 Proclamation later establish-
ing the procedures for its cession or purchase.383 Under the protection of
the Treaties, the Sant6 Mawfomi's jurisdiction and tenure continued, as
well as the Mfkmaw family's management and uses of the land.
b. Foreign Jurisdictions
Treaties creating protective jurisdiction over territory outside of Great
Britain came to be known in British constitutional law as a foreign
jurisdiction under the Crown.384 Foreign jurisdictions are a separate legal
category from dominions and colonies in British law.385 The Foreign
Jurisdiction Act, 1890386 was a declaratory act about the distribution of
power between Parliament and the royal prerogatives in foreign colonies
over indigenous peoples. It affirmed the continuing exercise of Her
Majesty's prerogative jurisdiction consistent with the terms of the treaties
of protection with indigenous nations.38 7 These protectorates or protected
states created by prerogative acts were considered a "foreign county".388
382. Royal Instructions of December 9, 1771, Governor Belcher 1772 Proclamation, 1773
Proclamation, supra note 202 at 285-89. See supra notes 260 and 262. New South Wales v.
Commonwealth ofAustralia (1975), 135 C.A.R. 337 at 388 and 490; R. v. Kent Justices, [1967]
1 All ER 560 at 564.
383. For the English law of future interest at the time of the treaties, see Bacon, Maximus,
reg. 14.
384. "Constitutional Law" 8 Halsbury's Law, supra note 352 atparas. 889-1082; 6Halsbury's
Law, ibid. paras. 806 and 981.
385. 6 Halsbury's Laws, ibid. describes a foreign jurisdiction as "a territory, outside Her
Majesty's dominions, for whose international relations Her Majesty's government is respon-
sible is styled a 'protectorate' or protected state." In a protectorate the Crown acquires
jurisdiction exercisable by virtue of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. The preamble of the Act
provides that acquisition of legislative jurisdiction in a protectorate is by treaty, grant or other
lawful means. In the sense of section 16 of the this Act, a protectorate or protected state was
a "foreign county".
386. Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890 (U.K.) 53 & 54 Vict., c. 37, original enactment 6 & 7
Vict. c. 94 (1843); In a protectorate the Crown acquires jurisdiction exercisable, by virtue of
the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. The preamble of the Act provides that acquisition of legislative
jurisdiction in a protectorate is by treaty, grant or other lawful means. In the sense of section
16 of this Act, a protectorate or protected state was a "foreign county". See also Calvin's Case,
supra note 18; sections 132 and 129 of Constitution Act, 1867; Thompson and Story JJ.'s
dissenting opinion in Cherokee Nation, supra note 249 at 49ff that the Cherokees composed
a foreign state in the Law of Nations and within the sense and meaning of the constitution.
387. Foreign Jurisdiction Act, ibid. at s. 1. The exercise of prerogative power within foreign
jurisdictions was limited by the doctrine of continuity of law and property. Supra note 173.
388. Ibid. at s. 16.
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The Act instructed the British judiciary to interpret every prerogative
action performed pursuant to this unique jurisdiction as valid, thus
limiting the supremacy of the Parliament to pass inconsistent legisla-
tion.389 This Act affirms the Mfkmaq Compact and prerogative legislation
within British constitutional law. As distinct legal categories from the
republican and colonial tradition of parliamentary or responsible govern-
ment, the Act also immunizes the Mfkmaw Nation from all authority
derived from the Imperial Parliament's usual competency in the domin-
ions and colonies or over subjects.
The prerogative Legislation reserving and protecting Mfkmaw lands,
liberties, and properties cannot be interpreted as annexing the territory to
either the Crown or any colonial province or the dominion of Canada.
This establishes a crucial constitutional fact. Together the 1771 Instruc-
tion and 1773 Proclamation establish Mfkmaq lands as an acknowledged
and protected 'dominium' or territorial sovereign in its own right. In
1910, in The King v. Earl of Crewe. Ex parte Sikgome,39 the King's
Bench held that until Her Majesty and the Imperial Parliament and the
local chiefs agreed to a consensual annexation of a territory protected by
a prerogative Treaty, the territory remained a foreign country to the
surrounding dominions even though it was administered solely by
servants of Her Majesty. In analyzing the existing relations to the
Crown's authority in a dominion and a foreign jurisdiction, Kennedy L.J.
stated:
what the idea of a protectorate excludes, and the idea of annexation on the
other hand includes is the absolute ownership [in the Crown] which was
signified by the word 'dominium' in Roman law, and which, though
perhaps not quite satisfactory, is sometimes described as a territorial
sovereignty. 91
389. Ibid. at s. 3. This is a special law, parallel to An Act to Remove Doubts as to the Validity
of Colonial Law, 28 & 29 Vict., c. 63 (1865).
390. [1910] 2 K.B. 576.
391. Ibid. at 619. Later, Lord Chancellor Shelborne reached the same conclusion. He stated:
"Annexation is the direct assumption of territorial sovereignty. Protectorate is the recognition
of the rights of the aboriginal or actual inhabitants of their own country, with no further
assumption of territorial right than is necessary to maintain the paramount authority and
discharge the duties of protecting power. In such a case, the measure of the protectorate, if
assumed or asserted in general terms, would probably be the extent of territory occupied or
inhabited by the races or tribes whom we have taken into our possession, for the coastline inland
until some natural or tribal boundary was reached." A.D. McNair, International Law Opinions,
selected andannotated (Cambridge: University Press, 1956) at 289-90; Memorandum of Lord
Chancellor Shelborne, Secretrary of State (30 January 1885). See 1883 draft of Proclamation
of protectorate and Annexation (McNair, ibid. 293-94).
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Central to an understanding of the distinct process of protectorates and
annexation is the issue of a juridical state and a territorial sovereign. A
foreign state or jurisdiction, judicially considered, consists in its being
under a different jurisdiction or government, without any reference to its
geographical position.392 The Mawiomi's delegation of authority to the
British Sovereign in the Compact vastly limited the nature and scope of
British authority in Mfkmiki. Together the Georgian Compacts and
prerogative legislation established firm constitutional limitations on the
competence of the Legislative Assembly outside the settlements. When
the colonies are spoken of as provinces, reference is to their political or
administrative capacity, and not to any proprietary capacity.3 93 Thus, to
the Crown it was not perceived as inconsistent to have the reserved
Hunting Grounds of Mlkmdki within the political jurisdiction of one or
many colonies.
Until the Constitution Act, 1982,394 no prerogative legislation formally
incorporated the reserved tenures with the domestic realm of England or
the colonies or dominions of British North America. From this perspec-
tive, it becomes clearer why the Supreme Court of Canada characterized
Aboriginal title as sui generis. The reserved Mfkmaw tenure in the
treaties was of its own kind of class in English land law. By the
Constitution Act, 1982, the Compact and its liberties were recognized and
protected by Canadian law. The Compact was affirmed as limiting to
other Imperial acts establishing the conventions of responsible govern-
ment under the supremacy of law provisions.
3. English Domestic Land Law
Separate from prerogative legislation, the classic theory of the common
law would affirm aboriginal tenure as an allodial tenure. At the time of the
Mikmaw Compact, the classic theory of English common law held that
law was an expression of a deeper reality found in custom remembered
and observed or ancient collections of unwritten maxims and customs,
which were merely discovered and publicly declared by judges.3 95
Blackstone's Commentaries96 and Hale's History 397did not trace English
392. See Cherokee Nation, supra note 249 at 54-58.
393. Ibid. at 54-55. For example, there are still no clearly established prerogative boundaries
between Nova Scotia and New Brunswick in the written Constitution of Canada.
394. Supra note 1.
395. Blackstone, supra note 19, vol. I at 17,64 and 68; Sir M. Hale, A History of the Common
Law, 3d ed. by C.M. Gray (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971) at 17.
396. Ibid.
397. Supra note 395.
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law back to a priori first principles, but rather they located it within the
living body of law and traced its historical development. Common law
rested ultimately on general use and acceptance, the only way to show that
a given rule is a rule of common law was by showing how it figures
regularly in standard legal argument or tradition, use, and experience.3 98
The authority of any rules existed only insofar as they were used or relied
upon. This theory was consistent with the respect the treaties with the
Mikmaq accorded Aboriginal tenure and rights.399
The common law of England, derived from feudalism, acknowledged
descent or inherited authority over land as the domestic model of land
tenure. In contrast, personal effort by the Imperial Crown was the
international model for acquisitions of foreign jurisdictions or territo-
ries."° Personal effort comprised both purchase and conquest. Either
method gave extensive prerogatives to the Crown with respect to ac-
quired foreign jurisdictions or territories. In either method the title
acquired by personal effort was a derivative title, not an original title.
40'
Since the King could not acquire title to America through inheritance,
acquisition of Aboriginal title had to be through personal effort. The
translation of personal effort into purchase or conquest has created some
perplexity. In the fifteenth century, Littleton defined "purchase" as the
possession a man has, not by descent but ... "per son fait, ou per
agreement.' '40 2 In the seventeenth century Sir Edward Coke in his
Commentary on Littleton translated "purchase" to mean by deed or
agreement. Coke stated expressly what Littleton had not: that a gift was
also a purchase. Blackstone in his Commentaries rounded out the ratio-
nalization of Littleton by explaining that one who receives a gift "comes
to the estate by his own agreement, that is, he consents to the gift. '4 3 In
addition, Blackstone asserts that title by conquest was one method of
purchase.' He noted the Celtic word for "purchase" in Scottish law405 ,
398. Ibid. at 17 and 68.
399. NcNeil, supra note 24. "Qui prior est Temporepotior estjure" ("he [sic] has the better
title who was first in point of time"), Coke, supra note 93 at 14a.
400. Calvin's Case, supra note 18 at 17a and 18a.
401. Western Sahara, supra note 274.
402. Sir T. Littleton, Tenures, trans. in Coke, supra note 93.
403. Coke, ibid. at 4a. With gift included, the special sense of law 'French purchase' is
divorced alike from ancient etymology ("personal effort") and from the layman's understand-
ing of purchase ("pay something").
404. Blackstone, supra note 19, vol. 2 at 243; L.C. Warmington, ed., Stephen's Commentar-
ies on the Laws of England, 21 st ed. (London: Butterworths, 1950) vol. 1 at 355; E.A. Freeman,
The History of the Norman Conquest of England (Toronto: J. Campbell & Son, 1877) vol. 2
at 626; W.M. Spelman, Glossarium Archaiologicum (1687) under "conquest".
405. Blackstone, ibid. There is some controversy about this position. See Oxford English
Dictionary, under "conquest".
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as well as the French root of "conquest", and rejects the idea of military
"conquest" for the legal idea of "purchase." As for English law, "pur-
chase" and "conquest" were blended terms. Conquest was not an issue of
brute force.4 °6
From the legal concept of personal effort came the concept of treaties
of cession as a third method for acquiring territory. 4 7 Later, a fourth
method of acquiring foreign territory was by peaceful settlement and
birthright, if the territory was waste or desert or unoccupied.40 8 The
particular nature of each acquisition determined the scope of protection
of the law of existing land rights, but in any of these situations there were
legal constraints on the Crown's actions.
An example of the common law's classic quandary about customary
land rights in foreign jurisdictions in relation to changes in sovereignty
in Great Britain is Calvin's Case.4° The English court asserted that if the
Crown inherited in a territory, the local law (lex loci) survived the change
in sovreignty, thereby protezting pr-exxisting rights of tht iRhabitants 4 10
The effect of this rule was that since a King (such as James VI of Scotland
becoming James I of England) succeeded to the new kingdom by
operation of law, the King could not alter the existing law of the inherited
Kingdom to suit himself or to be inconsistent with the laws of the old
kingdom.41' Thus after the accession of James I, Englishmen retained
their own laws and Scottish laws were not imposed on them and vice
versa. A new King had no greater prerogatives than his predecessor, and
was bound by the rule of law.
The same principles applied to land acquired by conquest, the pre-
existing rights of the inhabitants continued through a presumption of the
rule of law. The King, as military conqueror, was not bound to respect
those rights under the local law, unless they had been recognized in the
articles of capitulation or prerogative legislation. Still the Crown's
authority in making laws for the conquered territories was curtailed by
principles of natural justice and equity in making laws for the acquired
territories. 411 Moreover, in the absence of treaties, articles of capitulation
406. Sir Edward Coke conceptualized "conquest" of infidels in Calvin's Case by stating that
there need be no wars of fire and sword (supra note 93 at 17a).
407. McNeil, supra note 24 at 108; Barsh, supra note 163.
408. McNeil, supra note 24 at 134.
409. Supra note 18.
410. Ibid.
411. Ibid. at 18a.
412. Ibid. at 17a-18a. In Campbell, supra note 168 at 848, Lord Mansfield rejected the
distinction between Christians and infidels and held that in any conquest, the laws of that
kingdom continued in force until altered by the King. Any alteration of the existing law would
have to be consistent with the principles in the British Constitution.
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or prerogative legislation, the Crown never had absolute discretion to
disrupt the customary traditions, whether or not it introduced the domes-
tic common law in the foreign jurisdiction or colony." 3 The doctrine of
continuity of existing law, derived from the element of custom as law in
the common law, became the constitutional law of English colonization
in "dominions not parcels of the realm".
4 14
By the terms of Compact and treaties with the Mfkmaq, the Crown did
not have any authority to unilaterally seize the lands contrary to law. This
principle was adopted in the leading British case on colonization in 1774,
Campbell v. Hall, where Lord Mansfield held "the articles of capitulation
upon which the country is surrendered, and the articles of peace by which
it is ceded, are sacred and inviolable according to their true intent and
meanings. ' '415 In 1820, Chitty in his treaties of the law of the prerogatives
could state: "Nor can the King legally disregard or violate the articles in
which the country is surrendered or ceded; but such articles are sacred and
inviolable, according to their true intent and meaning. '4 6 The existence
of Compact and treaties established the first principles of the foreign
jurisdictions.
Under the classic principles of the common law and prerogatives of the
King, on the acquisition of territorial jurisdiction in North America under
the discovery theory of treaties, the Aboriginal peoples and their imme-
morial customs remain the controlling law of the land if an "alien friend
that is in league". Mfkmaw customs as expressions or manifestations of
commonly shared values and continuity with past experience were
protected by the Crown as distinct jurisdictions of tenures and laws. By
the Compact, these customary laws became vested rights as a matter of
English law. 17 These existing Aboriginal rights did not need to be
recognized by the Crown,4 18 but when they were recognized in a Treaty
or Act they became authentic instructions to the colonial authorities and
vested rights in British and Mlfkmaw laws.
In the Mfkmaw context, the Compact and prerogative legislation
prevented the application of the notion of conquest and English domestic
land law to the reserved Mfkcmaw tenure. The Compact established an
"alien friend in league" or nation to nation relationship been the Sante
413. Campbell, ibid. See Smith, supra note 192 at 467-69.
414. Smith, ibid. note 191 at 468.
415. Supra note 168 at 208.
416. Supra note 173 at 29.
417. Ibid. at 17a; Campbell, supra note 168; Worcester, supra note 5. See also the liberties
of the subjects 8 Halsbury's Laws, supra note 352 at para. 828.
418. Calder, supra note 5.
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Mawfomi and the Sovereign which reserved all Mflkmaw territory to the
Mawfomi and placed that territory under its foreign jurisdictions as a
protected nation. Since the King did not receive any derivative title from
the Sant6 Mawiomi in the Compact, neither the Crown nor its agents
could transfer any interest to the English settlers. Without a treaty cession
from the Mawiomi, neither the King nor his Governor could grant any
valid royal estates or interest to British immigrants to reserved allodial
tenure of the Mfkmaq.4 19 Prerogative Legislation affirms the same
conclusions.
Conclusion
Although our law is prisoner of its history, it is not now bound by decisions
of courts in the hierarchy of an Empire then concerned with the develop-
ment of its colonies.. .. If it were permissible in past centuries to keep the
common law in step with international law, it is imperative in today's
world that the common law should neither be nor seen to be frozen in an
age of racial discrimination.
Justice Brennan42
Decolonizing Canadian law requires a new analysis of property law
and Aboriginal title precedents.42 It requires an understanding of the false
superiority of colonial legal thought that is built into existing precedents.
It requires a legal theory that is not comprised of racist assumptions. It
cannot be assumed that British law automatically applies to North
America because the Indian had no law or property systems. Such an
assumption is built on supremacist colonial theory. A decolonizing legal
system requires a departure from law as an artifact of Eurocentric society,
to take into account the legal history of the actual dialogue and agree-
ments between the nations and discovering the obvious.
Under section 35(l) of the Constitution Act, 1982, the field of Indian
law has been refocused to Aboriginal rights and prerogative Treaties. All
419. See Royal Commission of 1749, supra notes 171-72.
420. Mabo, supra note 64, A.L.R. at 18-19.
421. J.R. Ponting, Arduous Journey: Canadian Indians and Decolonization (Toronto:
McCelland and Stewart, 1986); P. Moynihan, "The Decolonization of Modem Law: Disman-
tling the Relations between Race and Law" (1993) 8 Can. J.L. & Soc. 191; J.R. Ponting, "The
Native American Struggle: Conquering the Rule of Law. A Colloquium" (1993) 20 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change 199; R.N. Clinton, "Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision
Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law" (1993) 46 Ark. L. Rev. 77. J. Fish, "Law as a
Means and as an End: Some Remarks on the Function of European and Non-European Law in
the Process of European Expansion" in W.J. Mommsen & J.A. De Moor, European Expansion
and Law: The Encounter of European and Indigenous Law in the 19th and 20th Century (New
York: Berg, 1992) at 15; R.A. Williams, "Columbus's Legacy: Law as an Instrument of Racial
Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples' Right of Self-Determination" (1991) 9 Ariz. J.
Int'l & Comp. L. 51.
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legislation is to be constitutionally measured by these old rights. To
understand whether legislation is compatible or inconsistent with Ab-
original or Treaty rights, it is essential to reach back to contexts of
Aboriginal dominion, worldview, and language.
In the post-colonial era, we can give constitutional force to these old
laws. The Supreme Court of Canada has resurrected aboriginal tenures
and rights, and reaffirmed treaty rights. Moreover, it has established that
the Crown is under an equitable duty, enforceable in courts, to determine
whether a prerogative power has been exercised in good faith in accor-
dance with its fiduciary duties. It has reversed the colonial precedent and
pronouncement that the Crown's duty was only political or moral.422
Prior to 1982, Aboriginal and Treaty rights were compromised or
ignored by the courts. The courts had no authority to challenge the federal
Parliament's action. Now in the post-colonial order of Canada, these
rights have been recognized as having full constitutional authority as well
as being an integral part of unwritten federal common law operating in the
constitution of Canada.423 Thus, they are actionable against the Crown
and generate judicial remedies and damages. 424
The Aboriginal nations, as illustrated by the Mikmaw Compact with
the Crown, are the source of title to their unsold territory in Atlantic
Canada. All the land is held allodially by the Mawiomi under Aboriginal
dominion. Justice Lamer has clearly stated in Sioui:
The British Crown recognized that the Indians had certain ownership
rights over their land.... [and] allowed them autonomy in their internal
affairs, intervening in this era as little as possible.42
The Wabanaki and Mfkmaw Compacts describe and affirm this general
principle. The reservation of their Aboriginal territories and lands in these
422. St. Catharines Milling, supra note 5 at 649 cited to S.C.R. Justice Taschereau stated "The
Indians must in the future ... be treated with the same considerations for their just claims and
demands that they have received in the past, but as in the past, it will not be because of any legal
obligation to do so, but as a sacred political obligation in the execution of which the State must
be free from judicial control." See also Ontario (A.G.) v. Canada (A.G.) (1895), 25 S.C.R. 434,
aff'd (1897), A.C. 199 (H.L.); Cayuga Indian Case (1926), 6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 173. These
cases arose at the height of colonial thought.
423, Wilson J. in Roberts v. Canada (1989), 1 S.C.R. 322 at 340. The Supreme Court of
Canada had previously established that common laws of Canada that fall within the jurisdiction
of federal Parliaments are paramount to provincial law (Bisaillon v. Keable, [ 1983] 2 S.C.R.
60, at 108). This judicial decision creates greater autonomy for Aboriginal and Treaty rights
than section 88 of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5.
424. Sparrow, supra note 20.
425. Supra note 245, C.N.L.R. at 1055. The Court followed Worcester precedents that Great
Britain established the policy of considering the Indians as protected nations under obligations
of treaties that inhabited a territory from which al] others were excluded (at 1054-55).
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Compacts established the basis for retaining Aboriginal rights and served
as the guardian of their liberties against Crown intrusion.
It is difficult to conceive of the Sant6 Mawfomi or any Mfkmaq ever
silently surrendering, to the Imperial Crown or settlers, the context in
which they liv ed. The Mawiomi assign seven generations of responsibili-
ties for the use of the land or space and thus define a long-term
relationship with the land. Their relationship with land is the worldview
that has always defined their identity, their langscape, their spiritual
ecology, and their reality. The cession or purchase of the land, the rights
of future generations, was never contemplated in the Compact. The sale
of their land of friendships never became an issue in the Compact,
because the protection and reservation of the land for the future genera-
tion was the elusive and operational context of the Sant6 Mawfomi.
Although the British Crown may have an international and ultimate
preemptive interest in Aboriginal territory against other European nations
and people, this future interest has no effect on Aboriginal dominion. The
power of Aboriginal nations to enter into international Compacts and
Treaties does not by itself affect its territorial sovereignty. All legitimate
British authority in North America is derived from the Compact and Treaties
with the Aboriginal nations. Thus, any Crown authority over the Aboriginal
nations is limited to the actual scope of their treaty delegations. If no authority
or power has been delegated to the Crown, this power must be interpreted as
reserved to the Aboriginal nations. If the Treaties have recognized and
affirmed an Aboriginal tenure or right of the Mfkmaw nation, this right has
become vested in the constitutional law of Great Britain and Canada. Tenure
became the birthright of each generation of Mfkmaq.
Mfkmaw tenure is more than an expectation interest which the Crown
acquired from the Mawfomi. Through the prerogative Compact, treaties
and legislation, Mikmaq tenure became a vested constitutional, legal and
equitable right to the present and future enjoyment of their land.
The Mfkmaw Nation had every right to rely on the Crown's promises
that it intended to respect their tenure protected under their Compact and
Treaties. They were entitled by the Compact to assert their dominion over
their ancestral lands as a legal right, a civil right. They were entitled to
have their settled expectations transformed into positive constitutional
laws creating reliance-based rights. A fundamental principle of British
law is that courts will assume that the British Crown iltends that the right
of property of the inhabitants of any newly ceded territory will be fully
respected.4
26
426. Oyekan v. Adele, [1957] 2 All E.R. 785 at 788 (P.C.), see supra note 173.
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Consequently, colonial administration or regulation of these protected
tenures or rights, either provincially or federally, cannot legally extin-
guish this distinct legal realm or the reserved tenure, since such action
would be violative of the fundamental constitutional regime of Great
Britain and ultra vires.42 7 An Act which is inconsistent with the Consti-
tution of Canada cannot become law, since its radical invalidity remains
with the act until it is either repealed or struck down.
428
Furthermore, the passage of time cannot validate an unconstitutional
statute.429 To make the contrary suggestion of implied extinguishment of
vested Mfkmaq tenure because of unauthorized colonial settlements is to
attempt to enshrine the perverse notion that vested rights are not to be
legally protected in precisely those situations when protection is essen-
tial. Aboriginal and Treaty rights do not cease to exist because the
Crown's servants fail to secure them. It is now essential to turn our minds
to the issue of remedies for those who have been victimized by centuries
of illegal and colonialist conduct.
427. See Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 at 744 (discussion of the
relationship between section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 and section 2 of the Colonial
Law Validity Act, supra note 389).
428. Manitoba (A.G.) v. Metro Stores (MTS) Ltd., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110 at 132; P.A.TA. v.
Canada (A.G.), [1931] A.C. 310 at 313.
429. Supra note 356.
